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1. Introduction: Envisioning Future War 
Daniel Moran 
 
The workshop whose proceedings are presented here was convened to provide the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) with insight into the way war in the intermediate future, meaning the 
next twenty years or so, is viewed from the perspective of America’s allies, partners, and potential 
adversaries. The group took as its starting point two works by the NIC: Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World, which seeks to identify emerging economic, social, geopolitical, and other forces 
that will shape the future security environment; and a more specialized study entitled Tomorrow’s 
Security Challenges: The Defense Implications of Emerging Global Trends, which draws specific inferences 
from these trends with respect to defense organization, strategic planning, and the conduct of war.1 
These documents served as read-ahead material for all the contributors, who were asked to consider 
how the issues they posed were viewed from elsewhere in the world, either in general or with respect 
to a range of specialized issues (cyber war, irregular warfare, access and area denial, nuclear 
proliferation, humanitarian intervention) of particular concern to the United States. 
The general theme of the workshop was the influence of global economic, technological, 
demographic, and other trends on the likely forms that international violence will take in years to 
come. Tomorrow’s Security Challenges, prepared for the DoD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
proposed four alternative scenarios that, should they come to pass, will represent significant shifts 
from today’s global security environment. These four scenarios provide four alternative contexts in 
which the future of warfare may be considered. They can be summarized as follows: 
• The Concert of Powers scenario describes a future in which the growing number of powerful states 
strengthens the international community’s ability to deal with future security challenges, creating 
opportunities for the United States and its allies to forge new multilateral security partnerships. 
• The Fragmented International System scenario postulates a security environment in which the 
diffusion of global power makes it more difficult for the international community to achieve 
consensus on managing global security challenges such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and 
energy security. 
• The Rise of Non-state Networks scenario envisions a future in which the dispersion of power and 
authority away from nation-states gives rise to a myriad of security challenges involving sub-
national and transnational entities. 
• In the Return of Great Power Confrontations scenario, the future security environment is defined by 
increasing competition between rising and status quo global powers for resources, markets, and 
influence. 
Each of these scenarios poses distinct security challenges for all states in the international system. 
These challenges will in turn drive strategic requirements, defense budgets, alliance relationships, and 
military capabilities in diverging directions. It was well understood by all contributors that none of 
these “alternative” futures will actually unfold as hypothesized, and also that they are not mutually 
exclusive. Each is basically a thought experiment intended to identify critical pressures on the future 
                                                
1 Global Trends 2025 can be found at http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html. Tomorrow’s Secuirty Challenges 
appears as Appendix A of these proceedings. 
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conduct of war. Up to now, these thought experiments have been conducted chiefly from the point 
of view of the United States. The aim of this workshop was to broaden the terms of the experiment, 
by considering these alternative futures as they might be viewed by other important international 
actors. 
Within that framework, workshop participants were asked to keep four generic questions in mind as 
they addressed their particular topics: 
• What features of war and warfare in the present can we expect to persist into the future, and 
which can we expect to fade or transform into something new? 
• What current, emerging, or foreseeable social, economic, and political trends, within and beyond 
the traditional security arena, will drive changes in warfare and conflict over the next 15-20 years? 
• How is American thinking on the evolution of modern warfare perceived internationally? 
• What new concepts and doctrine for future warfare are emerging among current and prospective 
violent actors (both states and non-states) around the world? 
• The remarks below are not intended to anticipate or summarize the contributions that comprise 
the remainder of this report, but to highlight some of the themes that bind them together. As 
will be apparent, all the contributors approached their task in a spirit of cautious self-confidence, 
based on some shared assumptions that are worth making explicit: 
• The past is, within limits, a useful guide to the future. 
• The basic character of the world system over the next twenty years will depend mainly on the 
conduct of its strongest members. 
• The preservation of global order is critically dependent on the continued health, increasing 
integration, and responsible management, of the world economy. 
By way of introduction, each of these deserves some preliminary comment. 
 
The Modernization of the Future 
It is surprising how many works in security studies begin with the claim that the future is uncertain, 
and more so than it used to be. This claim often turns on false memories of the Cold War, when 
world politics is sometimes imagined to have boiled itself down to a well-understood process of 
stately bilateral confrontation. On that basis the whole idea might simply be dismissed as foolishness. 
Viewed more generally, however, it is an observation worth pondering. Strictly speaking the future is 
always unknown, and no more so at one time than another. Yet there is no question that attitudes 
toward the future, the extent to which it is viewed with complacency, eagerness, or apprehension, 
have varied a good deal. 
For most of human history people have tended to assume that both the past and the future 
resembled the present, and that human existence played out against an unchanging background 
defined by nature, divine providence, or some other power beyond humanity’s ken. There have, 
however, been times when people have believed the past was better than the present, and that 
mankind should do its best recover the wisdom it had lost. The European Renaissance was such a 
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period. The so-called scientific revolution that followed, whose methods were inspired by the more 
inquisitive attitude toward the historical record that the Renaissance exemplified, reversed this 
attitude. New modes of thought emphasizing dispassionate inquiring and universal theory promised 
a future that would be better than the present, if only the inherited errors of the past could be 
overcome. 
More recently, the confident expectation of progress that modern science seemed to promise has 
been modified by the actual experience of life lived amidst increasingly rapid social and technological 
change. Modernity has not proven to be a steady march toward a better future, but a hard and 
unexpectedly violent struggle to adapt to circumstances in which, as Karl Marx foresaw, “all that is 
solid melts into air.” Attitudes toward both the past and the future have accordingly become 
ambivalent and inconsistent. People still expect to learn from the past, and have been admonished 
by George Santayana that a failure to learn its “lessons” will condemn them to repeat the course. Yet 
“dwelling on the past” or (worse) “living” in it, are always bad things, as is “fighting the last war.” 
People mostly spend their time thinking about the future: what they will do, what they hope for, 
what they fear. But all they really know, all they have to go on, is the past, which no one expects to 
happen again. 
Modern attitudes toward the future are thus marked by strong apprehensions of discontinuity, 
moderated by a residual confidence that humanity does possess cognitive and technical resources 
that give it a fair chance of improving its lot, if only they are applied correctly. In the realm of 
strategic planning, which is the concern of this workshop, these competing outlooks have long-since 
resolved themselves into a desire to avoid surprise through the application of systematic information 
gathering and analysis. It is primarily toward this end that military planning staffs and intelligence 
agencies have striven for the last century and a half. It has proven a surprisingly thankless task. As 
can easily be shown, none of the major geopolitical events associated with the cold war—including 
its transformative conclusion—were foreseen by the intelligence agencies of the major powers. Such 
short-comings are now routinely deprecated as “intelligence failures,” a phrase that is threatening to 
become the all-purpose explanation for why, in politics, things often go wrong. 
What the phrase actually reveals is a misunderstanding of what we can realistically expect from our 
efforts to foresee the future. There is, first of all, an element of circularity in the problem that must 
be acknowledged: surprising events are, by definition, events that defy our expectations. More 
broadly, however unfathomable such episodes may seem while they are being experienced, in 
retrospect they are always freighted with an enormous load of historical contingency, turning upon a 
range of choices, personalities, and local conditions that could just as easily have turned out 
differently. To say that any given surprise might have been avoided may be true. But to imagine that 
surprise itself can be overcome—and with it one of the defining features of modern life—is to defy 
an overwhelming historical record, and perhaps the limits of human knowledge itself. 
This project is not about avoiding surprise. It is about correctly contextualizing it, so that when it 
occurs—and it will—our chances of mastering it will be improved. The value of such improved 
understanding should not be exaggerated. There are waves that the winds push, and there are tides 
that the moon pulls. Both can be studied, and must be. Yet it is a fact that the wind can change 
direction in ways that the best science cannot foresee. It is also a fact, as every sailor knows, that the 
waves can sink you even if the tide is setting in your favor. Nevertheless, the tides are worth 
studying too. This project has much to say about the waves that roil today’s politics; but in the end 
its subject is the tides. 
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Global Power and Global Order 
Ocean tides have proven more amenable to systematic investigation than waves because people have 
realized that tidal movements are determined by the orbit of the moon. But what if there is no moon? 
Or many moons? Not the least difference between social and natural science is that, metaphorically 
speaking, finding the moon is a lot harder in politics than it is in astronomy. Even so, all the 
contributors to this project accept that the preeminent gravitational force shaping global politics in 
the intermediate future will arise from the interests, conduct, and values of the strongest states in the 
international system. In this they have placed themselves firmly on the side of those who believe the 
future will resemble the past. Yet there are also features of the present that are unusual in historical 
terms, and worth noting for that reason. 
There have been few if any periods in the past when global power has been distributed as 
incongruously as it is today. At present the military capabilities of the United States are unmatched 
by any plausible combination of other powers, and are likely to remain so for decades to come. For 
the rest of the world, military planning is dominated by the requirements of maintaining local order 
(which can be considerable), and by the prosecution of parochial rivalries over territory, irredentist 
populations, and so on. Beyond that, all that remains is the problem of adapting to American 
strength—by obtaining nuclear weapons (Iran, North Korea) or devising niche capabilities (China) 
designed to hold the US at bay; by maintaining amiable relations despite hard feelings about failing 
to do one’s share (nearly all current American allies except the UK); or by trusting that America’s 
sobering experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan will dissuade it from using force against countries 
unable to defend themselves except by throwing the bodies of their people in the way of American 
forces. 
This unprecedented distribution of military power contrasts markedly with the rapidly increasing and 
equally unprecedented diffusion of global wealth. This is not to suggest that we face a future in 
which the conditions of rich and poor will converge—in human terms the opposite appears to be 
the case—but rather that the international system is becoming increasingly populated by states who 
have consciously or implicitly chosen to maintain military capabilities far below their inherent 
capacities. The European Union, a treaty organization whose members collectively comprise the 
world’s largest economy, is the outstanding example of this, but not the only one. Excluding the 
United States, global military spending has been declining for years, despite the fact that the world 
can now afford more “defense” than ever. The optimistic, and arguably the most plausible, 
interpretation of this development is that it reflects the marginalization of war itself, at least from the 
point of advanced societies, who may be reaching the conclusion that they have little to hope for 
from the use of force, and also (more problematically) little to fear. 
It is at any rate striking that, among the alternative futures that provided the starting point for this 
project, the one that came in for the least attention among workshop contributors was the “concert 
of powers.” This neglect was not owed to any expectation of great power conflict (a scenario that 
was almost equally neglected), but rather from the perception that there are no “powers” (plural) to 
concert. Conversely, the scenario that cast the longest shadow over the workshop’s proceedings was 
“fragmentation,” a condition that would arise if one or more strong states were to decide that 
prevailing forms of political and economic interaction had become disadvantageous to it. In this 
context the most likely protagonist—perhaps the only plausible one—is China, whose historical 
traditions are not conducive to multilateralism and collective security, but whose recent, trade-driven 
economic growth is pushing it firmly toward increasing engagement with, and commitment to, the 
world system. Exactly how this contest among Chinese cultural habits and economic interests will 
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play out is one of the two outstanding questions whose answers will define the basic structure of 
global politics. 
The other is how much longer the United States can continue to play the role of systemic guardian 
and guarantor, and what will happen when it finally lays its burden down. Pax Americana was not 
among the alternative futures the contributors to this project were asked to consider. On the 
contrary, all realistic conceptions of the global future recognize that American power must wane in 
relative terms. Judging the limits of its willingness to play the constabulary role that it has assumed in 
recent years will undoubtedly challenge the good judgment of the rest of the world. Absent an 
obvious and worthy successor (as the United States provided to Great Britain), new institutions to 
promote and enforce international cooperation will be called for. It is hard to imagine such 
innovation occurring absent American leadership. Failure to provide it will leave its legacy in 
uncertain hands. 
 
Globalization and its Enemies 
It will be apparent from the preceding discussion that, however essential military power remains to 
the maintenance of global order, it does not constitute the essential glue of global politics. That glue 
has been provided, for some time now, by the progressive integration of the world economy, a 
process that (to speak in measurable economic terms) began in the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, was interrupted by the world wars, and resumed in the early 1950s. It has accelerated 
decisively since the end of the Cold War, whose ideological shibboleths presented a modest but 
palpable obstacle to its progress. Economic integration is in turn at the heart of the more general 
and nebulous process of “globalization,” a term encompassing the increasingly unrestrained 
international movement of money, goods, information, and (more ominously to some) people. 
No one doubts that the increasing volume and speed of transnational activity pose risks to its 
participants. Globalization affords its beneficiaries new means of harassing, surveilling, and harming 
each other, deliberately or not. Significant risks can attach to such actions, particularly in the 
economic sphere. The line between hard bargaining and strategic coercion can be surprisingly faint, 
and mistaking its location has proven calamitous in the past. Economic decisions, once made, can 
generally be unmade, with penalties for foolishness or overreaching paid in arrears. Such decisions 
acquire a different character, however, when market participants attempt to use their market 
position in lieu of force, to coerce a result that the market itself refuses to produce. Such actions, 
like the use of force directly, can acquire a finality unknown to other spheres of public life. The 
extent to which economic integration may entail strategic risk, or invite strategic risk-taking, has 
been well recognized since the end of the First World War. Nothing in present circumstances should 
be mistaken for evidence that this risk can safely be ignored. 
Nevertheless, contributors to this workshop remain convinced that, within the period they have 
been asked to consider, recourse to war is less likely to occur among the beneficiaries of 
globalization than among those who have been left out of it, whether from political incapacity, 
cultural resistance, or simply because they have nothing to trade. That the advanced world should 
seek to craft policies to encourage the integration of those left behind is too obvious to require 
much comment. The more difficult question is how, and how far, it should intervene to discourage 
recourse to war on the periphery of the system, either from fear that it will spread toward the center, 
or in response to the qualms that such atavistic and transgressive violence may arouse in world 
opinion. 
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The contemporary preponderance of “irregular” warfare, terrorism, massacre, and so on, is partly 
owed to the fact the other kinds of war have lately retired from the scene. War now arises almost 
exclusively in regions where even the regular forces of organized states possess only limited capacity 
for sustained conventional operations. Since 1945, war has never pitted two genuinely capable 
belligerents against each other; though it has sometimes brought the weak and the strong onto the 
same battlefield, often to the frustration of the strong. It is possible that this spectacle, however 
disheartening, may simply be further evidence that war’s value as an instrument of policy is now so 
steeply discounted by advanced societies, compared to the other instruments at their disposal, that it 
is of interest only to the disappointed and the marginalized. There are some, however, who fear that, 
by a malign quirk of fate, the weak will inherit—or at any rate consume—the earth that the strong 
have made. 
Even the weak may now obtain weapons of immense destructiveness, most ominously nuclear and 
biological, but also conventional arms in sufficient quantity to pose a grave threat to the civil 
populations, if not to the armed forces, of advanced countries—not to mention the people on 
whose behalf they purport to fight. Western armies puzzle over how large a share of their resources 
and mental energy they should devote to the suppression of such fighting. Their task is complicated 
by the knowledge that the stakes for their own societies in such conflicts are in most instances 
(Israel being the obvious exception) liable to be so low as to subvert the political will to accept, and 
inflict, the suffering that will always be involved. This complex calculus is a source of strategic 
leverage for the enemies of global order, who take for granted the reluctance of the guardians of 
order to use the overwhelming power at their disposal. This can be a dangerous bet, as anyone who 
has seen a photograph of Dresden in the spring of 1945 will know. Yet it is one that has paid off in 
the past, and will presumably continue to do so from time to time, as long as international violence 
remains confined to the margins of the system; and as long as the stakes really do remain low. 
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Future Warfare: Possible Developments from a European Perspective 
Dirk Rogalski and Karsten Struß 
 
Optimism is most usually the effect of an intellectual error. 
                                             -- Howard Q. Quint 
 
Although the quotation above by Howard Q. Quint is taken out of context, it indicates what might 
happen if our analysis of potential future developments proves incorrect. An analysis that ignores 
certain developments and potential future risks might find us caught by surprise and left unprepared 
to counter new threats. This paper is laid out to outline the European view on how the security 
environment might change in an increasingly globalized and multi-polar world, and how that might 
impact the future of warfare in the next fifteen to twenty years.  
When we say “European View” we do not intend to claim that we speak for Europe in any official 
capacity. What we would like to share with you is our own interpretation of European strategic 
documents and scholarly work on this issue. The two main documents we consulted are the 
European Security Strategy 2003 with its 2008 Implementation Report, and the European Defense Agency’s 
Long Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs 2006. Taking these documents as 
the starting point, we will then analyze the developments within the different dimensions of the 
strategic environment that determine the design of any strategic vision. 
Since the authors have worked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU) for the last twenty years at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, this 
interpretation will also reflect practical experiences. And of course you might expect a bit of a 
German touch. This is mainly because Europe still has a hard time coming up with a common view 
that is shared, accepted, and interpreted in the same way by all twenty-seven member states of the 
EU. “Unity in Diversity” is one of Europe’s greatest assets but also its greatest challenge when it 
comes to decision-making in high politics and crisis management. 
Before we start to analyze what Europe’s vision for the midterm future is, we need to understand 
some particularities about the EU: 
• The EU is not a nation-state. Its five hundred million citizens come from twenty-seven member 
states. The EU does not have a constitution but is based on treaties.  
• The EU is not an alliance like NATO. There are many policy areas that fall under the auspices of 
supranational bodies like the European Commission and Parliament. Decisions by these bodies 
are treated as secondary legislation and are binding for member states. 
• Decisions regarding security and defense, in contrast, have to be made unanimously by the 
member states. Up to now the EU has been unable to enforce common strategies, common 
positions, and joint action in the area of security and defense.  
These characteristics show that the EU is based on effective multilateralism. Effective 
multilateralism has worked for the EU. The EU’s economic strength and the EU’s security depend 
on a functioning multilateral system and effective multilateral institutions. Whether this concept will 
still be valid in the future is inevitably subject to debate. 
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The return of power politics, perhaps triggered by unilateral decisions of major global players or the 
failure of multilateral institutions, is a direct threat to European security and prosperity. 
Unilateralism is an attack on European beliefs and threatens the very foundations of the EU. It 
might also endanger the most valuable strategic asset that the EU has provided to the US in the past 
decades—peace in Europe. 
This, in a nutshell, is the framework and the foundation in which the EU has to operate, and it is not 
likely that this framework will change dramatically over the course of the next twenty years. Over the 
last two decades, security and defense have become areas of increasing effort within the EU. The 
EU has taken over responsibility for operations, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and the Operation Atalanta to combat the threat of pirates off the coast of Africa. It has set up the 
EU Battle Groups as a system of quick response forces that are highly mobile and capable of coping 
with smaller operations. Taking the limited time frame into account, the achievements in this field 
are remarkable but, still, far from sufficient to match the threats of the future. 
Now let us draw our attention from the current situation to the future and briefly look at the 
Alternative Future Security Narratives provided by the National Intelligence Council (figure 1). The EU 
certainly prefers a future security scenario located in the upper right quadrant, which means a 
cooperative concert of powers based on an effective multilateral system capable of dealing with 
emerging challenges and threats. And the EU wants to be a valued player in this system. 
 
Figure	  1:	  Alternative	  Future	  Security	  Narratives	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• Failing States  
• International Crime 
• Migration  
• Energy Security 
• Climate 
But is this assessment still valid, and will it hold for the next fifteen to twenty years? To answer this 
question we need to look at the six dimensions that form the environment of strategic planning. 
These six dimensions, namely the political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental 
dimensions, have to be understood as elements in a network with a high degree of interdependency. 
 
The political dimension 
The global political landscape will be characterized by a much higher degree of multi-polarity than 
we see currently. The problem seems to be that in an increasingly globalized and multi-polar world, 
the existing multilateral system and its main institution, the UN, can hardly manage the challenges 
and threats. While the United States will remain a global power, its position will be less dominant 
and increasingly challenged by other powers. Rising or reemerging states like Brazil, Russia, India, 
Turkey, and China need to take on more responsibility within this system, become more active, and 
invest more. Some of these nations will begin to lead globally, like China and Russia. Others will be 
mainly of more regional importance, like Turkey, which has already begun to increase its influence in 
the Middle East and will in all probability continue doing so. Globalization will continue and will 
create a more interdependent world where challenges and threats need to be addressed across 
borders. Globalization will continue to have winners and losers. And no country alone, not even the 
West alone, can address these challenges effectively. The West needs the rest, but in many fields it 
will also face a competitive relationship with these rising powers. 
While the US and large parts of Asia and Latin America will remain zones of stability, the prospect 
for the Middle East and Africa as well as for some parts of Latin America are less promising. 
Developments in the Middle East and Africa, due to their geographical proximity, will often have 
direct implications for Europe. Thus, they will be of special interest for Europe. These regions might 
become or remain zones of instability and, at least for the foreseeable future, will be characterized by 
a high degree of uncertainty. The EU itself, despite several national differences and its current 
financial crisis, will remain a zone of stability and increasing integration, with the majority of 
member states facing no direct military or conventional threats on their borders. 
 
The economic dimension 
Globalization will remain the dominating factor in the global economic development. This 
globalization, however, will be characterized by increasing competition for markets, resources, and 
intellectual capital. The degree of interdependence of the global players will grow respectively, which 
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will, despite their rivalry and competition, prevent the outbreak of existential conflicts between the 
global players described above. States in the West, especially in the EU and the US, will be affected 
by severely limited budgets which will force these states to reconsider their current positions and 
policies. These budget constraints will also reduce the military capability gap between the West and 
new global powers over time. 
 
The social dimension 
The most influential development in the social dimension of the strategic environment will be 
determined by the changes in the demographics of Europe. With birth rates decreasing, Western 
societies will age and at the same time the composition and size of the European population and 
labor force (figure 2)—with regard to ethnicity, culture and religion—will change. This, in the short 
term, requires Europe to change its integration policies and, in the long term, to initiate a discourse 
within society to reverse some of the current trends. The homework many European countries have 
forgotten to do in the past will require some attention. These developments might lead to significant 
changes in the self-perception of Europeans and the definition of their identity with direct 
implications for foreign policy, including security and defense. 
 
Figure	  2:	  Labor	  Force	  Growth	  (ages	  15-­‐64)	  
 
 
The technological dimension 
The technological developments we have faced over the last decades occurred with continuously 
increasing speed, and this tendency of ever shorter product life cycles will continue. This tendency 
of developments in the technological dimension will become one of the major challenges for 
security and defense. As described above, current decision making processes—especially in 
organizations like the EU—are not able, and have not been designed, to cope with such rapidly 
evolving developments. 
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Moreover, societies all over the world will increasingly be dependent on cyberspace. Cyberspace has 
started to revolutionize economies, information exchange, and education as well as science and has 
penetrated almost every sphere of life. Thus, threats will increasingly stem from cyberspace, and 
cyberspace will also, or actually has already, become a kind of “military platform” that enables 
leading military operations at all levels of command. 
Another technological sector of increasing importance is the use of space-based assets. 
Communication assets especially are of critical importance for the developed world. Threats to these 
assets will be threats to the political and economic dimensions as well. European nations, through 
the European Space Agency (ESA, a non-EU organization), play a leading role in the use of space-
based assets and, therefore, are also vulnerable to threats to these assets. This reliance on space-
based assets will increase. The EU, together with ESA, has reacted and implemented a strategy for 
the future use of space. Security, however, still plays a subordinated role in the European 
considerations. For good reasons, the weaponization of space is strongly condemned by European 
nations. In addition, some European nations, namely France and Germany, have begun to build up 
their own space surveillance capability and will continue to Europeanize it. 
The technological dimension, however, does not only have to be seen as a dimension of future 
vulnerability, but also as a dimension of new changes and opportunities to overcome shortfalls in 
current defense capabilities and to counter threats more effectively and efficiently. Increasing 
automation and use of robotics can be a way to overcome the shortage of available personnel for the 
military, to minimize the risk to the lives of soldiers, and to maximize efficiency. In the long run, 
technology gaps in the military capabilities of the leading nations will close, as stated above. 
 
The legal dimension 
New developments, especially in the technological dimension, will impose challenges to the legal 
dimension of the strategic environment. The increased threat of cyber warfare raises the question of 
accountability and, also, of an international legal architecture that ensures the enforcement of legal 
obligations. Arms control and reduction treatments—especially in the fields of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), the military use of space, and also small arms in the developing world—need 
more attention. This includes regimes to observe the compliance with the respective treaties. 
Consequently, this raises the question of the role of international institutions, like the UN. This takes 
us back to the political dimension and clearly shows the interdependencies of developments in the 
different dimensions of the strategic environment. 
 
The Environmental Dimension 
The environmental dimension, finally, influences the development of new strategies mainly for two 
reasons: the competition for scarce resources and the risks stemming from climate change. Europe 
itself suffers from a lack of natural resources, which significantly weakens its position in the overall 
competition with the other global players, especially at times where human and intellectual capital 
will increasingly become scarce resources taking the demographic development into account.  
Water scarcity and food shortages in Africa might have direct impacts on Europe, with a growing 
number of conflicts and increasing numbers of refugees both inside Africa, and between Africa and 
Europe. Most of these environmental challenges can’t be dealt with nationally or regionally. They 
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require a global approach. Thus, besides their disastrous consequences, there might be a chance for 
increased global cooperation lying within these global challenges. 
 
Implications for a future European security strategy 
Based upon this analysis, we can draw conclusions and recommendations for a future European 
security strategy. The overall threat scenario, as described in the analysis, can be summarized as 
follows: A majority of states in Europe will not face conventional, military threats at its borders. 
Major future security threats will: occur in cyberspace; eventually arise from the proliferation of 
WMD; be directed against critical infrastructures, including space-based assets; result from the 
competition for resources as well as markets; and, finally, produce a potential influx of refugees from 
potential zones of instability. Terrorism will remain a continuous threat to western societies. The 
developments in the dimensions of the strategic environment will require Europe to accommodate 
the following considerations in its future security strategy: 
• A new approach to homeland security, defense of territorial integrity, and expeditionary military 
operations. The fusion of internal and external security has become an accepted fact. The 
capabilities needed in the field of internal and external security, however, often differ. Moreover, 
not everybody has to deal with both of these aspects of security on their own. As stated above 
the majority of EU member states do not face direct conventional military threats to their 
territory. Thus, defense at the borders of the EU should become a European effort. This 
includes capabilities to counter the threat of ballistic missiles and threats to space-based assets. 
Taking the sophistication and costs of means to counter these threats into account, these 
capabilities should be called “European” capabilities, too. Moreover, cooperation with the US in 
this field might be of mutual interest and, at least for Europe, of high importance and a conditio 
sine qua non. 
• The same applies to expeditionary military operations. This will enable the EU to build up 
sufficient capabilities while, at the same time, sharing the burden for these sophisticated—but 
expensive—capabilities. Taking the current conflict of national interests within the EU into 
account, this objective can’t be achieved in the short run. However, budget deficits in the US 
and the challenge imposed by rising powers to the US will require the Europeans to take care of 
themselves. 
• Homeland security and defense, in contrast, should remain a national responsibility in a 
European network. Taking the nature of the most severe threats to homeland security into 
account, however, the role of the military should be reconsidered. Capabilities for countering 
such threats as cyber attack and terrorism do not necessarily have to be managed and provided 
by the military. 
• This division between EU and national responsibilities, nevertheless, does not exclude EU-wide 
cooperation and coordination in the fields of national responsibility. On the contrary, it is the 
opposite that is required.  
• There will be continued financial pressures on security and defense spending. Security spending 
will be favored over defense spending because it is more acceptable to the public.  
• Taking demographic developments and budget constraints into account, European militaries in 
general will struggle in the competition with industry and other areas of the public sector for 
personnel. Thus, military capabilities will increasingly have to be based on automation and 
reliance on technology.  
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• Limited military capabilities on the national and European level will directly influence the future 
ability of the UN to mount UN-mandated military operations. That means, from a European 
perspective, that the UN’s weak capacity to provide collective security by means of military force 
will remain. This is not necessarily a bad thing, because most of today’s challenges and threats 
cannot be addressed by military force alone. Even if you happen to have a big hammer, not 
every problem is a nail. 
• This understanding must lead to changes in the role played by force. Today and in the future, the 
use of force will be intimately interwoven with political developments applied against an obscure 
opponent under tight rules of engagement and closely monitored and scrutinized by the media 
and the public. 
• That means operations will often be expeditionary, multinational, and multi-instrumental, and 
designed to achieve security and stability, and not necessarily military victory as traditionally 
understood. 
• Information in this kind of operation will be key. Information can provide the opportunity for 
quicker decision-making but does not guarantee better decisions. The efficient utilization of 
technological as well as human assets is key to successful intelligence and will directly influence 
future military capabilities. 
• Asymmetry will not only apply to tactics but also to aims and values. 
• Military force will only be one of the instruments applied to achieve campaign goals. And again, 
when force is used it has to be proportionate, justifiable and legitimate. 
• Nevertheless, Europe will remain very cautious about military intervention. Proportionality and 
political legitimacy, primarily in the form of extended multilateral endorsement, will be 
paramount. Europe will remain risk-averse. 
• The focus of military efforts for Europe will shift to  
o Supporting diplomacy in preventing war 
o Discouraging parties who generate crisis 
o Supporting civilian crisis management instruments 
o Containing conflict 
o Providing territorial defense. 
• The last point could be questioned, because the plausibility of interstate warfare between 
comparable opponents, in general, is reduced. Except perhaps for the US and to some degree 
for the EU, which have the most capable forces, most players would seek asymmetric strategies. 
And most effective in this area will be non-state players because they don’t have another option 
and are not restrained by the law of armed conflict. 
• In this scenario the technological revolution does not always play to the advantage of state actors. 
In a globalized world proliferation of technology is often beyond the control of governments. 
The sustained unilateral technological advantage of state actors over non-state actors cannot be 
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So, does Europe share the strategic assessment and vision provided by the National Intelligence 
Council? As we have demonstrated, Europe and the US have identified in principle the same threats 
and challenges to security. We agree that from the four Alternative Future Security Narratives, 
scenarios can be derived to analyze key security issues. The narratives are useful for framing thinking 
and debate. However, we all realize that these narratives will not be as pure in the real world as they 
might appear in the academic one. The real world security environment will present itself as a 
mixture of elements from all these narratives.  
No matter to which quadrant the world order shifts—and this might be very hard to predict without 
a crystal ball—in none of the quadrants will the threats and challenges be military alone and they 
cannot be resolved by military force alone. Therefore, we feel that it is of utmost importance to have 
a variety of civilian and military instruments available, which can be tailored to address different 
security threats and challenges and which must be employed in an effective multilateral system. 
This means that we should focus less on the symptoms and more on the root causes of threats. This 
in turn means that the focus of providing security has to shift from the military to civilian 
instruments, particularly in crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crisis reconstruction. That 
does not exclude the use of military force in certain scenarios to support civilian efforts or to show 
necessary resolve. Nevertheless, we always have to realize that the military can perhaps manage a 
crisis, but not solve it. What is needed is a comprehensive approach to security that provides 
multilateral institutions with a mix of instruments, including military force, that can be tailored to a 
specific threat or challenge (figure 3). 
 
Figure	  3:	  Comprehensive	  Security	  
 
Source: Schmid and Doering, 2008 
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Of course, this approach works best and is probably most effective in the concert of powers 
scenario, but it unlikely that there is a valid alternative to this approach if world order shifts to a less 
benign quadrant of the narratives.  
For Europe the adoption of this approach is the only way to remain relevant as a security provider. 
In the changing strategic environment, Europe is on the edge of either remaining a global player or 
being increasingly marginalized. For the time being, its economic power will enable Europe to 
maintain global importance at least in the short to medium term. Taking the growing importance of 
other players on the one hand, and Europe’s shortage of natural resources, budget deficits, and 
demographic decline on the other hand into account, the only option for Europe is further 
integration and a functioning multilateral system, both internally and externally. The alternative is an 
increasing marginalization of Europe and in the worst case a breakdown of the European 
multilateral system with probably devastating consequences. 
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3. Casus Bel l i : The Case of Russia 
Mikhail Tsypkin 
 
How do the Russians view possible causes of future wars? Over the course of the last century, 
Russia has presented forecasters with several major surprises.  Therefore, it would be also at least 
prudent to produce two prognoses: one derived from what we know about the people who run 
Russia now and may run it for the next two decades (I will call it the Putinist elite), and another one, 
which assumes one of those surprises characteristic of the Russian history. 
Several factors that are crucial for Russian views of the future warfare are not likely to change.   
• Today’s Russia, even reduced territorially, economically and demographically from its Soviet and 
Tsarist Russian predecessors, is still an empire.  Ethnic Russians constitute about 80 percent of 
the population of the Russian Federation.  The remaining 20 percent identify with the Russian 
state to a lesser degree, especially the Muslim minorities of the North Caucasus.   
• The Russians have been traditionally preoccupied with defensive space.  After 1991, they have 
added to this preoccupation a post-imperial neurosis focused on the former Soviet republics 
and, to a lesser degree, former Eastern European satellites.  Even though often dependent on 
Russia economically and even militarily, none of these states has become a reliable ally of Russia, 
as demonstrated by their failure to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. 
• Russia is unique among other major energy exporters.  It can fully provide for its own energy 
security.  Russia is a nuclear superpower, which puts it, as far as the measurement of its 
destructive might, in the same category as the United States. Russia has a tradition (which it 
wants to maintain) of being an active international actor on the global scene, something not 
characteristic of other major energy exporters.  Russia is a very significant arms exporter, in fact, 
second after the United States.  It is also a space power with some unmatched capabilities: once 
the space shuttle is retired in 2011, Russia will be the only country with the reliable capability to 
put humans into space.   
• Russia is experiencing severe demographic problems—even if its population did not decline in 
2009 (for the first time since 1993), experts predict that the population will begin to decline 
again.1   
• Russia’s size and location mean that its security interests are so varied that it would be nearly 
impossible to accommodate them within a system of international security not centered on 
Russia.   
The above factors have shaped the Russian elite’s perceptions of the causes of war in the future.  
These characteristics may not dramatically change over the next two decades, although, as I will 
discuss below, many observers believe otherwise.  So apparently do many members of the Putinist 
elite, and hence their fears about the viability of the Russian nuclear deterrent when faced with the 
developing American missile defense programs. 
Russia’s threat scenarios are partially rooted in the exaggerated (sometimes painfully so) sense of 
Russia’s importance in international affairs and of the Western world’s hostility to Russia.  This is 
particularly true when it comes to Russian interpretations of American politics and policies, the most 
prominent example being the Russian obsession with American missile defense program.  I do not 
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have an explanation for this phenomenon, except that it may be a psychological compensation for 
the loss of the superpower status, and also mirror-imaging of Russian preoccupation with the US.  
This psychological factor, often dismissed in the West as “paranoia,” should by no means be 
overlooked.2  (Examples: Putin and others on “Brzezinski’s plan to partition Russia,” Gates asked 
about the alleged quote (alternatively by Madeleine Albright or Dick Cheney) that Russia is too rich 
in natural resources and therefore should be forced to “share” them with others. These examples 
can be continued.) 
Despite Russia’s desire to continue its role as a global international player, in reality Russian security 
concerns are focused on Russian interests in Eurasia. The Putinist elite is preoccupied with the 
possible linkage between internal “enemies” (i.e., ethno-religious separatists) and external powers, 
which may want to cooperate in order to partition Russia. (Vladimir Putin has articulated such 
concerns on several occasions.) Such fears bring with them inevitable concerns that powerful 
external actors (both state and non-state) that could supposedly benefit from such a partition, would 
actually facilitate the process of Russia’s disintegration.  (It does not help that Putin has managed to 
extinguish the fire of the open war in Chechnya only by turning it over to a local warlord who is 
turning it into a de facto Islamic state.)  
Therefore, Russia may anticipate internal conflicts escalating from terrorism to cross-border regular 
warfare.  Following this logic, Russia should prepare for two types of conflicts at once: both 
counter-insurgency and conventional conflicts against opponents equipped with modern weaponry.   
The August 2008 war against Georgia could serve as the model of the Russian threat perception 
regarding the former Soviet republics.  Russians tend to view these new nations with barely 
concealed contempt.  They also expect (with good reason) these nations to nurture grudges against 
Russia because such grudges can be useful to politicians there.  Since the new states are much 
weaker than Russia militarily and economically, they seek protection from the West.  Once they 
obtain such protection, they begin to challenge Russia.  Such challenges cannot go unpunished. The 
danger, from the Russian standpoint, is that the US and NATO might become involved in such 
conflicts.  The Russians assume that in 2008 President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia fully expected 
the US to come directly to his aid. Had this happened, Russian choices would have been to back 
down (and encourage other post-Soviet nations to seek protection from the US), or risk defeat at the 
hands of the US conventional forces, or risk nuclear war.   
Russian views of the causes of future wars suffer from a serious contradiction.  While fear of the US 
appears to shape these views much of the time, the United States is treated as a useful ally in 
containing the possible spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Afghanistan.  But even the fear of 
the fundamentalist surge into Central Asia has not stopped Russia from trying to sabotage American 
long-term presence in that region. 
The unmentionable elephant in the room of Russian discussions of the future is China.  This 
suggests to me that Russian concerns about China are quite serious.  Russian leaders do not 
understand China and fear it.3  Russia’s demographic weakness and its resource riches feed 
suspicions in Moscow that China, whose appetites for natural resources are well known, would 
eventually encroach on the Far East and Siberia.  The Russian armed forces regularly conduct major 
exercises in the Far East, where the most likely possible opponent on the ground could be China.  It 
appears that the most likely threat scenario is not an outright attack, but rather crawling into an 
armed conflict as a result of increased Chinese migration into the Far East, where they would 
outnumber Russian citizens and gradually claim political power and begin to take orders from 
Beijing, rather than Moscow, whose control over the Far East has never been particularly strong.   
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Do the Russians believe that they have a conventional capability to deter or repel the Chinese?  They 
probably do not, given the demographic realities and the inability of the Russian defense industry to 
manufacture high tech weapons that would completely outclass what the Chinese have or will have 
soon.  Therefore, nuclear deterrence would remain their only realistic option for preventing a 
Chinese armed encroachment, while a full-blown military confrontation would be nothing short of a 
disaster.  
How may Russia view the evolving international system and its place in it?   
Russia has been increasingly integrated into a global market economy.  It has not done so, however, 
in the area of security and foreign policy.  It can afford a certain degree of strategic loneliness 
because of its strengths as a nuclear superpower and major energy exporter.  Russian domestic 
politics also contributes to its relative isolation – or full sovereignty, as Putin would put it.  
Integration into international institutions requires following the rules of transparency and political 
fair play.  Russia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world; the main purpose of its political 
system is to enrich bureaucrats and associated businessmen.  Transparency and application of the 
rule of fair play are a mortal threat to the stability of this system.  The Russian political tradition can 
be safely described as the realist one, permitting active engagement in international institutions only 
in as far as they serve Russian interests.  Viewing the world through the realist prism, the Russians 
began to challenge from the early 1990s on, and initially only intellectually, the American vision of 
the New World Order.  They argued that the idea of a unipolar world made no sense, and that 
instead bi-polarity would be replaced by multi-polarity and conflict over access to natural resources.  
Incidentally, they would probably agree with Donald Trump’s suggestions that the US should have 
seized Iraqi oil – after all, they believe that the war in Iraq was precisely about seizing its oil 
resources. 
The influx of Western ideas into Russia after the Iron Curtain was lifted has not resulted in an 
adoption of liberal internationalist ideas by the ruling elites.  It is hardly surprising that the Russians 
mostly picked up a rather crude version of geopolitics that fit into the suddenly empty mold of the 
Soviet ideology.  Instead of the global class struggle, yesterday’s instructors of Marxism-Leninism are 
now teaching that nations are in the process of a natural and perpetual conflict over resources, living 
space, etc.  One should also note that the faith in international institutions was severely damaged in 
Russia together with the rest of the liberal package of ideas presented by Mikhail Gorbachev and 
then pursued (at least for some time in foreign policy) by Boris Yeltsin.  Thus, Russia has stayed 
aloof from the liberal reorganization of the international system that the West has embarked upon 
after the end of the Cold war.   
The Russian elites would become more positive about international institutions and real cooperation 
if the factors that have so far kept Russia strategically aloof change – as they are likely to do.   
Russia suffers from a profound political, social and economic malaise.  It has been unable to find a 
reliable way forward.  In the 1990s Russia tried the Western model of democracy and market 
economy, and it didn’t seem to fit Russia’s needs.  During the last decade, Vladimir Putin pursued 
policies, mixing traditional Russian statism and nationalism; this worked for some time but now their 
popularity is declining as well.   
After the heady years of 2000-2008, when it seemed to the Russian elites that rising energy prices 
would solve all their problems, this view has changed even among the Putinists.  Even official 
experts, such as the Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, say that further economic growth cannot be 
achieved by relying solely on energy exports.  The Russian government is concerned about its ability 
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to produce new armaments for its military and is planning to pour huge amounts of money into the 
defense industry.  There is little optimism about the results of these plans, and Mr. Kudrin has 
warned that the Russian budget cannot afford such expenditures.   
Russia can no longer be an autarkic weapons manufacturer.  This is likely to have a serious impact 
on the international security environment.  The Russians will have to enter into co-production 
agreements with other nations or simply import weapons, as they are already doing with the Mistral 
amphibious assault ships from France.  It is noteworthy that Moscow appears to have become more 
cautious about arms exports to China.  Their choice of partners in arms trade is likely to affect the 
international security environment: it may make Russia and NATO nations mutual hostages to their 
arms trade, or Russia may come to the conclusion that it depends on their partners too much to 
even contemplate the possibility of a conflict with them.  Alternatively, Russia may decide that its 
arms business is too valuable for NATO members and that the Kremlin’s hands therefore are untied 
when it comes to dealing with its pesky small neighbors. 
Domestic observers with increasing frequency question Russia’s political stability.  The situation has 
been well described by an astute Russian analyst: 
Russia is undergoing a latent revolution.  It resembles a peat bog fire.  The fire is 
burning somewhere deep, burning tree roots, acid smoke seeps from underground, 
here and there people fall into holes burnt through the ground and perish, but then 
on the surface the forest with burnt roots looks quite decent.  … Today’s Russian 
society and state are such a dead forest.  Wherever you look, you can see the masts 
of state institutions and the underbrush of laws, but there has been no life in them 
for quite some time.  
Chaos is the fundamental systemic characteristic of the condition of the current 
Russian society.  The vertical of power has completely degenerated into its complete 
opposite, the horizontal of anarchy.  The main problem of Russia is that no political 
or administrative decision, irrespective of who gives it, cannot be implemented.4 
The fact that President Dmitri Medvedev, handpicked by Putin, has chosen to distance himself at 
least rhetorically from his mentor suggests a considerable degree of unease about the future.  The 
factors that have allowed Russia to be strategically self-sufficient may very well change for the worse 
in the future: reliance on energy exports may no longer be sufficient for economic stability, 
substantial conventional military capability may no longer be achievable, and nuclear parity with the 
US (whatever this means) may be lost, or at least perceived as lost.  Such change may mean an 
attempt to close the gap with the West and to turn Russia into a more cooperative (from the 
American point of view) actor in the international system.  This may be more likely if conflicts are 
avoided in the sore spots of South Caucasus, Ukraine and the Baltic States, while China continues to 
loom large over the Far East and Siberia.  This prediction of positive (from the American 
standpoint) developments, however, may run into a great uncertainty at the heart of Russian politics.   
There is no coherent Russian perspective on the future, on the past, or on the present.  Twenty 
years after the collapse of communism, Russian opinion is deeply split between the relatively few 
who see Russia’s future in the West, and take their cues from Western values and intellectual 
fashions, those who prefer to see Russia as a self-contained civilization, and those (the vast majority) 
who do not have a well-formed opinion on such matters.   
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There is a sense of an intellectual void, of doubt about Russia as a culture, as a nation, and as a state 
– a doubt manifested not only by the flight of capital, but by the flight of the future – the tendency 
of the well-to-do to send their children to study and live abroad.  The educated Westernized elites 
view their own people (narod) with hopelessness and fear; critical as they often are of Putin and his 
regime, one regularly hears concerns that Putin’s regime may be replaced by something much worse.  
The outburst of the Russian nationalist violence in December 2010 near the Kremlin has frightened 
both the ruling elite and its Westernized opposition, which is always mindful of Alexander Pushkin’s 




Source: http://zyalt.livejournal.com/330396.html#cutid1  
 
One of the most disturbing experiences in Russia today is going to a bookstore and looking at the 
selection on history and politics.  While much has been done to publish quality works on these 
subjects, bookshelves are dominated by conspiracy theorists, Stalin’s apologists, various deniers of 
historical facts, and such. Perhaps one of the greatest challenges to our ability to predict Russian 
actions in the longer term is the decline of the Russian intellectual life.  Meeting younger Russians at 
international intellectual gatherings, one may easily think that I am exaggerating: they are 
accomplished and Westernized.  But there are different strands of cultural and political life in Russia.  
There is the School of Sociology at the Moscow State University that teaches something called 
Orthodox Sociology and houses the Center for Conservative Studies, led by one of the most radical 
personalities in Russian intellectual and political life, Alexander Dugin.  Dugin promotes ideas of 
Russian racial and cultural superiority, and has on several occasions called for criminal prosecution 
of intellectuals who engage in the dialogue with the West. There is also a professor at the Academy 
of General Staff who publishes one book after another on the subject of a world Zionist plot. 
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Despite all the reforms instituted by Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, it is impossible to get 
rid of the eminent “political scientist” Tatyana Gracheva, whose professional background is as a 
French language instructor.  Or just look behind the diplomatic façade of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: the website of the Ministry’s journal International Affairs reacted to the death of Osama bin 
Laden with an article by the journal’s staff writer expounding various conspiracy theories and 
accusing the US of “state terrorism.”5  And this witches’ brew is inevitably laced with a heavy dose 
of paranoid anti-Americanism.   
It would be foolhardy to ignore such trends, while it is admittedly difficult to make forecasts on their 
basis.  As a minimum, we cannot exclude the chance of an extreme political movement or 
movements destabilizing the domestic situation, aggravating ethnic conflicts within Russia, and 
perhaps stirring up armed conflicts with Russia’s small neighbors.   
To summarize, the Russian expectations about the role of armed conflict in the future and the ability 
of the international system to prevent them are generally pessimistic.  The Russian thinking is 
focused on smaller conflicts around Russia’s periphery and on preventing the major powers from 
getting involved in these conflicts against Russia.  The obvious exception is the Russian vulnerability 
in the Far East to the growth of Chinese power – while the Russians do not see China as bent on a 
military conflict there, the economic and demographic disparity, as well as the disparity in natural 
resources, create a potential for an armed conflict.   
The future development of Russian domestic politics will determine whether Russia will be able to 
mitigate the threat of armed conflict through increased integration into international system or 
would exacerbate the threat of conflict, even against its own interests. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1. See A. Vishnevskiy, Sberezhenie naroda ili depopulyatsiya Rossii? (Moscow: 2010), p. 4. 
2. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russian Politics and American Missile Defense,” 
International Affairs (London), 85: 4 (2009), pp. 773–791. 
3. I have heard this opinion time and again in discussions with Russian Sinologists. 
4. Vladimir Pastukhov, Uyti nel’zya vernut’sya, http://www.polit.ru/country/2011/05/10/comma_print.html, accessed on 
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5. Sergei Filatov, Proekt “bin Laden” zakryt, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, 16 May 2011, 
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4. Future Warfare and China 
Nan Li 
 
China has so far exhibited a mix of policy behavior more or less associated with the four different 
future security scenarios specified in Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: fragmented international system, 
concert of powers, return of great power confrontations, and rise of non-state networks. This essay 
fleshes out the Chinese policy behavior associated with each of these four scenarios, together with a 
brief discussion of factors/variables that may affect changes in this behavior, which may also 
indicate which scenario is likely to dominate Chinese policy behavior in the future.  
 
Fragmented international system and Chinese behavior 
In comparison with Europe, where regional integration is taking shape, or with Africa, where states 
are either weak or failing, East Asia is characterized by strong, autonomous states that guide both 
domestic development and foreign policies, which are further reinforced by strong national identities 
and inter-state mistrust associated with historical legacies. Chinese policy behavior is both a response 
to and a perpetuator of such conditions of a fragmented international system where inter-state policy 
coordination remains difficult. China, for instance, is faced with the issue of reunification with 
Taiwan and has unresolved land and maritime territorial disputes with many of its neighbors; the 
central mission of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) since 1985 is to be prepared for fighting and 
winning “local war” regarding territorial disputes on the margins of China as well as reunification 
with Taiwan.  
Whether these disputes may be resolved peacefully or escalate to military conflicts in the future may 
be determined by success or failure of Chinese diplomatic and economic integration strategies, 
preferences and priorities of Chinese leadership, ebb and flow of nationalism, and relative 
importance of oil.  
How the PLA would fight a war if all other policies and strategies fail, however, may depend on the 
relative balance of battlefield capabilities. If the PLA is the “superior” power in a conflict against an 
“inferior” opponent, it might deploy strategic-level, exterior-line quick and offensive operations 
(外线的速决进攻战). If the PLA is the “inferior” power fighting a “superior” opponent, however, 
it would likely proceed with elevated caution and a shift to interior-line strategic defense 
(内线战略防御). In this equation, the dominant PLA strategy employed is what is known as 
“movement warfare” (运动战), that is, quick, tactical-level, exterior-line offensive operations within 
the general context of interior-line strategic defense.  
This active defense strategy highlights constant force movements, including giving up places (or 
defensive bastions) to avoid the spearheads of enemy offensives; conducting constant outflanking to 
shift, divide, disperse, and isolate enemy forces and to “cause the enemy to make mistakes;” 
identifying the weaknesses of enemy offensives in movement; “luring enemy in deep;” developing 
local and temporary but also absolutely superior forces (绝对优势兵力) relative to each of these 
weaknesses in movement; and annihilating enemy forces piece by piece in movements 
(在运动中各个歼灭敌人) beginning with the weakest link. Even in a frontal engagement, which is 
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to be avoided if at all possible, the primary tactics employed include deep-thrust (穿插), cut-up 
(分割), outflanking (迂回) and encirclement (包围). 
Constant force movement is essential mainly because it generates elasticity that enhances the 
survival of the PLA against a superior opponent. A bastion defense-type positional war of matching 
attrition, on the other hand, favors the numerically superior side because similar casualties may mean 
only marginal loss for this side but possibly total annihilation of the inferior side. Letting the enemy 
take and defend places or bastions also helps to disperse and isolate enemy forces and gives the 
initiative to the inferior side that can hold its vital forces (有生力量) together and deploy these 
forces more freely and decisively. Moreover, force movements gain time to get familiarized with the 
enemy in order to understand and identify its weaknesses. Achieving local and temporary but 
absolute force superiority also requires force movement. Finally, concentrating absolutely superior 
forces to fight the weakest link of the enemy ensures high probability of victory in these battles. As a 
result, annihilating enemy forces piece by piece in movement, beginning with the weakest link, 
enables the gradual shift of balance of forces on the battlefield that may eventually allow for 
strategic-level offensive, exterior-line operations.  
This active defense strategy may assign research and development priorities to those weapons 
systems that are highly elastic (弹性) to the extent of being able to conduct “deep thrust, cut-up, 
outflanking and encirclement” maneuvers, rather than to those systems that are highly inelastic and 
escalatory, or more appropriate for a frontal war of matching attrition. 
The PLA has also initiated a policy of “informatization” to enhance the effectiveness of its active 
defense strategy. This policy first intends to integrate information technologies (IT) that can 
improve the PLA's survivability, including integrating low-observable design into the new naval and 
air platforms, acquisition of more concealed naval platforms, and enhancing missile defense. China’s 
successful test of a mid-course missile interception on January 11, 2010, test flights of the highly 
stealthy 4th generation combat aircraft J-20 since January 11, 2011, and acquisition of several new 
types of submarines are recent examples.  
Moreover, this policy aims to integrate IT that can “cause the enemy to make mistakes” by triggering 
misjudgments. New capabilities may include anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, cyber-warfare and 
other counter-measures that may reduce the effectiveness of the opponent’s C4ISR (command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). China’s 
successful ASAT test on January 11, 2007 is a recent example. 
Furthermore, this policy intends to integrate IT that can help improve battlefield awareness to 
identify the opponent’s vulnerabilities. The intensified PLA effort in recent years to develop land, 
coast, sea, air and space-based ISR networks represents this development. Finally, this policy intends 
to integrate IT that can assist in integrating forces, and that can enhance precision of strikes. 
 
Concert of powers and Chinese behavior 
Chinese analysts seem to understand that China’s obligations to provide public goods for the global 
community should grow because China’s economic rise is closely related to globalization. China has 
now become the biggest contributor of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces among the 
permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council. It has also continuously deployed naval 
escort groups to Gulf of Aden to fight piracy since December 2008. China’s sponsorship of six-
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party talks to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula is arguably China’s major non-proliferation 
initiative. Finally, the PLA Navy’s dedicated hospital ship Peace Ark embarked on a three-month 
voyage of East African and Indian Ocean countries for a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) mission in 2010.  
These Chinese initiatives are driven partly by a desire to enhance China’s international prestige and 
partly by the practical need to create a stable and peaceful environment for continued economic 
growth at home and for its expanded interests abroad. There are, however, concerns among Chinese 
analysts that these policies, if excessive, may cause over-extension that may hurt Chinese interests. 
One major Chinese reflection on Zheng He’s maritime voyages in the Ming Dynasty, for instance, is 
that these voyages squandered resources by building gigantic ships and spreading wealth to enhance 
imperial prestige but without engaging in profitable trade and acquiring overseas colonies. The 
tributary system that these voyages helped to develop also contributed to imperial decline because 
the lesser states scrambled to become tributary states since the Chinese court would give out more 
expensive gifts than it took in (厚往薄来). These concerns may explain why Chinese policies to do 
international good can be quite limited and they are mainly confined to protecting Chinese interests. 
The counter-piracy mission in Gulf of Aden, for instance, serves mainly to protect Chinese flagged 
ships. The mission of the hospital ship voyage was to provide medical treatment first to Chinese 
military personnel serving in the South China Sea and Gulf of Aden; second to Chinese diplomatic 
personnel serving in the East Africa and Indian Ocean countries; and finally to the locals in these 
countries. Because China suffers from numerous natural disasters every year, the HA/DR missions 
of the PLA are likely to be primarily concentrated on relieving domestic disasters in the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Return of great power confrontations and Chinese behavior 
The two types of Chinese behavior discussed above may all have implications for return of great 
power confrontations. The first type, Chinese behavior in the fragmented East Asian international 
system, does not exhibit the sort of structural and systemic competitions that existed between the 
US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. The territorial disputes that China has had such as over 
Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and Diaoyu/Senkaku pose no direct threat to the security of the US. 
Neither does China’s military doctrine of preparing for fighting and winning a “local war” assume 
the US as the enemy. The small and limited nuclear arsenal that China has deployed so far may attest 
to this assumption. China’s independent, non-alignment foreign policy also forsakes a major military 
alliance such as another Warsaw Pact against the US. Furthermore, US and China cooperate on 
issues of countering international terrorism, energy security, environmental protection, and counter-
nuclear proliferation. The level of economic interdependence between the two countries is also quite 
high.  
On the other hand, some countries and regions that China has quarrels with are US allies whom the 
US has treaty or legal obligations to defend. Also, any assertive Chinese behavior in handling these 
territorial issues may be perceived as China’s attempt to undermine and diminish US power and 
influence in the region. The mutual suspicion and possible miscalculation about each other’s 
intentions and capabilities within the context of perceived power transition may trigger tension and 
even small-scale military conflicts. These may further erode the already limited mutual trust and 
confidence, contributing to precarious conditions that may foster possible great power 
confrontations. 
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The second type, Chinese behavior within the framework of a concert of powers, reflects a dilemma 
that China faces in protecting its expanding overseas interests. Traditionally, China has been 
dependent on US provision of public goods such as sea lanes security. But a major Chinese concern 
is that China may pay a high cost for such dependence in a conflict such as over Taiwan, where the 
US may impose an oil embargo on China. China can try to develop a blue-water navy, but it takes 
time and it may also trigger great power confrontations that could diminish Chinese security. As a 
result, China now takes an indirect and non-confrontational approach, mainly in terms of promoting 
non-traditional security to protect its overseas interests. China is also trying to diversify its sea-borne 
transportation away from choke points such as Strait of Malacca and to develop land-bound energy 
and trade-related transportation routes. To reduce over-dependence on exports, expand domestic 
consumption and achieve more equitable distribution of wealth, the government is also attempting 
to shift investment capital from the wealthy coastal provinces to more backward hinterland 
provinces. 
There are other major constraints on how far China can go to protect its overseas interests. China, 
for instance, has no overseas naval bases. A major reason is that China’s independent, non-
alignment foreign policy forbids China to develop a military alliance relationship with other 
countries, but overseas military bases are usually located in territories of close allies. This makes it 
difficult for Chinese naval ships to gain sustained logistics, maintenance and combat support.  
Related to this policy is China’s approach of “non-interference in internal affairs” (also associated 
with the pre-modern tributary system) of other countries. While this approach may enable China to 
avoid entanglement in regional and domestic conflicts of other countries, it also means that China 
may have minimal influence on domestic development of these countries. This lack of domestic 
influence may in turn incur heavy economic losses to China in times of domestic chaos and anarchy, 
as has happened to Chinese investment recently in Libya. Similarly, Chinese military doctrine is 
about fighting and winning “local war” on the margins of China. This makes it difficult to justify and 
normalize out-of-region military deployment to protect Chinese overseas interests. Moreover, the 
PLA Navy is quite weak in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which in turn would expose 
Chinese naval ships deployed overseas to submarine threats. 
There are, however, heated debates among China’s foreign policy elites on issues such as 
establishing overseas military bases, maintaining the non-alignment and non-interference foreign 
policies, and developing the “local war” doctrine. Such debates have resulted in some subtle changes 
to Chinese policy behavior. China, for instance, has recently begun to cultivate relations with 
political oppositions in countries such as Libya and Sudan, which represents an important departure 
from its policy of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. The outcome of these debates 
is crucially important because they may constitute major indicators on whether China intends to 
become a global superpower, which may have major implications for great power competitions if 
not direct confrontations.  
 
Rise of non-state networks and Chinese behavior 
Numerous small-scale protests/riots every year and ethnic unrests in Tibet and Xinjiang constitute 
major domestic challenges to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in China. The causes of 
these incidents are complex, ranging from unfair compensation, and poor working conditions, to 
environmental and safety-related issues, abuses of power by local officials such as land grabs, 
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regional and ethnic discrimination, and the spread of the internet and proliferation of sensational 
media.  
In a country of 1.3 billion people experiencing rapid economic and social changes, occurrence of 
these so-called “mass incidents” may not be totally abnormal. A major indicator of whether these 
incidents may represent the rise of politically motivated non-state networks is whether they evolve 
into nationally organized oppositions that directly challenge the party rule. Another major indicator 
of whether governance collapses in China and whether major civil conflicts prevail due to the rise of 
these networks is whether the PLA is mobilized to defend the party against these domestic political 
oppositions.  
On both counts, however, trends seem to favor the government rather than the non-state networks. 
For instance, these protests have so far stayed relatively localized, disconnected to each other, and 
confined to economic and other practical grievances and demands rather than political ones. Also, 
instead of being mobilized to protect the party against domestic political oppositions, the PLA has 
been largely confined to its functional, technical and external missions for more than 20 years since 
1989. Lessons learned from the 1989 Tian’anmen incident and the collapse of communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991 by China’s governing elites may 
account for these trends. 
One major lesson learned from the events during 1989-1991 is that the CCP’s dependence on 
military force in Tian’anmen for survival indicates the failure of the party-state to resolve major 
social-economic crises and implies its lack of ability to manage social protests other than through the 
use of such lethal means as tanks and sub-machine guns. This had contributed to a decline in the 
CCP’s legitimacy to rule. Also, there are indicators that the PLA was reluctant to get involved in the 
suppression of the rebellion mainly because its image would be damaged. Even for Deng Xiaoping, 
the task of persuading the PLA to intervene had been far from easy, and he had to exhaust much of 
his political capital to accomplish this.  
More recent leaders such as Jiang Zemin do not possess the kind of revolutionary and military 
credentials that Deng did. So new leaders are not confident that the military would take their side if 
ordered to intervene in another crisis on the scale of Tian’anmen. The popular revolts that ended 
communist rule in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe show that rather than taking the 
party’s side, the military mostly defied its orders. This means the party’s reliance on military force for 
its survival may not necessarily guarantee success, but may quicken the demise of the party rule 
instead.  
These concerns may explain why Jiang replaced the post-1989 policy of military control and 
ideological indoctrination with a new policy of promoting economic growth at the 14th CCP 
Congress of 1992, a policy also associated with Deng’s southern tour in early 1992. Such a policy 
was intended to enhance the CCP’s legitimacy to rule by increasing income and improving living 
standards, and providing employment opportunities for millions of people who join the labor force 
every year. It also helped to generate revenue for preventing and preempting social crises. By 2011, 
for instance, China’s public (domestic) security outlays of $95.0 billion overtook its official defense 
budget of $91.5 billion for the first time. 
Strategies have been developed to manage social protests stemming from the downsides of rapid 
economic growth, such as massive urban unemployment due to reform of state-owned enterprises, 
over-taxation of the peasants, rampant corruption, wealth polarization and environmental 
degradation. They range from soft approaches such as co-opting protesters by meeting their 
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demands and improving institutions for monitoring, expressing and resolving grievances before they 
escalate, to hard ones such as arresting politically conscious organizers, and isolating and containing 
such protests to prevent them from evolving into larger, better organized movements that directly 
challenge the CCP's rule.  
Similarly, the People’s Armed Police, which is primarily responsible for maintaining domestic social 
stability, has been substantially strengthened, and riot control units with non-lethal means such as 
tear gas and rubber bullets were developed and deployed. All these have reduced the need to 
mobilize the PLA against domestic political oppositions. They in turn made it possible to confine 
the PLA to the narrower functional, technical and external missions.  
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5. Geopolitical Trends and Security Challenges across the Indian 
Ocean and Asia-Pacific Regions 
G. Parthasarathy 
 
India’s foreign policy in the contemporary world will be guided by a number of diverse 
considerations. Now described as an “emerging power,” the predominant focus of attention in India 
will remain on fashioning an environment, both external and internal, which will help the country to 
proceed on a path of around double digit economic growth, with economic growth being as 
inclusive as possible. In a diverse and pluralistic country like India, the very process of economic 
growth will inevitably generate social, ethnic, linguistic and sectarian tensions. While corruption and 
criminalization of politics are presently straining its body politic, adversely affecting economic 
growth and evoking public criticism, there is, nevertheless, confidence that India has the strength 
and resilience to overcome these challenges. Terrorism sponsored by radical, Wahhabi oriented 
Islamist groups, is going to remain a formidable diplomatic and security challenge. The American 
“War on Terror” has dispersed, but not destroyed the terrorist threat emerging from India’s western 
neighbourhood. Moreover, with its demand for energy resources rising rapidly, India will have to 
focus increasing attention on the Persian Gulf, where over two thirds of the world’s resources of oil 
and gas are located and regional rivalries and sectarian tensions have been exacerbated following the 
American invasion of Iraq. 
The National Intelligence Council Report Global Trends 2020 observed that Asia, with a relatively 
young population and work force, expanding educational facilities and the benefits of globalization, 
and 60% of the world’s population, will become the manufacturing hub of the world in coming 
years. China and India will alone provide 1.1 billion of the labour force of 1.7 billion in the Asia-
Pacific Region. In the next half century, as the developed world and especially Europe ages, a 
younger and better educated work force in Asia will become the driving force for global 
manufacturing and growth. The balance of power will shift—particularly from Europe to Asia. 
Given this scenario, India is developing a comprehensive policy of promoting widespread 
engagement not only with the fast growing Asia-Pacific Region to its East, but also with the oil rich 
Persian Gulf Region to its west, from where it imports 70% of its oil and where an estimated 5.8 
million Indian nationals now live and work, accounting for the bulk of the $50 billion total that 
Indians overseas remit to India every year.  
India has made sustained efforts for economic integration, not only in South Asia and within 
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), but also with the rapidly growing 
economies of East and Southeast Asia. Over the past two decades, India’s “Look East” policies have 
enhanced its diplomatic profile in its eastern neighbourhood. As a full “Dialogue Partner of 
ASEAN” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and as a member of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), India has concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the ASEAN grouping, after 
concluding bilateral FTAS with two ASEAN members, Thailand and Singapore. It is now a 
participant in the annual East Asia Summit, which currently includes the leaders of China, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (with the US and Russia scheduled to join), apart from the 
Heads of ASEAN Governments. India’s trade and investment ties with the countries of East and 
Southeast Asia are rapidly expanding. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements with 
Japan and South Korea have been inked. Within South Asia, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA), though limited to trade in goods, is regarded as the first step towards establishing free 
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trade in investments and services, with the goal of progressively moving towards establishing a 
customs union and an economic union in South Asia. Supplementing efforts at economic 
integration within SAARC are moves for economic cooperation in the Bay of Bengal. The Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an economic 
grouping comprising Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand, acts as a 
bridge between South and Southeast Asia.  
In this emerging scenario, where a common quest for prosperity and rapid economic growth is 
driving a process of increased Asian economic integration, how will the US and China, which are set 
to be the two major competing centres of global power, view other players in coming years? A US 
journalist described the US-China relationship as one “between a still dominant, but fading 
superpower, facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides.” China’s economy 
continues to boom, recording a growth of 10.3% in 2010. China has spent over $ 100 billion in aid 
to developing countries during the past few years—exceeding the aid given by the World Bank. 
Chinese aid is ostensibly without strings, but is focused on acquiring access to natural resources in 
recipient countries. The United States, on the other hand, is presently mired in an economic crisis 
with high unemployment and with a budget deficit estimated at 10.64% of GDP.  
While there has been a marked improvement in the climate of Sino-Indian relations in recent years, 
the relationship between India and China is still clouded by mistrust. While China views improved 
US-Indian relations with suspicion, India retains memories of close Sino-US cooperation detrimental 
to its interests, during the Nixon and Clinton Administrations. There is concern in India about what 
is perceived as China’s policy of “containment” of India, marked by growing Chinese interest in 
maritime facilities in countries like Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China’s supply of 
weapons to the beleaguered regime of King Gyanendra of Nepal at a time when the international 
community was nurturing a process of democratic change in the country, as well as its continuing 
cooperation with Pakistan in nuclear and missile development, have only accentuated Indian 
misgivings. China’s growing “assertiveness” in its territorial claims on the Indian border State of 
Arunachal Pradesh, its efforts to undermine India’s efforts for regional influence by opposing 
India’s participation in forums like the East Asia Summit and the summit-level Asia Europe 
Meetings (ASEM), its ambivalence on India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council and its attempts within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to maintain global 
nuclear sanctions on India, indicate that dealing with China is going to be a major challenge for India 
in coming years. 
Despite these differences and challenges, bilateral trade and economic relations between Beijing and 
New Delhi are booming and the two countries have embarked on a series of measures to enhance 
mutual confidence. Moreover, on multilateral issues, such as global warming and the Doha Round 
of the WTO, common and shared interests and perceptions have led the two governments to 
cooperate with each other. The Indian response to Chinese policies of “containment” and “strategic 
encirclement” has been largely defensive. But, as India’s economic and military potential grow and 
the country’s “soft power” expands, India is dealing with Chinese policies by adopting more pro-
active measures in its relations with countries like Japan, South Korea and Vietnam; by developing a 
larger footprint in its relations with ASEAN; and a more imaginative economic engagement with 
Taiwan. At the same time, there are significant constituencies for peace and cooperation in both 
India and China. There are efforts collectively by India, Russia and China to cooperate in the 
evolution of a stable, multipolar world order, in forums like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa) and the G20. Conscious efforts are being made to keep tensions from escalating—
particularly along the Sino-Indian border—and to widen engagement between India and China 
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bilaterally, regionally and globally. Common sense dictates that there is enough strategic space across 
Asia for India and China to cooperate and develop to their full potential. 
In 1991, Deng Xiaoping advocated to his countrymen a strategy of “hide your strength, bide your 
time,” to enable China to develop rapidly, without being held back by global and regional tensions 
and rivalries. As its economic power and military strength have grown, China is widely perceived in 
recent years as flexing its military muscle, evoking concerns in its hitherto sanguine neighbours. 
China has, over the past few years, been more assertive in relations with countries across its Asia-
Pacific neighbourhood, ranging from Japan and Vietnam to Indonesia and India, particularly on 
issues pertaining to maritime and land borders. Another issue arises from reports of China’s plans to 
dam the Brahmaputra River, provoking substantial concern in India and Bangladesh. There are 
concerns that what are presently run of the river projects, could well be the first step towards future 
diversion of river waters. China is not a signatory to the 1997 UN Convention on Transnational 
Rivers and the experiences of downstream countries along the Mekong Basin evoke concerns in 
India and Bangladesh. India has formal inter-State agreements on sharing river waters with 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which have worked well, despite new problems arising from the melting of 
Himalayan glaciers because of climate change.  
China recently declared that like Tibet and Taiwan, the entire South China Sea is an area of “core 
interest.” Territorial claims in the South China Sea have been enforced using maritime power. The 
visiting Commander of the American Pacific Fleet Admiral Timothy Keating was told by his 
Chinese counterparts in May 2009 that the United States should recognize the western Pacific and 
the Indian Ocean as China’s sphere of influence. China opposed Joint US-South Korean military 
exercises in the Yellow Sea, after North Korea torpedoed and sank a South Korean naval vessel. 
China has also been increasingly assertive with Japan in disputes in the East China Sea over the 
Senkaku Island and on differences over drilling rights in contested areas. The export of crucial rare 
earth materials to Japan was suspended in the wake of tensions over maritime boundaries. 
Consultations have now been held between India and Japan on measures to end dependence on 
China in such strategic areas. The crucial concern is whether China will become militarily more 
assertive and nationalistic as its economic and military power grows, or whether it will abide by the 
policies advocated by Deng Xiaoping.  
There are concerns cross Asia that as Chinese economic and military power grow, the United States 
will become more circumspect and accommodating in dealing with China. The Chinese will, in turn, 
appear to respond positively to American concerns on issues like nuclear proliferation in Iran and 
North Korea. The Russians seem to be prepared to take advantage of this situation by extending 
selective support to the US on issues like their logistical needs in Afghanistan. Japan has already 
adopted a more China-specific defence posture. Japan’s New Defence Guidelines Programme of 
2010 explicitly states that China’s “military modernization and its insufficiency of transparency” are a 
“major concern.” Naval exercises involving India, Japan and the US were held near Okinawa last 
year and India is expanding security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries like Japan, South Korea 
and Vietnam. India’s partnership with Russia remains strong and multi-faceted.  
While the US-Russian relationship has strengthened recently, a stable balance of power across Asia 
cannot emerge until there is a clear understanding and accommodation between the US and Russia 
on the vital issues of NATO expansion and an on what legitimate Russian interests are in the former 
Soviet Republics. Even if there are rivalries over access to energy resources, both the US and Russia 
share a common interest in resisting religious extremism in Central Asia and across the Caucasus 
region. It is crucial that differences between the US and Russia do not affect the invaluable role that 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 30
Parthasarathy Geopolitical Trends and Security Challenges across the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific Regions
	  	  
US-Russian cooperation can play in dealing with problems of extremism and terrorism emanating 
from Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. As the Global Trends 2025 report observes, Pakistan 
faces strains to its polity, arising from the conflict in Afghanistan. The northern supply route 
through Russia and Central Asia is crucial for a joint US-Russian effort to stabilize Afghanistan and 
its neighbourhood.  
China will continue its military, nuclear, economic, and diplomatic cooperation with Pakistan and 
enhance its economic and military profile across the strategic sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. This 
will have to be dealt with by imaginative economic, diplomatic and military responses and a process 
of intense engagement with China. Efforts to build structures for cooperation in the Indian Ocean 
region can be initiated by building an inclusive and effective architecture for cooperation to deal 
with problems like piracy and natural disasters. It would be incorrect to exaggerate the possibilities 
of conflict between India and China. India will, however, complement its economic growth with 
modernization of its armed forces, improvement of communications along its borders with China 
and development of its nuclear and missile capabilities. India’s interaction with ASEAN members 
and especially with Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia is regarded as essential in promoting this 
effort. The United States will maintain a naval presence in India’s eastern neighbourhood and India 
and the US are cooperating in building an inclusive architecture for cooperation in East and 
Southeast Asia. India’s interaction with the US and Japan is also set to increase in the quest for 
building a stable balance of power across the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. 
As Asia emerges as the hub of international economic growth in the twenty first century, it is the 
longer term Indian aim to see that tensions in the region are subsumed as far as possible, through 
greater economic integration in a common quest for prosperity, as Europe experienced in the 20th 
century. Moreover, there is a measure of confidence that while a rising China will continue to pose a 
strategic challenge, a conflict with China can be avoided not only through bilateral cooperation and 
confidence-building measures (CBM), but also by ensuring a measure of adequacy in India’s defence 
potential. Two mountain divisions are being raised and frontline fighter aircraft deployed on India’s 
borders with China. A substantive development of naval potential is underway, to ensure that the 
Indian navy has two operational aircraft carriers, two nuclear submarines and Scorpene-class 
submarines by the end of this decade. India is also acquiring maritime and airlift capabilities, which 
will enable it to respond appropriately to challenges across its Indian Ocean neighbourhood. 
While there is a measure of optimism about India’s eastern neighbourhood, the country’s Indian 
Ocean neighbourhood, extending from the Afpak region, across the Persian Gulf to the Straits of 
Hormuz and the shores of Somalia, remain volatile. Relations with Pakistan improved substantially, 
with broad agreement reached even on the framework of a settlement to the issue of Jammu and 
Kashmir, during the period 2003-2007, when General Pervez Musharraf was Pakistan’s President. 
This followed an assurance that General Musharraf would not allow “territory under Pakistan’s 
control” to be used for terrorism against India. Relations experienced a setback following the 
terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008, which was carried out by members of Lashkar e 
Taiba, an organization based in Pakistan. While dialogue between the two countries has resumed, 
concerns remain that tensions could escalate, should there be another major terrorist attack on 
Indian soil emanating from “territory under Pakistan’s control.” In the meantime, the effort will be 
to see if it is possible to build on the progress achieved before 2007. 
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, the Head 
of the Strategic Planning Division for its National Command Authority told a team of physicists 
from Italy’s Landau Network in 2002 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India.” 
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According to the report of the Landau team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons 
if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air 
forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of using nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically 
strangle” Pakistan or pushes it to political destabilization. Most Indian observers acknowledge that 
while there was a tendency within political and diplomatic quarters in Pakistan to wrongly assume 
that India would be deterred from conventional cross border responses if it was made out that 
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold was low, General Kidwai’s elucidation, which came in the wake of 
serious tensions along the borders, was a realistic signal of the military’s views on the thresholds of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons strategy. They set the stage for preventing misunderstandings about 
nuclear thresholds leading to nuclear escalation. It should, however, be evident that in the event of 
another terrorist attack like that on Mumbai on November 26, 2008, the Indian response is likely to 
be measured, proportionate, carefully calibrated and internationally justifiable. 
India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated on January 4, 2003, asserts that it intends to build 
and maintain a “credible, minimum deterrent.” This deterrent is to be based on a “triad” of “aircraft, 
mobile land-based missiles, and sea based assets.” While adopting a policy of “no first use,” the 
doctrine clarifies that its nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a major attack on 
Indian territory or against a nuclear attack on Indian forces anywhere. India also retains the right to 
use nuclear weapons in the event of major attacks on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, 
that use chemical or biological weapons. While concern has been voiced about strained relations 
between India and Pakistan leading to a nuclear conflict, India and Pakistan acknowledged on June 
6, 2004, that “the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security 
imperatives, constitute a factor for stability.” Apart from a degree of mutual confidence which now 
exists because of a better understanding of each other’s nuclear thresholds, India and Pakistan have 
cooperated in working out a series of nuclear CBMs. They have signed agreements on “Reducing 
the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons” and “Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of 
Ballistic Missiles.” India’s nuclear arsenal and delivery systems are not “Pakistan specific,” but geared 
to also deal with the existence of substantial Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. 
Interestingly, in recent months, there has been the commencement of a Track 2 dialogue between 
India, Pakistan and China, on enhancing nuclear confidence across their borders. 
The US intervention in Afghanistan was ill conceived and failed in military terms from the very 
outset. Actual fighting in the north and the takeover of Kabul was virtually outsourced to the 
Northern Alliance. More inexplicably, no attempt was made to block the exit route of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda leadership to safe havens in Pakistan, across the Durand Line. This has rejuvenated 
the Taliban and its allies, including the Al Qaeda, inflicting a heavy toll on American lives. With the 
Pakistan army unwilling and unable to crack down on groups long regarded as “assets,” the US and 
its NATO allies are stuck in an apparent quagmire, even though the hope has been expressed that 
Afghan forces will take on counter insurgency responsibilities by the end of 2014. The stalemate in 
Afghanistan is unlikely to end at an early date. It is unlikely that the Taliban will accept a solution 
that requires it to eventually lay down arms and accept the present Afghan Constitution. It is equally 
unlikely that the Taliban will forsake its allies in Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda linked groups like the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the North Caucasus Emirate, Lashkar e Taiba, Harkat ul Jihad ul 
Islami, or Jaish e Mohammed. And ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, together with a section of 
Pashtuns in Afghanistan, will resist any attempt at a Taliban takeover. It is unlikely that peace and 
stability will return to Afghanistan, in the course of this decade—a development that will have 
profound implications for peace and stability not just in Pakistan, but regionally and globally. 
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India’s Persian Gulf neighbourhood contains two thirds of the world’s proven petroleum reserves 
and 35% of the world’s gas reserves. Moreover, as energy demands increase worldwide, it is these 
countries, which maintain 90% of the world’s excess production capacity, which alone can meet the 
growing demand of rapidly emerging economies like China and India and help tide over breakdowns 
in supplies elsewhere. India’s major suppliers of oil from the Gulf are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. An estimated 5.8 million Indians reside and work in member 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Indians living in these six Arab States are responsible 
for the bulk of the $50 billion that Indians working abroad remit annually. These six countries meet 
around two-thirds of India’s oil needs. Iran provides 17% of India’s oil imports, with some key 
refineries dependent on Iranian crude. Moreover, Iran remains India’s transit point for trade with 
Central Asia, Afghanistan, and—through the Caspian—Russia. Iran and India share a common 
aversion to the return of Taliban style extremism to Afghanistan, but India joined the US and others 
on issues pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme. The assessment in the Global Trends 2025 report 
expressing doubt that Iran will inevitably go nuclear is broadly shared in India. But, in dealing with 
Iran, it would be a folly to underestimate the sentiments of of Persian civilizational pride that 
transcend internal political differences. 
The Persian Gulf remains a crucible for ancient rivalries, civilizational (Arab vs. Persian) and 
sectarian (Shia vs. Sunni). The depth of these animosities was exposed when, alluding to King 
Abdullah, Wikileaks revealed the “King’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and put an 
end to its nuclear weapons programme.” Riyadh even reportedly offered over-flight facilities to 
Israeli warplanes, in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel has astutely played 
on Arab-Persian rivalries to ensure it remains the sole nuclear power in the Middle East. Moreover, 
despite all talk of their solidarity with the Palestinians, a number of Arab countries maintain covert 
and not so covert ties with Mossad. 
The sectarian dimensions of rivalries in the Persian Gulf cannot be ignored. Iran has consistently 
stirred up Shia minorities in Yemen and Kuwait and the Shia majority in Sunni-ruled Bahrain. This 
rivalry is also being played out in Iraq, where the Shia majority has accused its Sunni Arab 
neighbours of backing extremist Sunni groups. Paradoxically, after endeavouring to follow a policy 
of “dual containment” of both Iran and Iraq for over a decade, the US is now finding that its ill 
advised invasion of Iraq has only brought the two countries closer together, with a number of Iraqi 
political and religious figures beholden to Tehran for the support they have received. As Charles 
Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, recently observed: "These changes (in the Arab 
world) are occurring as the US withdraws from Iraq, leaving behind a ruined country under heavy 
Iranian influence. Iraq is incapable, at least for now, of resuming its historic role as part of an Arab 
coalition to check Persian aspirations and hegemony in West Asia." While Arab regimes may be 
dependent on American support, the mood in Arab streets is distinctly anti-American—a 
development that will inevitably affect the course of developments in the Middle East and shape the 
contours of global terrorism. 
India’s relations with Arab Gulf States have shown a distinct improvement after the visits of Saudi 
Arabia’s King Abdullah in January 2006 and Dr. Manmohan Singh to Riyadh in February-March 
2010. India has received Saudi assurances of meeting of its growing requirements for oil. The desert 
kingdom and home of Islam’s holiest shrines appears to recognize the need to reach out to countries 
like India and China, even as it maintains its strong security ties with the US. Moreover, relations 
with Oman, the UAE and Qatar have expanded significantly, with Qatar emerging as an important 
supplier of liquified natural gas (LNG). While India enjoyed a good relationship with secular 
Baathist-ruled Iraq, it is the Indian view that the invasion of Iraq was a serious mistake. It has ignited 
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Shia-Sunni rivalries across the oil rich Persian Gulf and led to the emergence of strong links between 
erstwhile foes Iran and Iraq. The entire balance of power in the Persian Gulf has been destabilized. 
The greatest threats to global stability are likely to emerge even beyond the present decade will 
emerge from rivalries, instability, violence and terrorism in the Greater Middle East. It is imperative 
for outside powers to devise common strategies and collective measures to maintain peace and 
stability in this region.  
The Global Trends 2025 Report realistically acknowledges that the US will be one of a number of 
actors on the world stage, albeit the most powerful one. It notes that multipolar systems have been 
more unstable than bipolar or even unipolar ones. While noting that emerging powers and many 
Europeans dispute the right of any one power to be a global hegemon, the report observes this 
could well lead to less cohesiveness. But it is obvious that the new order that emerged with the end 
of the Cold War based on global economic dominance by the Atlantic alliance is no longer 
sustainable. But despite aging populations and the current economic downturn, Europe will remain 
an important player in the development of cutting edge technologies and economic assistance to 
developing countries. China and India are returning to the position they held two centuries ago, 
when they together they produced 45% of the world’s wealth. They are, for the first time since the 
18th Century, set to be the largest contributors to worldwide economic growth. These two countries 
are likely to surpass the GDP of all other countries except the US and perhaps Japan by 2025.  
What now appears to be transpiring is the emergence of a “Multipolar World Order”, where the 
emerging powers have relatively large populations, with their governments increasingly recognizing 
the importance of economic growth and technological advancement as being key to power and 
influence. Wars between emerging powers or with existing economically advanced nations would 
undermine their economic power, erode their global standing, and remain unwinnable. Such wars 
appear unlikely, in an era of increasing economic interdependence. But, rivalries in the quest for 
influence and primacy in different regions of the world and for preferred access to natural resources 
would remain inevitable. It is evident that given its innovative and technological capabilities, its 
technological edge in military capabilities, its vibrant democracy and its openness to immigration, the 
United States is and is likely to remain, the dominant player in world affairs for the foreseeable 
future. But, mired in an economic morass and with rates of economic growth averaging 2-3%, the 
United States cannot exercise influence exclusively. The concerns in the Global Trends 2025 Report 
about a “Fragmented International System,” however, appear misplaced, despite inevitable rivalries 
for influence and access to natural resources. Unlike during the Cold war and in earlier eras, the 
rivalry for natural resources and political influence has necessarily to be moderated by the 
imperatives of global economic interdependence. 
As mentioned earlier, the region stretching from South Asia to East and Southeast Asia is going 
through a historically unprecedented process of economic integration. Rivalries and tensions over 
territorial disputes, access to river water and other resources will, however, remain, along with 
concerns about the future directions of China’s policies. The US has a crucial role to play in 
remaining engaged with this region, in participating in an inclusive architecture for cooperation and 
security and for securing a viable Asian balance of power. The recently expanded East Asia Summit 
which brings together the members of ASEAN with Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New 
Zealand, India, Russia, and the US, provides an inclusive and viable framework for seeking these 
objectives. These developments are taking place at a time when emerging powers are building 
groupings like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where they can ensure that their 
interests on issues like energy, global warming, world trade and international finance are protected. 
Emerging countries will also seek to evolve a common approach to respond to efforts for “regime 
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change” through the use of military force, under the rubric of “Responsibility to Protect.” The 
emergence of the G20 as a forum to discuss global economic issues also reflects these changes in 
global power equations. 
The Tomorrow’s Security Challenges report alludes to the rise of non-state networks and possibilities of a 
return of Great Power confrontations. Given the volatility of the political situation across the greater 
Middle East, it is evident that the problems posed by local, regional and global terrorist networks 
will continue. As global communications and interconnectivity expand, networking between terrorist 
organizations will inevitably expand, posing a greater threat to global stability. The US and more 
significantly its European allies will remain vulnerable to such threats, given the growing population 
of immigrants and expatriate populations who bring local grievances and prejudices from their home 
countries. Manifestations of what some describe as “Islamophobia” in countries like France may, 
however, only increase the potential for terrorist violence across Europe. 
Despite its military/technological edge, the United States will find it costly and difficult to respond 
to perceived threats through conventional military intervention, as it has done in the past decade in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost the American taxpayer an estimated 
total of $1.1 trillion through July 2010. The Iraq invasion led to an estimated 655,000 Iraqis killed 
and 4.2 million displaced from their homes. It has only resulted in greater instability across the 
greater Middle East, with sectarian rivalries being accentuated and the entire balance of power 
destabilised. While the military intervention in Afghanistan was inevitable and internationally 
justifiable after the terrorist strikes of 9/11, the wisdom and necessity of military action in Iraq is 
questionable. Both these conflicts have established that counterinsurgency on foreign soil is 
expensive and often unwinnable. The AK-47, IED, and suicide bomber are great “equalizers.” They 
can render counter-insurgency operations in distant lands costly and unsustainable.  
In these circumstances, it is important that, while avoiding massive commitments of ground forces, 
powers like the US deploy their military potential and particularly ground forces rarely, using them 
selectively and primarily as a deterrent. Ill advised and ill planned use of military power, which 
cannot achieve strategic objectives in a matter of days, only reduces credibility and invites challenges. 
Moreover, use of force has to invariably enjoy international sanction and legitimacy. As global 
economic interdependence grows, ways will be found for major powers not to allow competition to 
lead to confrontation. The global situation is such that no major power can prevail militarily over 
real or perceived rivals, without having to pay unacceptably high costs, nationally. The challenge lies 
in devising frameworks of consultation and cooperation, to avoid competition spiralling into 
confrontation. 
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Predicting future war and warfare is as daunting a task as the issue of forecasting world politics. Paul 
Hirst (2002: 90) argued that: “Predicting the future of war is a risky business. The key thing to avoid 
is over generalisation from current events.” Hans Morgenthau (1985: 23) even claimed that: “The 
first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities 
of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the 
scholar and the charlatan part company.” Another well known and respected American social 
scientist, Robert Jervis (1992), once stressed that the basic problem for us is that phenomena such as 
wars tend to be multi-causal and, since predictions usually rely on extrapolating from one variable, 
predictions are inherently difficult in world politics. A second problem for forecasting is that 
humans may actually learn things. If they do, they can, of course, avoid repeating past mistakes; but, 
as they do so, they inadvertently make predictions even trickier. John Lewis Gaddis (2004: 11) has 
argued that the true worth of history is “to prepare you for the future by expanding experience, so 
that you can increase your skills, your stamina—and, if all goes well, your wisdom.”  
In general, it is fruitful to distinguish between different approaches to the study of the future and the 
role of the future for current policy processes. The first approach develops scenarios for the future. 
It can be said to premier current policy considerations over necessarily predicting the future as such. 
Typically, government long-term planning focuses on this approach, since it provides clear-cut 
alternatives that the state needs to factor in and, in worst-case scenarios, try to avoid or manage. 
This approach can often be criticised for overstating the importance of present policy concerns in 
predicting the future. Moreover, scenarios are quite often detached from the current situation, thus 
creating the impression of lack of agency. The second approach attempts to predict the future as 
correctly as possible, and these predictions then serve as a basis for current policy options. Within 
this approach, current trends are usually thought to have an important role insofar as they serve as 
the baseline from which to extrapolate the future. Often, structural features such as conflict patterns, 
demography, and long-term economic trends are used within this approach. It, too, can be criticised 
for understating the importance of agency in shaping the future. Still, by being grounded in 
systematic data, it provides a compelling case for telling us something about the future.  
In this paper, I will develop a slightly different approach that instead assumes that the future is path-
dependent. This approach allows for a greater impact of agency and can be easily summed up as 
what happens in 2030 depends upon what we do in 2029, and what happens in 2029 depends upon 
what we do in 2028, and so on. Agency thus becomes crucial for shaping the future. Moreover, 
rather than focusing on actions, in this paper, I will primarily focus on norms. Norms change only 
gradually and slowly and are therefore a more promising baseline than current actions. Specifically, I 
will focus on norms of political order: about what it means to govern and be governed, how we 
understand the relationship between the public and private, and the concepts of civil and military.  
This paper is structured as follows. First, I will briefly discuss current patterns in war and warfare to 
evaluate whether or not there are trends that can be discerned. This part of the paper is based on the 
second approach and it serves a springboard to begin to think differently about the future. 
Throughout the paper, I will use the trends as a point of departure. Second, I will begin with a 
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 discussion on what we already know about the future. In doing so, I will critically engage with the 
NIC documents Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World and Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: The Defence 
Implications of Emerging Global Trends. In short, my critique will stress the lack of attention given to 
ideational factors. Third, and finally, I will suggest ideationally driven scenarios and identify the 
challenges to such a development of war and warfare.  
 
What we know of the recent past 
There are a number of different data sets on armed conflict. To possibly identify some current 
trends, I consulted Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). This source has recorded ongoing 
violent conflicts since the 1970s and tracks conflicts back to the Second World War. Its definition of 
armed conflict is becoming a standard in how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. Its 
data is used in research published worldwide and in many top journals. Every year its updated data is 
published in Journal of Peace Research, as well as in a separate research report identifying trends in 
armed conflicts.  
There are a number of visible trends in the data that most likely is interesting for ten to 20 years into 
the future. First, the number of conflicts nearly doubled in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This 
number peaked in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but then slowly receded down to a 
1980s level where it seemingly has stabilized. Second, it is, in particular, armed conflicts in the 
developing world—in Africa and Asia, specifically—that can account for the rise of armed conflict 
in the 1970s and 1980s (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Armed Conflicts by Region, 1946–2009 
 
 
Third, it is clear that intrastate armed conflicts have been a major problem since the early 1960s, and 
this trend is reinforced throughout the following decades. The one category that starts to challenge 
this picture is internationalized armed conflicts, but they are still just a minor part of the total 
number of armed conflicts. We can also see that traditional interstate armed conflict is something 
that has been remarkably uncommon during the whole era (figure 2).  
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Fourth, contrary to popular wisdom that holds that ethnicity-based and secessionist wars have been 
the major problem for international security since the Cold War, it is primarily conflicts regarding 
governance that have increased since the 1970s, while the number of ethnicity-based and 
secessionist armed conflicts have remained more or less stable since the mid-1960s (figure 3).  
 




Finally, the data confirm the well-known tendency that armed conflicts do not escalate very often 
into wars, large-scale organised violence. The number of on-going wars throughout this period has 
roughly been 5-10 per year. The increase from the 1970s and onwards in armed conflicts instead can 
be attributed to an increase in minor armed conflicts (figure 4). Armed conflict is defined by UCDP 
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 as “… a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths.” War is defined as involving “At least 1,000 battle-related deaths in 
one calendar year.” 
 




Following from this, one could argue that typical armed conflicts in the future will be of fairly low 
intensity, occur in the developing world, mainly be intrastate, and are most likely to be about the 
governance of a state. One of the problems, however, with trying to project these trends, even into 
the near future of coming decades, is that we need to figure out how to explain these trends. If we 
cannot, then we cannot be sure that we are projecting the right trends. It is also difficult for data-
collection forecasts to account for sudden disruptions and discontinuities. This challenge is 
appropriately recognised in Global Trends 2025. The end of the Cold War and its consequences are 
cases in point. To try to figure out the future, it may be necessary to use a different approach. 
 
What we already know about the future 
My starting point for this discussion is that predicting the future may not be a problem. It is my 
contention that we know the medium-term future of war and warfare pretty well already. We know it 
already. This may sound rather alarming at first, but two important conditions underpin this claim.  
First, if you believe in the importance of ideational factors, i.e., if you are in any shape or form a 
little bit constructivist, you will recognise that we cannot fight wars and conduct strategy or 
operations in a way we have not thought about beforehand. A number of scholars have recognised 
the impact of culture and mental frameworks on the conduct of operations (e.g. Farrell 2005; van 
Creveld 2009). Hence, a precondition for action is our images of war. Our planning and plans for 
war are, therefore, important roadmaps. Our categories of warfare will influence how we conduct 
our operations in the future. In this case, two sets of norms are critical.  
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 Following Katzenstein (1996), we can differentiate between constitutive norms and prescriptive 
norms. The former refers to a set of norms regarding our identity, while the latter refers to a set of 
norms encouraging or discouraging certain behaviour. Following this logic, we can talk of certain 
prevailing values in the West today that make us who we are and what we deem acceptable military 
behaviour to reach policy ends. For instance, in the Kosovar village of Caglavica in 2004, Swedish 
soldiers took a beating for more than 12 hours with sticks, bottles, and stones thrown at them, but 
they did not open fire. Neither did they, despite having the capacity to do so, attack the villagers 
during the night using their superior night vision capability as a force multiplier. Change century to 
the Thirty Years’ War. Again with Swedish forces fighting on the European continent, there are 
hardly any doubts that Swedish units committed what we now would consider atrocities.  
One could also argue that current soldier ethos—and what military sociologist Anthony King has 
called “infanterisation of war”—are problems for Western counter-insurgency efforts. Is part of the 
problem for the West that we are trained for and our doctrines are written for a war on the Soviet 
Union in Central Europe? Can we have a truly “adaptive mindset,” or do we need to choose our 
images of war? Regardless, these arguments suggest that since there is inertia in our minds of what 
war will look like; all we have to do is investigate the outcome of the work of groups such as 
ourselves. The categories, operation types, and strategies that we come up with are the ones we can 
expect to be pursued and conducted in the medium-term future. In short, since we will fight the 
wars we can imagine, we can already now understand how wars will look in 20 years.  
Second, even if you are not a constructivist, you can still reach the conclusion that we already know 
what wars will look like in the medium-term future. The reason, from a rationalist point of view, 
would be to stress partly the plans and planning that are conducted in military staffs and 
headquarters around the globe. The planning exercises that take place and are contrived in military 
colleges are also part of this and are influenced in part by the long life cycle of today’s advanced 
military hardware. For instance, we know that Sweden will not wage nuclear war even in 20 years’ 
time. It simply does not have the know-how and technological capabilities to build the warheads and 
missiles needed to wage nuclear war. It is not uncommon to talk of advanced weapon systems 
having a life cycle of 30 to 40 years from development to retirement. Whatever capabilities we now 
have or are developing will be the capabilities that we have at our disposal in the medium-term 
future. This line of reasoning also points to the fact that we already know quite a bit about future 
war.  
There are, however, two important problems with this approach. First, as Clausewitz reminds us, 
war, we control the dynamics equally as much as our opponent does. Thus, even if we assume that 
our mental frameworks rule our behaviour, the opponent is likely to differ in terms of how the war 
should be conducted. This interaction is inherent in war. In that interchange of strategies, there are 
bound to be surprises and processes of learning, adapting, and copying (Horowitz 2010). It also 
follows that our opponent may create different military capabilities that can counter ours. We, thus, 
cannot be completely sure that actual war in the future will follow exactly how we currently think 
and prepare for war. Elsewhere, I (2011) have differentiated between four types of asymmetric 
conflicts: configurative, power, organizational, and norms. Perhaps the most challenging of these 
will be asymmetry in norms, which this paper will address in the following section.  
Second, even if the argument that how we prepare, plan, and think today reflects how we will do so 
in the future was a perfect match, it does not really help us a great deal in limiting the alternatives. 
Typically, long-term defense planning attempts to cover all conceivable bases when describing future 
war. For example, the document at hand includes conflict categories and scenarios such as great-
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 power war, small-power war, and non-state war; we also consider potential conflict scenarios as 
nuclear wars, conventional wars, and asymmetric wars. This vast range usually makes it very difficult 
and impractical to establish priorities. On the one hand, for instance, Sweden may feel constrained 
by its limited resources and thus tough priorities are needed. The US military with considerably more 
resources may not need to set such priorities; but, on the other hand, perhaps increased guidance 
and priorities are exactly what is needed in the US context, too. Note, however, that this is not 
necessarily a major criticism of the two NIC documents. I think they are strong, seem thought-
through, and make a very convincing case in futurology for the scenarios.  
The one major bit of criticism, though, that can be levelled against the documents is that they 
underplay the role of ideas and norms in strategic decisions, such as what military capabilities a state 
acquires, when it goes to war, and how it conducts war. Neither of the documents, moreover, 
question fundamental features of the political order today.  
 
Notions of political order and their impact on war and warfare 
Following Kalevi Holsti (1996), my starting point in this argument is that our ideas of political order 
have an impact on three things: 1) how we institutionalise large-scale violence, i.e., the organizations 
that we create to conduct war; 2) for what purposes we conduct wars; and 3) how we conduct war. 
In the following, I will outline this logic and, derived from three-tiered global political order, identify 
three challenges that are not only bothersome but that are also most-likely scenarios for the West. A 
main conclusion from this may be that we create problems for ourselves.  
Modern archaeologists of humankind now know that rather than a serial evolution from 
Neanderthals to Homo sapiens where one species replaced the other these two species co-existed 
for thousands of years with interbreeding taking place. It is logical that other forms of interaction 
took place, as well, including conflict and competition for food, resources, and housing. I claim is 
that we, too, now live in a period of change in human history and fundamental transition in human 
social and political order. War and conflict are inherent parts of these orders. But war plays different 
roles in these processes. It is creator, destroyer, and maintainer. Types of war and conflict will 
therefore co-exist. It will not be a time of only interstate war or only intrastate (or extra-state) war; it 
will be a transition period where both types of war and conflict will exist at the same time. This is 
not the first time such a set of competing forms of political order have existed. Hendrik Spruyt 
(1994) has demonstrated that in late Medieval Europe, emerging territorial sovereign states co-
existed with city-states and empires, as well as overlapping authorities of the Church, world leaders, 
and feudal princes. Rivalry between economic and political systems ensued. It took, arguably, several 
hundred years of wars and unrest to settle the European state system.  
Today, three major forms of political order co-exist (Cooper 2003). Within each political regime (or 
system of thinking), the various actors share similar interpretations for the concepts of power, 
justice, war, violence, peace, victory, and the relationship between private and public. Between the 
different forms of political order there is not a shared understanding of these key concepts. First, we 
have what we can call pre-Westphalian political order. We find this most often in the developing 
world; indeed, the lack of a Western version of statehood is a well-known problem among scholars 
interested in the developing world. My Western understanding of the pre-Westphalian system 
shares, for example, many similarities with what Jackson (1990) termed “quasi-states. In a way, these 
are political systems that never went through the internal processes of state-building and instead 
have experienced a mixture of external “life-support” and “too tight embraces”—to use Astri 
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 Suhrke’s (2010) words—from an “invited Leviathan” (Angstrom 2008). Note that the lack of a 
strong Westphalian state system does not imply that there is chaos. Quite a few studies have instead 
demonstrated the quite remarkable longevity and stability of this pre-Westphalian order. Not only 
has it proven successful in terms of survival, but some individuals and collective actors can thrive 
and prosper within the order. Still, weak statehood also means that there are alternative levels of 
identity formation. Clans, families, and ethnic groups remain viable alternatives to the state. 
Second, we have a remaining Westphalian political order. In East Asia, parts of Latin America, and 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Westphalian state order remains strong and vital. Paradoxically, the 
wars that broke up Yugoslavia strengthened the state system in that region. Processes of 
centralization and capital accumulation continue unchecked in these regions, and the state capitals 
are capable of extending control over territory and population to an increased degree. Processes of 
identity formation are increasingly joined with statehood. Initiation in adulthood happens with clear 
state symbols, such as the right to vote and conscription.  
Third, primarily in Western Europe and the US, globalisation, increased interstate trade, and porous 
borders are transforming the political order. This is especially so with the emergence of the modern 
European Union, something political scientists still struggle to define and conceptualise. Following 
Cooper and Sperling (2009), we can talk of an emerging post-Westphalian form of political order. 
Here, again, identities become disjointed from the state. Professional armies and the emergence of 
private security options are partly decoupling the state from security and identity.  
For the purposes of analysis, I understand war not only as an expression of agency but from 
functional perspective, as an institution within the forms of order. War will maintain the order. 
Because war is seen—from within this system—as only useable by a certain category of social actors; 
whenever war is fought, it confirms the social order. Other violence is understood to be something 
other than war. War is, therefore, central to work out differences between actors—to handle 
conflicts. And, it has been understood to be the final arbiter of these differences of opinion. Thus, 
when in doubt, use war, because, however harmful, it is the one institution that confirms the system. 
And it is one where the rules of the game—and practices of war—are more or less coherent within 
each “system of thought and values.” Within the Westphalian regime, war has been stigmatized, or 
even prohibited in various forms of international law if there was a state involved. If other actors 
engaged in organizing large-scale, politically motivated violence, it was not considered to be war, but 
a form of crime. In this way, war confirmed the existence of the state throughout the Westphalian 
system, which by the war was re-created continuously. The Westphalian order is confirmed 
continuously through a long list of institutions other than war, international intergovernmental 
organizations such as the UN, diplomacy, foreign aid, and international trade.  
Simultaneously, I suggest that war maintains the non-Westphalian systems of order, too. But, these 
have a different version of war and, consequently, a different form of social and political order is 
reproduced and maintained, one that is decentralised and small scale, with skirmishes and limited 
combat, rather than mass battles as the main kinetic interaction. This implies that there is no need 
for larger armies, which means that there are few incentives to bureaucratize and make taxation 
more efficient, which again reinforces a decentralised political order (Angstrom under review). Even 
in this kind of order, war retains political order. Here, it is not a state that is created or recreated, 
since the war between the actors in this system of thought is not carried out large-scale, but through 
small wars where skirmishes, ambushes, and looting dominate warfare. The consequence is that this 
type of war generates and regenerates a different polity on a continual basis.  
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 War, while it effectively maintains a particular form of social order, is also the major challenge for 
this particular form of order. War was a central part in creating this system, but it is also the one 
force that can unravel it, if one lets it go. And this is the second function for the rivalling social 
political order. It destroys the old system by being the major form for rivalling the existing socio-
political order. These forms of war will be fought between different systems of thought, different 
perceptions of what constitutes civilians, victory, and indeed war itself. The coming 30 years will be, 
I claim, a transition period where both types of war and conflict will exist at the same time; just as 
Neanderthals and Homo sapiens interbred, so may the types of war and conflict. And in these 
clashes, war will destroy the social and political order of one or both of the actors.  
If we understand war from a functionalistic perspective, war is also a process of emulation, learning, 
adaptation, and adjustment. This also means that war between forms of order will not only be a 
force for transformation of the actors’ political systems but also a force for transforming warfare 
itself. We have only seen this in Afghanistan so far. The war in Iraq in the 2000s was not a challenge 
to destroy things; it has confirmed the state. But the evolution in Central Asia and in the Afghan-
Pakistan border regions is the sign of things to come where these systems of thought collide.  
This form of conflict will occur between actors representing different interpretations of social and 
political order, non-Westphalian versus Westphalian. It is worth noting that this development 
cannot be equated with “the West Against the Rest” hypothesis according to a Huntingtonian 
cultural logic. First of all, conflicts will not arise between cultures, like earthquakes in the cracks 
between teutonic plates, as Huntington claimed. Already we can observe conflict between different 
factions representing nongovernmental regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, two states with 
essentially Westphalian orders—and these are two countries located in the same culture, according 
to Huntington. Second, Huntington’s culturalist argument is essentially pessimistic, because he 
claims that the basic cause of conflict is the diversity of cultures. Thus, because there are likely to be 
differences among people in the foreseeable future, conflicts will also continue. The earlier points 
made about different types of political order are, in contrast to Huntington, an optimistic thought. 
Since conflict is a result of different perceptions as to what is the correct interpretation of various 
concepts, we can learn to think differently. The archtypical case of a conflict under the third type of 
conflict is the conflict in southern Central Asia, which has lasted for over 30 years and involves 
globalized post-Westphalian actors, Westphalian actors, and decentralized nonstate actors. In all 
respects, this is a form of conflict where the involved parties have to change their fundamental ideas 
about key concepts, such as justice, power, and the like. If this war is a “struggle of wills,” only very 
fundamental societal transformations will constitute “victory.” 
It is equally important to note that these types of conflict are not equivalent to the dichotomy 
between the regular and irregular. There are several typical Westphalian wars and conflicts in which 
irregular warfare has been a central part of the war. In a way, it is the inclusive presence of the idea 
of a dichotomy between regular and irregular confirmation that we live in a Westphalian system. The 
word regular means literally “regular” or normal. It could be argued that the establishment of a 
dichotomy where one considered to follow the rules, while the other does not, by implication, 
suggests a normative statement about what is desirable. We are usually not, of course, arguing that it 
is good to break the rules.  
Take two poignant examples of the challenges for the Westphalian and post-Westphalian system of 
order: The separation of public and private, as well as the separation of civil and military, are inherent 
norms that made the Westphalian state possible and that also underpin the two NIC documents 
under consideration here. As keen followers of politics and conflict in the developing world will tell 
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 you, however, this separation is far from self-evident. Those knowledgeable about European history 
also will far better understand politics in Somalia or Afghanistan using the lenses of absolutist 
monarchies than through the spectacles provided by modern European states. In an essay titled 
“Nixon in Hell,” Richard N. Lebow (2003) portrays how the distinction between public and private 
is a specifically Western norm and one which evidently is not shared by many rulers in the 
developing world, where, in many cases, the revenues of state are considered to be the ruler’s private 
property. By placing this logic in a US setting with Richard Nixon, Lebow’s analysis aptly captures 
how we—as Nixon does when being tortured in Hell for things he did as holder of the office of the 
US Presidency—would struggle with a system that does not recognise the separation of public and 
private.  
We do not have to go to essayistic endeavours to illustrate how uneasy we become with actions that 
undermine the separation of public and private. The intended killing of political leaders of our 
opponents is an even clearer example, as illustrated by the different fates of Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden. US forces captured Hussein and handed him over to the Iraqi authorities for 
prosecution and later conviction and execution. Although there was some criticism, it was primarily 
levelled at the new Iraqi government for keeping the death penalty. However, in the case of Osama 
bin Laden, US soldiers seemingly were forced to kill him on the spot, rather than capturing him for a 
US court to decide his fate. Suddenly, an ethical and legal debate has emerged about the legitimacy 
of killing the political leaders of one’s opponents. While understandable, the strategic narrative of 
the West intervening in other states has for the past 20 years been one of separating the leader from 
the population by claiming that we are conducting a war against (any given leader’s name), not the 
(any given country’s) population. The consequence of this narrative is that the leader is personalized 
rather than made a holder of an office. Public office is thus turned into a private matter; the 
distinction between private and public that we want to maintain and that underpins the state is 
threatened. In stressing this newer strategic message, we undermine ourselves and our form of 
political order.  
A second example is how altering our understanding of the separation of civil and military would 
challenge and risk changing us in ways we are not necessarily comfortable with. This problem, again, 
is partly driven by our own strategies and is, therefore, a prime example of how war is a process of 
adjustment and copying. The current war in Afghanistan may not necessarily leave us in a position 
where our opponents adjust to our will; instead, we may end up copying the Taliban to a further 
extent than we originally thought. The problem is that military force has become primarily a tactical 
tool (Smith 2007; Angstrom & Duyvesteyn 2010). Because it is of tactical utility, we will struggle to 
conduct war in mixed-war contexts. If we fight an opponent who does not distinguish between 
civilian and military the way we tend to do, it will be difficult to conduct any reasonable targeting 
with kinetic or non-kinetic means. More importantly, though, the way we prepare for war makes a 
sharp distinction between civil and military and also between war and peace, where different judicial 
systems were meant to operate. This Western zone of comfort, however, is increasingly challenged 
when conducting war in the developing world. The result has been an increased focus on tactics. If 
we only kill enough, or kill the right ones, the tactical victories would be translatable into strategic 
effects.  
What if, to reach strategic ends, there is a need to adapt not only militarily, but also politically? Are 
we prepared to weaken the distinction between civil and military, upon which so much of our 
political and legal frameworks hinge? Traditionally, civilian in the Western context has meant an 
individual that is not a member of a militia or the armed forces. If we face an opponent who does 
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 not understand civilian in this way—instead using “part-timers,” for instance—our forces will 
struggle to identify proper targets and question whom to protect.  
Recasting the distinction and contents of the dichotomy between civilian and military presents three 
bad options. First, recasting civilians to be exposed as a state is hugely controversial. It would, for 
example, entail that the West adapts to the pre-Westphalian system. It would, for example, imply 
treating development aid in strategic rather than altruistic sense. If we compromise our belief 
systems, one can even start to discuss whether or not we have already lost the war.  
A second unfavorable option is to change what we mean by peace and war. The two options are, of 
course, interrelated, since we do not normally associate killing civilians with war. Critically, however, 
it may be necessary to stop making a sharp distinction between war and peace. This is troubling, 
since it would undermine international law and quite a few national laws as well, but it also has some 
promise. If we return to an understanding of organized violence as an arbiter and a constant 
presence, we may be better off fighting today’s types of wars. This is tempting, since it would 
reinforce and be in accordance with the fact that force has tactical utility. However, another 
drawback is that this would effectively leave strategy out of the war. If we do not have a political end 
in mind for the war, we would never be able to tell whether or not we won, we would not be able to 
hold our leadership accountable, and we would not be able to separate war from peace. Again, 
would not such a development imply that we have adapted to the will of our opponent?  
The third bad option would be to force the opponent to adapt to our understanding of order and 
war. As soon as that would happen, the West’s superior technology, superior firepower, and 
capabilities for large-scale warfare and integrating the branches would overpower the sometimes-
ragged local actors. The problem is that it is also clear to our opponents that playing the game 
according to the West’s standards is not an option; doing so would imply suicide to fight the West 
according to the West’s way of doing and thinking strategy. Moreover, we can hardly accredit the 
Taliban, al-Qaeda or other militants for not being guile, cleaver, and skillful.  
A third example is directly driven by globalisation. Because of modern communications, we have 
near-worldwide instant exchange of ideas and spread of ideas. Images and information of living 
standards, role models, and political ideas can spread quickly and more or less freely. Egyptian 
authorities tried to shut down social media and computer networks in an attempt to stop the 
demonstrations in central Cairo. They blocked Twitter, Facebook and other social-media sites, but 
the demonstrators maintained contact with each other and spread information through dating 
agencies and dating chat rooms that were still open. “Let’s meet at Tahir for a kiss at seven,” 
suddenly had a new—and for the Egyptian authorities—threatening meaning. The spread of ideas is 
not necessarily a problem in and of itself, but widespread access to information so far seems to have 
generated a sense of entitlement, not duty.  
If we step back in history for a short while, we can witness how European kings maintained social 
and political order by granting royal privileges. Some were exempt from taxation, some were granted 
housing and land, and some were given the opportunity for retirement benefits, far earlier than 
modern-day pensions were established. In response, nobility, priests, free peasantry, and burgers 
paid their taxes and made arms and locals available for the king’s use. The important part of this 
exchange was that privilege was turned into a sense of duty. An important part of being an adult 
citizen gradually was interwoven with enrolling as a conscript. Far earlier, of course, the nobility 
started to pride itself, and define itself, in relation to other segments of society by allegiance, duty, 
and loyalty as the leit motif in life. It seems today that increased individualization and freedom from 
the state, i.e., a privilege, has not turned into a sense of duty among the young in many parts of the 
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 developing and developed world. Instead, images of others’ seemingly more wealthy lifestyles spread 
quickly, generating a sense of entitlement, i.e., a sense of craving more. This may appear to be a 
conservative viewpoint, but it is not meant as such. Just observing images of the wealth of many 
Western societies today does not reveal the hard work that has been put in to create that wealth. 
Nor does it reveal the extent to which the wealth of the globalized North was made possible at the 
expense of the South.  
As has been evident the last few months, the West is ambivalent toward the Arab Spring. The 
concept of democracy is deeply entrenched in our identity, so supporting the demonstrators should 
seem quite reasonable. At the same time, however, we show the same anxiety over change that was 
felt early on in the fall of 1989 when the Eastern Block crumbled. This time, voices have even been 
heard implying “stability” is even more important, since those striving for democracy this time are 
Muslim; there is a fear among some that Islamic fundamentalism will dominate in a democracy, 
rather than the tolerant traditions within Islam rising to the fore in elections. If we were to support 
the authoritarian Arabic leaders, however, what does that tell us about ourselves?  
 
Conclusions: Identifying challenges  
In this paper, I have primarily engaged with the question of what current trends in war and warfare 
will continue and strengthen over the coming decades. I have done so using three different 
approaches. First, extrapolating from recent and current trends seen in the UCDP dataset, we can 
possibly project that future armed conflicts will primarily be intrastate, relatively low-intensity affairs, 
occur in the developing world, and number around 30 to 40 annually. There will be some instances 
of interstate wars, but these will be few. Increasingly, armed conflicts will be about how states are 
governed, rather than about the make up of the state’s people and territory. This approach has some 
drawbacks, though, as discussed above. 
Second, I suggested that we already know quite a bit about future warfare through self-reflection on 
how, what, and when we plan and prepare for war as well as our current technologies of warfare. 
Based on this, we can expect that the US (not the entire West) will prepare for many types of armed 
conflict: global and regional, against great-power opponents and terrorist groups, and fought with 
weapons ranging from nuclear weapons to small arms. This approach, too, has some problems, 
most notably that armed conflicts are interactions where opponents govern your behaviour to the 
same extent that you govern theirs. Thus, deducing what future warfare will look like based on our 
planning and capabilities will only capture a glimpse of future war.  
Third, I suggest an alternative: that norms of political order will have a major influence on the 
reasons why we fight, how we fight, and how we organize for fighting. My main criticism against 
Global Trends 2025 would be that it does not sufficiently take into account such ideational factors. If 
one follows the logic of a three-tiered global political order, it is possible to outline more 
uncomfortable scenarios.  
The challenge is that we are putting ourselves in these uncomfortable positions. The current 
strategies of the West are especially ill prepared to deal with these scenarios. Problematically, the 
behaviour of the West is one of the causes of this trend. Our current behaviour strengthens the very 
same tendencies that challenge us and undermines how we understand justice, right, public, private, 
civil, military, and—indeed—also peace and war. We are adapting to our opponents’ values at the 
moment. And it is precisely because we do so that we struggle with the Arab Spring. The 
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 globalization of our values—democracy, capitalism, and freedom from oppressive leaders—creates 
among the impoverished of the developing world a sense of entitlement when given the privilege to 
govern. Not duty. And it is precisely a sense of duty that has upheld social and political order in the 
West. It made the differentiation between public and private possible—and it made a division of 
labor possible between the civilian and military realms. As these divisions erode, we may come to 
look more like our opponents. This will—quite possibly—make us more effective in war against 
them, but what will be the costs of placing such a premium on tactics?  
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7. The Future of Western Warfare: Coalitions and Capability Gaps 
Theo Farrell 
 
The US National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) report Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: The Defence 
Implications of Emerging Global Trends (TSC) presents four future worlds – concert of powers, 
fragmented international system, rise of non-state networks, and return of great-power 
confrontations – as a heuristic device to identify and explore the challenges facing American 
policymakers and strategists out to 2025. TSC says nothing about the modalities of US military 
power projection in these four futures. Of course, this is appropriate given that TSC is a product of 
the NIC. But equally, it is appropriate for participants of this workshop to ponder what form US 
power projection is most likely to take. 
One may predict, with a fair degree of certainty, that for the foreseeable future the United States will 
seek where possible to project military power in partnership with liked-minded states. This may 
occur within a formal framework, such as NATO, or through informal arrangement, i.e., an ad-hoc 
military coalition. Wartime partnership brings political and military benefits. Politically, it increases 
the legitimacy of the military campaign. And even for a superpower, like the United States, 
partnership in war offers military advantages. The ongoing war in Afghanistan points to three such 
benefits, in particular: More boots on the ground; increased civilian capacities; and more military 
specialists with a diversity of expertise, especially special operation forces (SOF) and other key 
enablers, such as medical, engineering, and counter-Improvised Explosive Devise (CIED) 
personnel. 
To be sure, going into war alongside partners brings its own set of problems. At a minimum, there 
are coordination problems, both strategic and operational. Some military operations may require the 
authorization of all partner governments, and this reduces the agility of campaign command. Within 
the campaign itself, many national militaries create complications in the command chain and in 
planning, logistics, and the conduct of operations. 
Yet for all these problems, the advantages of partnership in war outweigh the disadvantages. This is 
especially true, as noted, because partnership may take many different forms. I start by making the 
case for coalition warfare focusing on a core of states within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). I go on to discuss some of the capability shortfalls of European coalition partners. While 
technology is the most obvious capability gap, I identify less-noted shortfalls in strategy and law. 
Finally, I discuss the implications in terms of the four futures presented in TSC. 
 
Coalition warfare and the “fighting core” 
It is hard to imagine a scenario where the United States would go to war unilaterally inside the next 14 
years. Discrete unilateral use of force is possible, indeed likely. But any full-blown military campaign 
will almost certainly involve the United States in partnership with other states. Depending on where 
a future war lies on the necessity-discretion scale, partnership will come about due to demand or 
supply pressures. In a war at the necessity end of the spectrum, such as the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan, there will be supply pressures from US partners; indeed, any such war is likely to 
invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. In a war situated closer to the discretion end of the scale, 
such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, there will be demand pressures from within the US government to 
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 gather partners in order to increase the international and domestic legitimacy of the military 
campaign.  
The good news is that the United States has a number of fairly reliable military partners, i.e., 
Western states with a range of military capabilities and the willingness to project force globally 
alongside America. There is a core of states within NATO that have demonstrated this war-fighting 
potential, as well as Australia. Crucial here will be NATO’s reinvention of itself as a global security 
organization. In truth, NATO has failed to develop the machinery to project power globally; the 
NATO Response Force is a disappointment, having never deployed and eventually been 
downgraded. At the same time, NATO remains committed to its global security mission, and this is 
reinforced in the alliance’s New Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010.  
As a large alliance of now 28 states, NATO packs a powerful legitimacy punch when it comes to 
war. Indeed, as a general principle, the most powerful states carry more authoritative weight in 
customary international law. This principle was tested to an extent in NATO’s war against Serbia 
over Kosovo in 1999. In this case, NATO chose not to assert the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention as an evolving exception to the general prohibition in international law against the 
threat or use of force against other states. However, NATO’s intervention was still widely 
recognised as legitimate even if, strictly speaking, it was unlawful, because this war was conducted by 
such a powerful group of states with clear humanitarian purpose. 
Against this are some downsides. As a general rule, formal alliances are more unwieldy than ad-hoc 
coalitions. They have drawn out decision-making processes that can interfere with the military 
command of ongoing campaigns. Moreover, the less martial states within the alliance may restrain a 
more robust strategy.1 The problem is compounded by size and diversity, in that large alliances offer 
more opportunities for disagreement over strategy. NATO faces all these problems.  
These coordination, size, and restraint problems were all evident in the Kosovo air campaign. 
NATO’s senior decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council, was tasked to authorize whole 
categories of targets. But NATO capitals ended up imposing a target-by-target approach 
requirement on the campaign commander, SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clarke. Sixty-four percent of the 
fixed targets required higher approval, with the more sensitive targets requiring approval from all 19 
NATO capitals. At the end of the 78-day bombing campaign, there were some 150 fixed targets still 
awaiting approval from NATO capitals. NATO’s eastward expansion since the Kosovo campaign, 
growing the alliance from 19 to 28 members, has exacerbated its cumbersome character. 
The current war in Afghanistan, formally NATO-led, further demonstrates the problem of caveats. 
Some NATO states have imposed stipulations to limit the possibility of their forces being drawn 
into the war. Some, such as Belgium, Bulgaria, and Greece, will not even permit their forces to leave 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bases. Moreover, some of countries with large 
military forces, namely, Germany, Italy, and Spain, have deployed only to the more permissive 
northern and western regions of Afghanistan.  
But Afghanistan also demonstrates the potential and importance of military partnerships for US war 
efforts. In crude numbers of boots on the ground, the role of partners has been essential. At the 
height of the European contribution, in mid-2010, the partners were contributing 41,500 troops to 
ISAF whilst the United States was providing 78,500. Moreover, the contribution of some states 
from 2006-2009, when the United States was focused on Iraq, was little short of essential: Britain, 
Canada, and Holland held the line in the south, leaving the US Army to concentrate on the east 
during this period. 
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Table 1. Key US military partners in Afghanistan: Number of troops, 2010 
 
Australia 1,550 Germany 4,350 
Britain 9,500 Holland 1,700 
Canada 2,800 Italy 3,300 
Denmark    750 Poland 2,500 
France 3,750   
Data from ISAF Placemat, June 2010 
 
Of course, as noted, there has been considerable variation in the capabilities and will of partners, 
ranging from Denmark’s small war-fighting force to Germany’s large and largely peacekeeping force. 
We also need to recognize that both capabilities and will have shifted over the course of the 
campaign. Britain, Canada, Denmark, and Holland all rapidly beefed up their forces in the south as 
the scale of the military challenge became evident. Germany has come under the most criticism for 
the strict caveats it has imposed on its force. But even here, the picture has changed. By 2010, there 
was open recognition in Germany of ‘Krieg in Afghanistan.’ Previously, Germany’s political elite 
refused to recognise that ISAF was engaged in war. Moreover, in 2009-2010 German forces engaged 
in a tough fight in Baghlan province (especially around the ‘highway triangle’).  
In sum, the ISAF campaign suggests that there is a sizeable group of Western states that could be 
partners in any future US war effort. Table 1 lists the most significant US partners in ISAF in mid-
2010. I call this group the “Fighting Core’ of NATO (+ Australia). Of course, the circumstances of 
any future war will be critical in determining who will be prepared to sign-up for war and also the 
form of partnership and contribution, i.e., NATO versus an ad-hoc coalition, special operation 
forces versus logistical support.  
As a rule of thumb, NATO has been more advantageous in terms of increasing the legitimacy of a 
military campaign, but it is typically less advantageous than ad-hoc coalitions in terms of a 
campaign’s unity of effort.2 It is easier for the United States to exercise firm military leadership 
within ad-hoc coalitions. Indeed, the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War both demonstrated that 
coalitions typically involve a core of war-fighting states, in addition to a larger grouping of war-
supporting states, i.e., providing basing and logistical support, and some modest air, naval, or even 
ground forces. In both campaigns, the US multinational force commander was able to ensure unity 
of effort within the war-fighting core, which comprised the US, Britain, and France in the 1991 Gulf 
War and the US, Britain, and Australia in the 2003 Iraq War. 
We should recognise the differences within the Fighting Core. I would suggest a rough ordering of 
three tiers, based on political will and military capabilities. For the United States, tier 1 and 2 states 
are those that can bring the most resources to bear during coalition wars. Tier 3 partners are also 
worth having on board, but, for a variety of reasons, bring less capability. Of course, the order of 
states within these tiers may be expected to change over the next 14 years. 
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Table 2. The Fighting Core in Select US-led Coalitions of War, 1991-Present 
 










Ranking: Author’s own. 
 
Britain belongs in a category of its own as the US’s sole tier-1 partner. France comes close to Britain 
in terms of global reach and deployable forces. The gap between them is in deployable land forces 
and will. France deployed a light division in the 1991 Gulf War and could do so again. But in recent 
years, Britain has twice deployed a heavy division in a US-led war, in 1991 and 2003. The British 
military has been hit hard by cuts to the defence budget for 2011-2015. The Royal Air Force is to be 
slashed from 12 to six fast-jet squadrons, while the Royal Navy will similarly shrink from 23 to 19 
frigates and destroyers. France will keep far larger air and naval forces in terms of numbers, though 
Britain is acquiring a range of next-generation air and naval platforms. Much uncertainty still 
surrounds the Royal Navy’s Future Carrier Program. The British Army will suffer the least cuts 
among the services. It will only lose one brigade, leaving it with five multi-role brigades, plus an air 
assault brigade and the Royal Navy’s marine brigade. In addition, coming out of the 2010 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the British Army has managed to keep the requirement to be 
able to deploy a heavy division. Finally, it is interesting to note the British military assumption that 
any future war would be fought alongside the Americans. The British military’s Future Character of 
Conflict paper (the British version of TSC) explicitly states: “It is extremely unlikely that the UK will 
conduct warfighting without US leadership.” Thus, in terms of willingness and ability to wage war 
with the Americans, Britain remains well ahead of the pack. 
France is the next most militarily capable state in the Fighting Core but gets relegated to tier 2 
because of its awkward strategic relationship with the United States. Moreover, given its military 
potential, France has been a disappointing contributor to the ISAF campaign. Australia and Canada, 
also in tier 2, have far smaller armed forces than France, but both have been significant contributors 
to US-led campaigns. The Australian armed forces contributed around 2,000 strong to the US-led 
coalition in the 2003 Iraq. Most of these were navy and air force personnel. But, in both the 2001 
invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War, Australia provided a sizeable SOF contingent. In 
recent years, the Australian contingent, comprising a combined arms battle group, engineers, 
mentors, and SOF, has operated in support of the Dutch task force in Uruzgan Province. In sum, 
Australia belongs in tier 2 for its recent track record of contributing to US-led coalitions and 
specifically for its SOF contribution, which is a key asset for the type of wars the United States is 
most likely to wage in the near future.  
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 In Afghanistan, Canada contributed beyond what its capacity would predict, deploying almost 3,000 
troops from an active force of around 66,000 (including an army of only 35,000). The Canadian 
Army has also demonstrated its willingness and ability to fight in difficult conflict zones. Canada has 
suffered 154 personnel killed in Afghanistan since 2001, which is the third-highest number of 
fatalities in ISAF and the highest number per force size in ISAF (Britain has suffered the second-
highest rate of fatalities at 362). Whilst Canadian combat forces are due to withdraw from 
Afghanistan this year, the Canadian Army will leave behind a 950-strong training mission, and 
Canada will continue to lead the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In other words, 
Canada has been a reliable and resilient military partner in Afghanistan and hence belongs in tier 2 of 
the Fighting Core. 
Tier 3 includes states with large military forces but modest useable capabilities – due to political 
constraints or military limitations – such as Germany, Italy, and Poland. Tier 3 also includes states, 
such as Holland and Denmark, with small, deployable, war-fighting militaries. For the Dutch, 
Afghanistan was a chance to show their steel and shake off a deservedly terrible reputation from the 
1992-95 Bosnia campaign. In the event, the Dutch took a cautious approach to using force in 
Uruzgan Province; this created tension with a more gung-ho US special forces task force operating 
in the north of the province. This more cautious approach by the Dutch task force was consistent 
with Dutch strategy for Uruzgan, but it is also possible that political pressure to avoid Dutch 
casualties may have been a reinforcing incentive. Denmark is the most martial of the Nordic states, 
and the Danish had already shown how tough they were in Bosnia. Once again, they proved their 
mettle in central Helmand Province. It might be argued that at less than a thousand personnel, the 
Danish contribution to ISAF is not sufficient to qualify as a ‘significant’ partner. But, both the 
Danish and the Dutch contributions need to be seen in the context of contributing to a 
multinational brigade-plus sized package. 
 
Capability gaps 
We have had the good news: There is a Fighting Core of Western states that are viable partners for 
any future US-led military campaign. Now, the bad news. These potential military partners 
collectively, and individually to various degrees, have three capability gaps: Technological, strategic, 
and legal. 
 
The technology gap 
The transatlantic gap in military technology is old news. Way back in 1999, Gompert, Kugler, and 
Libicki warned that NATO needed to Mind the Gap that was opening up, with Europe lagging far 
behind US investments in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies. The key technologies 
then were in information technology (IT), reconnaissance, and precision strike. This past decade, 
European militaries have attempted to close these gaps. However, national conditions — military 
culture, existing modernization programs, and defense budget cuts — have produced great variation 
in European responses to the US military transformation. Germany raced ahead in developing a 
doctrine for military transformation, but bureaucratic obstacles have delayed investment in new 
technologies. In contrast, France pushed on with developing its next generation of technologies but 
has been slow to develop the concepts and doctrine for real transformation. Britain fell somewhere 
in between with a more balanced approach to developing both technologies and supporting 
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 concepts. The net result has been that by the late 2000s there were many transformation gaps 
opening up within Europe.3 
The situation has become more complicated as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US 
military has redirected some investment away from the potentially techno-centric wars of the future 
to meet the demands of the human-centric, counterinsurgency wars of today. Some argue that 
current wars require that more be spent on less high-technology platforms, such as Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as well as continued 
investment in Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and 
networking of military forces. Those NATO partners that have been in the fight in the south have 
reequipped their forces for the campaign at hand. For example, Canada is upgrading 550 of its 
Generation III Light Armoured Vehicles (LAV III) to provide better anti-mine and CIED 
capabilities. Canada also urgently acquired some old technology, namely, Leopard II main battle 
tanks, which were rushed to theatre. Britain is at the forefront in Europe of arming for small wars. 
For example, the British Army has purchased some 400 MRAPs for the campaign in Afghanistan, 
with orders for another 300. The Royal Air Force operates Predator and Reaper UAVs, is developing 
its own Watchkeeper UAVs, and following the SDSR has launched a new Combat ISTAR program. 
Upgrades to Britain’s strategic and operational network have improved the ability of the British 
military to push Full Motion Video (FMV), biometrics, and other intelligence data into and around 
the battle space. 
Thus, the technology gap for small wars has closed between the United States and key tier 1 and 2 
war-fighting states. Of note here is that France is procuring some 600 new infantry fighting vehicles 
with enhanced blast protection. For the big European militaries less engaged in war fighting in 
Afghanistan — namely, Germany, Italy, and Spain — military modernization continues to be 
focused on future conventional war with some investment in RMA technologies. Yet, here the 
technology gap continues to grow.4 
 
The strategy gap 
Less well appreciated is the transatlantic strategy gap that has emerged in the post-Cold War era. 
Simply put, Europe states have lost the art of strategy. This is self-evident in the Afghanistan 
campaign. NATO assumed command of ISAF in 2003, but it did not produce a Comprehensive 
Strategic Political-Military Plan until April 2008. Even then, ISAF did not generate a coherent 
campaign plan until a year later, with the arrival of US Gen. Stanley McChrystal in the summer of 
2009. In essence, it took American engagement for NATO and ISAF to develop a strategy for the 
war. Prior to 2009, the United States was preoccupied with the Iraq War, and the European allies 
were unable to formulate a strategy without America’s lead. 
Of course, this problem pre-dates Afghanistan. Western use of force became divorced from strategy 
in the humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era. In Northern Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia, 
Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor, Western states allowed themselves to be 
drawn into other peoples’ wars. Western militaries fought not to defeat an opponent, but to achieve 
a range of less decisive goals — to enforce a peace, protect a population, disarm warring parties, and 
so forth. In most of these cases (Sierra Leone and East Timor are exceptions), Western states failed 
to develop coherent strategies for these conflicts for a variety of reasons.  
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 The main reason was that the processes for generating campaign objectives and forces were de-
linked. UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions provided the mandates for all of these wars except 
Kosovo. Hence campaign objectives were generated through international diplomacy and mediated 
by the requirements of international law. In contrast, the contributions to these humanitarian 
campaigns were generated by various national political and bureaucratic processes. As a general 
trend, states tended to talk tough but failed to deliver the forces necessary to achieve the mission. 
Collective responsibility within the UN framework enabled individual states to shirk responsibility 
for failing humanitarian campaigns. Thus, Britain and France, Europe’s major military powers, let 
the humanitarian situation in Bosnia fester for three years, and the blame was shared across a broad 
rainbow alliance of states involved in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). There was also a 
significant element of posturing and symbolic use of force, not to impress opponents as part of a 
coercive or deterrent strategy, but to impress domestic audiences back home that their government 
was “doing something” about that humanitarian crisis.5 It can be argued that a similar dynamic is at 
play in the current NATO campaign in Libya. Political opportunism and posturing triggered British 
and French military intervention, without an agreed strategy in place. 
The capacity for strategy making has also been retarded in the West as a consequence of the Cold 
War, when Western strategy was focused on the technicalities of nuclear targeting and conventional 
force ratios on the intra-European front. Military technicalities were swapped for legal technicalities 
over two decades of humanitarian campaigning. The real matter of strategy — linking war 
objectives, resources, and politics — was lost from view, and the skill of producing a plan that 
marries these moving parts was also lost. 
These two fundamental problems — collective irresponsibility and an overly technical, apolitical 
approach to campaign planning — dogged the Afghanistan war until late 2009 when the United 
States finally took responsibility for the war and appointed a new campaign commander who 
understood that the conflict was primarily about politics. This goes to suggest that the art of strategy 
has not been lost in America, though the United States did commit some grievous strategic errors in 
Iraq and Afghanistan under the administration of President George W. Bush. In Britain, the military 
openly recognizes its failure to think strategically about the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan and, 
indeed, the Chief of the Defense Staff, Sir David Richards, has directed the creation of a military 
strategy shop within the Ministry of Defense (MOD).6 
 
The legal gap 
European states are bound, in a way that the United States is not, when it comes to legal restrictions 
on the use of force. A basic distinction needs to be drawn out between international law on when and 
how force may (and may not) be used. On both, but especially the latter, Europeans adhere more 
strictly to the law. Therein lies a problem for coalition operations that is also under-acknowledged. 
As a general rule, the UN Charter prohibits states from using, or threatening to use, military force 
against another state or civilians except under specific, restricted circumstances. This is a peremptory 
norm of international law from which there are no derogations. However, there are two exceptions 
to this rule – namely, use of force in self-defence and the UNSC authorising the use of force to 
restore international peace and security.7 Some states, especially the United States and Israel, take an 
expansive view of what qualifies self-defence, to include use of force to prevent a threat from 
emerging. Use of force to pre-empt an imminent attack may be legal under customary international law. 
Few states, though, recognize the legality of preventive use of force where a threat is not imminent. As 
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 a superpower, the United States has felt it necessary to use force on a number of occasions since 
1945 to protect its interests and thereby, as US policymakers see it, global security. 
In using force to protect global interests and prevent threats from materializing, the United States is 
not simply pursuing a “might makes right” approach. Rather, the United States and European states 
have different philosophical approaches to international law. European states generally take a 
positivist approach, rooted in the work of English and German scholars of the mid-19th to mid-20th 
centuries, which sees law as a set of rules agreed by states in agreements and customary practice. 
They consider states bound by these rules, regardless of the ethics of the situation. In other words, 
for legal positivism, international law is not about advancing moral outcomes in world politics but 
simply regulating state interaction. This view was challenged by Liberal theorists in mid-20th century 
America, in the context of an emerging Cold War struggle to promote democracy and contain and 
defeat Communism. The legacy of this is a Liberal approach to international law, where US 
policymakers seek to interpret and stretch the law so that it may be used to advance Liberal values. 
To be sure, necessity born of global interests and responsibilities gives the United States reason 
enough to be creative with the law.8 But the point is that this creativity is rooted in a Liberal 
approach that seeks to make law serve specific moral ends.9 
The political force in Europe that espouses a legal prohibition on use of force appears to have 
grown with the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that European states are entirely bound by 
international law on use of force. In NATO’s 1999 Kosovo War, European states used force 
without lawful right. However, the 2003 Iraq War appears to have hardened European opinion on 
the necessity of legal grounds for the use of force. Notably, France and Germany were strong 
opponents of the US-led invasion, mostly on political grounds, but they used law as the framework 
through which to argue their case with the United States. Perhaps less appreciated is the impact of 
this war on British political opinion. The debate in Britain mostly revolved around the legality of the 
war, rather than the military necessity of it. In deciding to support an illegal war by the United States 
— which is how it was view by most Britons and, crucially, the British Labour Party — then-Prime 
Minister Tony Blair effectively committed political suicide. This episode may be expected to throw a 
long shadow over British politics for years to come. Indeed, we see it already in the great lengths to 
which the current British coalition government has gone to establish the legal basis of NATO’s on-
going air campaign in Libya. 
An even more pronounced transatlantic legal gap exists on international law regulating the conduct 
of warfare, i.e., the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Here, too, US military forces view themselves 
as less constrained than their European counterparts. Two areas are worth highlighting. The first is 
targeting. In modern war, many targets — such as transportation, communications, and power 
infrastructure — serve both civilian and military uses. This is particularly so in small wars where the 
opponents include non-state actors. European states are bound by the 1971 Additional Protocols of 
the Geneva Conventions, which clarify the law on dual-use targets in a way that restricts when force 
may be directed against them. The United States is not a signatory of the 1977 Additional Protocols 
and, accordingly, adopts a more expansive interpretation of the law on attacking dual-use targets. 
Hence, when NATO sought to redouble the pressure on Serbia in the Kosovo War by extending its 
air campaign to dual-use targets in and around the Belgrade capital, European air forces were unable 
to execute most of the target packages based on their international legal commitments. 
The second area in the LOAC is the impact of European and domestic law on military operations. 
Incredible as it may sound to American ears, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
has a direct impact on how European militaries fight. The ECHR creates a high bar for European 
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 militaries in terms of their duty to care for service personnel. Obviously, allowances are made for 
conventional war but less so for counterinsurgency campaigns and other asymmetric conflicts. Even 
more profoundly, the ECHR creates obligations for European militaries with respect to how they 
treat civilians, and especially detainees, in such campaigns. The ECHR reinforces and exceeds the 
obligations under the LOAC, giving foreign affected civilians the right to pursue legal action in 
Europe against offending European militaries.  
European militaries may face additional restrictions under domestic law in how they conduct 
operations. This may be clearly seen in the case of Britain. In operations outside of war, British 
forces may only use force in self-defence. Up to the mid-2000s, this severely hindered British forces 
in Afghanistan and Iraq; for instance, insurgents could not be targeted unless they were armed and 
presented an immediate threat. Moreover, British military authorities are required to investigate 
lethal use of force outside of war and report any irregularities to the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) for possible prosecution under British criminal law. The realities of combat operations have 
led British legal advisors to reinterpret the law to permit the targeting of, for instance, insurgent 
spotters (what British soldiers call “dickers”). But, still today, in escalation of force incidents 
resulting in civilian deaths, British troops face the ever-present risk that the CPS may prosecute. 
 
Implications for TSC  
Tomorrow’s Security Challenges presents a world of trouble for the United States in the near future, or 
more precisely four worlds each with their own sets of threats. Consistent cooperation between 
allies has demonstrated that America need not face these dangers alone. The West contains a 
Fighting Core of states from which America can fashion military coalitions. In some cases, NATO 
itself may act, possibly even without UNSC authorisation, as it did in Kosovo in 1999. This would 
provide a powerful legitimacy boost to any US-led military campaign, but it would undoubtedly 
come at some cost to unity of command and effort. Alternatively, a coalition of states from the 
Fighting Core may join a US-led campaign, offering less by way of legitimacy but better unity of 
command and effort. 
It is a brave, or foolhardy, social scientist who would predict the future. But in the spirit of TSC, we 
may roughly sketch out the prospects for US-led coalition warfare in each of the four futures 
presented in the TSC. I shall do so along three parameters: 1) The probability of war generating the 
requirement for a Western coalition, 2) the likely supply of coalition partners from the Western 
Fighting Core, and 3) the likely effectiveness of western coalitions in terms of legitimacy and military 
capabilities. 
The Concert of Powers scenario is the most benign future for the United States out to 2025. On the 
whole, the international community works effectively through various multilateral institutions and 
channels to deal with the major security challenges facing the world. The probability of war is low, 
and the US military will be mostly conducting operations other than war. Ironically while the 
demand for coalition partners may be low, the supply is likely to be high given the mood of 
multilateralism and the limited risk of actual fighting. The prospects for US-led military coalitions are 
reasonably good in this scenario. Indeed, most US military operations are likely to occur in 
partnership with allies, especially NATO allies. There will be a degree of disunity of effort but this 
may be accommodated without too much trouble given the relatively low tempo and risk in 
operations other than war.  
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The Fragmented International System scenario is the most worrying future, because it is the most 
plausible of the four. This sees a world where Western power is diffused into regional blocs, and 
international consensus breaks down on how to deal with major security challenges. Here, the 
probability of war is medium, with relative decline of US power creating instability in the Middle 
East and with nuclear proliferation creating pressure for preventive military action. Ironically, and 
unfortunately, the supply of coalition partners is likely to be low in such a world. The NATO 
partners are unlikely to be able to agree sufficiently to commit the Alliance to war. The UNSC is also 
likely to be deadlocked, and in the absence of an authorising UNSC resolution, this will create a 
further obstacle to European participation in any US-led war. The United States should still be able 
to drum up a small coalition from within the Fighting Core, namely Britain and a couple of others. 
However, with few partners, the coalition would have limited effectiveness in terms of providing 
legitimacy and even resources to the campaign.10 
The Rise of Non-State Networks is a future where America faces a myriad of security challenges 
associated with the decline of states, rise of violent extremism, and an increase in transnational 
terrorism and crime. In this future, US forces must concentrate on counterterrorism (CT) and 
irregular warfare. There is a medium probability of war of the kind the United States is waging in 
Afghanistan — not large-scale conventional warfare, but large-scale counterinsurgency warfare. The 
supply of coalition partners will also be medium. The pool of coalition partners will be large in an 
Afghan-type scenario, where the war is clearly just and legal. The pool will be smaller in an Iraq-type 
scenario, where the legality and legitimacy of the war are open to question. The effectiveness of 
military coalitions will be high because the Fighting Core, especially tier 1 and 2 states, will bring 
military capabilities optimised for CT and irregular warfare. 
The Return of Great Power Confrontations is the most alarmist but, fortunately, least plausible future 
world for America. It forecasts a general shift in power from West to East (this trend is plausible 
enough), and increased competition between status quo and revisionist powers over “resources, 
markets, and influence.” This future has all the nightmare scenarios lumped together: The rise of 
China, a resurgent Russia, and energy insecurity. TSC suggests that all-out major conventional war is 
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 still unlikely in this future, but it foresees a return to pre-1914 style arms races and military 
confrontations between the United States and the rising powers. Most students of military history 
will agree that arms races coupled with multiple military confrontations lead to a high probability for 
conventional war. The supply of coalition partners in this future scenario will be low to medium: 
Low if the main challenge comes from China, because Europeans tend to view this threat differently 
than the United States; medium if the primary threat comes from a resurgent Russia or access to 
energy supplies. Some Europeans would plausibly support a war triggered by either threat, but other 
European states, especially Germany, would still favor non-military responses. Under this scenario, 
the effectiveness of military coalitions will be low to high. It will be low if the supply of coalition 
partners is low, impacting on the legitimacy uplift. Of course, in an era of great-power competition, 
low legitimacy is to be expected and hence more tolerable. In terms of military capabilities, a small 
coalition could have medium to high effectiveness at protecting access to the global commons or 
containing a rising China, because Europeans have relatively strong naval forces. Effectiveness will 
be high both in terms of legitimacy and military capabilities in the case of a large coalition/NATO 
military response to aggression from a resurgent Russia.  
 
Conclusions 
It is not too much of a stretch to say that military coalitions are the new norm for Western warfare. 
This paper has drawn out the distinction between formal alliances (focusing on NATO) and ad-hoc 
coalitions to explore the political legitimacy versus military capability benefits and constraints of 
military coalitions. In reality, future US-led coalitions may come in all shapes and sizes. Indeed, by 
identifying three tiers of military partners, the implication is that the Fighting Core from within 
NATO may form its own ad-hoc coalition, thus offering a legitimacy and capability uplift. 
Obviously, there are also other alliance and coalition partners outside of NATO that are important 
to the United States, including the African Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations. Depending on the location and nature of a particular future conflict, one 
of these alliances may provide more of a legitimacy uplift than NATO. Indeed, for the United 
States, the support of the Arab League was crucial in launching the air campaign against Libya, 
though, interestingly, the United States handed over control of the campaign to NATO about a 
week later in order to deflect criticisms from the Arab League about the scale of the bombings 
against Mu’ammar Qadhiffi’s forces.  
Regardless of which future, and whatever form and configuration of military coalition, any US 
wartime partnership with the Europeans will suffer from capability gaps in technology, strategy, and 
law. These gaps do not damn future coalitions; US strategists and policymakers simply need to be 
alert to them and take remedial action. Here again, Afghanistan shows the way. Coalition 
contingents may be parcelled out to areas and missions in the theatre of operations, depending on 
military capabilities and national caveats. Even within national areas of operation, contingents with 
limited operational capabilities due to military or political constraints may be augmented with more 
robust US units. Hence, the Italian and Spanish campaign in Regional Command (RC)-West and the 
German-led campaign in Regional Command-North, depend on air and combat support from US 
task forces that are dedicated to each of these RCs. This blending of US and European forces offers 
a useful model for dealing with the legal capability gap, in particular. Of course, the technology gap 
may create some problems in terms of multinational operations within these blended force 
constructs. Finally, Afghanistan also underlines the imperative for US leadership to overcome the 
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 strategy gap and to impose unity of command on coalitions, thereby ensuring unity of effort in the 
campaign. 	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  8. The Mystique of “Cyberwar” and the Strategic Latency of 
Networked Social Movements 
David Betz 
 
Cyberspace has come a long way since the science-fiction writer William Gibson coined the term in 
his 1982 short story, ‘Burning Chrome’. Of his creation, Gibson later said, ‘it seemed like an 
effective buzzword ... evocative and essentially meaningless. It was suggestive but had no real 
semantic meaning, even for me.’1 Few now could doubt the effectiveness of cyberspace as a 
buzzword. Many happy research grant holders can attest to the near-magical powers the cyber-prefix 
has over funding agencies. It is evocative, to be sure, but what does it actually mean for strategists 
concerned with the balancing of ends, ways, and means in conflict today? How useful is it for 
understanding global trends and the future of warfare?  
History can tell us two things about the past, which may help us understand the present. First, the 
essential strategic dilemma today is not merely adaptation to technical change—the advent of the 
‘Information Age’, though this is important; rather it is the same diminishing decisiveness of major 
war, for a mixture of political, economic and technological reasons, that has vexed generations of 
strategists, not merely our own. Second, contemporary strategists who reckon, for reasons including 
the technical difficulties of attribution in cyberspace, that ‘cyberwar’ is a decisive new form of 
conflict are wrong. Meanwhile, social science can tell us something about new power actors 
emerging in transnational space that strategists need to comprehend better, because digital 
connectivity is imbuing novel globally networked social movements—some egregiously violent and 
politically-orientated, others instrumentally-violent and profit-oriented, most politically-oriented and 
non- (or trivially) violent—with a strategic significance not seen by non-state actors in the Western 
world since 1648.  
Before we begin, a caveat and a few words of context are necessary. First, on the whole, in this 
paper I adopt the self–conscious tone of the historian ever sensitive to the continuity of events as 
opposed to their change. Having said that, though, I also believe that we are as a species near to a 
genuine discontinuity, which some scientists have described as ‘The Singularity’—the point at which 
human intelligence is surpassed by machine intelligence.2 Afterwards, whether we merge with our 
digital offspring, are massacred by them, or kept as reverend ancestors, or much-loved pets, there is 
no point speculating about war (or anything else); until then, however, war will remain as it ever 
was—an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, if you prefer Clausewitz, or the collective 
action of a group of men to realize their own will even against the resistance of another group, if you 
prefer Weber.3  
Second, no one would deny the awesome opportunities for business, governments, and citizens that 
the unparalleled advancement of digital interconnectivity in recent decades has brought with it—
cyberspace penetrates nearly every aspect of our lives, how we work, entertain ourselves, consume, 
maintain friendships, find spiritual sustenance, educate ourselves, and participate in civic life as free 
citizens. Indeed, so deep and multi-layered is the interpenetration of the 'real world' by the 'digital 
world' that it is increasingly nonsensical to speak of the two as distinct and separate. Clay Shirky puts 
it this way, ‘The old view of online as a separate space, cyberspace apart from the real world… the 
whole notion of cyberspace is fading. [Cyberspace is not] an alternative to real life, [it is] part of it.’4 
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 As individuals we inhabit both worlds simultaneously, and the same is true for governments, 
industries, and practically every other collective social entity. Truly, 'The Matrix is everywhere.'  
Naturally, there is an anxiety surrounding the concept of cyberspace, which is predictable. In the late 
1960s Marshall McLuhan, drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s 1844 book The Concept of Dread, observed 
that ‘wherever a new environment goes around an old one there is always new terror.’5 It is not hard 
to find evidence today of a 'new terror'. It is splashed across the pages of newspapers and the covers 
of popular books where all manner of cyber-prefixed threats from ‘cyberespionage’ and ‘cyberterror’ 
to ‘cyberwar’ and even ‘cybergeddon’ are proclaimed; and these in turn engender other cyber-
prefixed neologisms such as ‘cybersecurity’, ‘cyberpower’ and ‘cyberstrategy’ in response. It is also to 
be found in the stated strategic apprehensions of many major governments. The title and foreword 
of Britain’s new National Security Strategy, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, provides a perfect 
example of this: 
Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long 
history. More secure, in the sense that we do not currently face, as we have so often 
in our past, a conventional threat of attack on our territory by a hostile power. But 
more vulnerable, because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is 
more networked than ever before.6 
Britain is not peculiarly subject to this paradox of conventional physical security being matched by a 
sense of unconventional insecurity—the same sentiment pervades American strategic writings such 
as the latest Quadrennial Defense Review and, no doubt, the governments of most other major 
countries.7 Networked societies now perceive that they face threats which previous societal forms 
did not, including the vulnerability of critical national infrastructures to cyberattack, the potential 
enervation of their economies through cyberespionage and cybercrime, and the consequent 
endangerment of the lives, property, and well-being of their citizens. McLuhan was essentially 
correct: whatever the technology in question, eventually the ‘shock of the new’ tends, in time, to be 
absorbed and normalized. This is not to deny the transformative effects of technology, but it is 
important, as strategists, to maintain a degree of perspective on events and processes that at close 
hand appear as existential threats yet with respectful distance and consideration take on different 
hues. 
 
Some Things Change, Some Stay the Same 
If you want to understand what is happening in 2011 it is worth pausing for thought about the world 
as it seemed in 1911 because there is more than a passing resemblance between the first parts of the 
20th and 21st centuries. There is today a similar technological surge—the 19th was known as the 
century of invention for good reason; a similarly political revolutionary climate prevails in which les 
anciens regimes are the target of substantial subversion and political violence; and there is a similar 
popular feeling that the international order is shifting in some potentially tectonic way.  
The present is always shaped by many forces, often deep historical processes—political, social, 
economic, demographic, climatic and so on—but there can be little doubt that this particular 
moment is powerfully affected by a recent and radical change in the modality of communications 
which many regard as the dawning of an ‘Information Age’. ‘The Web is shifting power in ways that 
we could never have imagined’, claimed a recent BBC television documentary on cyberspace called 
The Virtual Revolution:  
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 With two billion people online the Web is holding governments to account, 
uncovering injustices, and accelerating globalisation. It’s providing us with new 
allegiances but it’s also reinventing warfare.8 
Leave aside for the time being whether or not this is true and consider where have we heard such 
claims before, particularly in respect to changes in warfare? In fact, they were wearyingly typical of 
the airpower theorists in Europe and the United States in the first decades of the 20th century. As 
Michael Sherry commented on early speculations about the 'age of flight' in his masterful history The 
Rise of American Air Power,  
Because prophecy necessarily leaped ahead of technology, it often read like fanciful 
or bloodless abstractions, as if designed, like science fiction, less to depict future 
dangers than to express current anxieties.9 
The bomber will always get through…', warned Stanley Baldwin in a famous House of Commons 
speech in November 1932 entitled ‘A Fear for the Future’.10 The prophets of airpower writing in the 
shadow of the Great War's ghastly yet indecisive slaughters were convinced of the power of aerial 
warfare to deliver big results fast. In one of his worst books, The Reformation of War, published in 
1923, the British strategist J.F.C. Fuller invited his readers to... 
Picture if you can what the result [of a mass aerial attack] will be: London for several 
days will be one vast raving Bedlam, the hospitals will be stormed, traffic will cease, 
the homeless will shriek for help, the city will be in pandemonium. What of the 
government at Westminster? It will be swept away by an avalanche of terror. Then 
will the enemy dictate his terms, which will be grasped at like a straw by a drowning 
man. Thus may a war be fought in forty-eight hours and the losses of the winning 
side may be actually nil!11 
It was not merely the apparent puissance of the new means of warfare that anchored the beliefs of 
airpower theorists in its decisiveness; equally important was their acute sense of the fragility of 
modern industrial society. In the 1920s and 1930s there was profound worry in Europe that the 
economic achievements in which they gloried—industrial power and material and cultural wealth—
also made them hopelessly vulnerable to attack on the home front. Consider the language of another 
British strategist Basil Liddell-Hart, also writing in the 1920s about the power of aerial 
bombardment to leap over a country’s surface fortifications and attack its innards directly:  
A nation’s nerve system, no longer covered by the flesh of its troops is now laid bare 
to attack, and, like the human nerves, the progress of civilization has rendered it far 
more sensitive than in earlier and more primitive times.12 
This is not to beg the question that bombs and bandwidth are the same or equivalent things, or that 
what was true or not true of airpower need necessarily be the same of its cyberspace analogue. Yet 
there are some lessons that we might take from the debates over airpower in the early part of the 
previous century. Perhaps the most germane of these is the fact that airpower never lived up to the 
dreams of its most enthusiastic boosters. There certainly is no denying the enormous contribution of 
it to modern warfare; but what never materialized was the ability to achieve independent war-winning 
effects—winning the war in forty-eight hours without casualties on the victorious side, as Fuller 
imagined, and as other prophets of airpower claimed too. 
Another lesson is to be cautious of experts in epaulettes whose vision may be more clouded by 
internal bureaucratic positioning than ‘non-expert’ outsiders. For instance, in 1908 the science 
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 fiction author H.G. Wells painted in his book The War in the Air a picture of the effects of airpower 
on war, which was essentially ambivalent if not dystopian. He got much of the detail wrong, often 
comically so—his war in the air was fought by vast fleets of Zeppelins, ground-based lightning 
cannons, and ‘Asiatic’ flying machines propelled by flapping wings.13 More important though was 
that he got the big picture right: his conclusion, written just five years after the first flight of the 
Wright brothers at Kitty Hawk, was that aerial warfare would be ‘at once enormously destructive 
and entirely indecisive.’ Compare this with the musings of the ‘father of the USAF’ Billy Mitchell 
whose thoughts on airpower’s significance by 1930 were utterly unequivocal and distinctly utopian: it 
was ‘a distinct move for the betterment of civilization, because wars will be decided quickly and not 
drag on for years.’14 Whose vision was the clearer? Old adages of missing the forest for the trees 
should spring to mind. 
Finally, we should bear in mind Eliot Cohen's sage observation that ‘air power is an unusually 
seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer 
gratification without commitment.’15 The fundamental characteristics of airpower are said to be: 
speed—a function of the lack of obstacles in air space which makes airpower highly responsive; 
range—a function of the ubiquity of the atmosphere which means airpower is highly mobile; and, 
elevation—a function of the depth of the air space which means airpower possesses a wide perspective 
on the conflict below. Cyberpower appears to offer similar things, only more so, which makes it a 
very sexy concept indeed. 
 
The Siren Song of the Cyber Prophets 
In fact, cyberpower offers other things too which airpower does not: anonymity—a function of the 
architecture of cyberspace;16 and low ‘buy-in costs’—a function of the ubiquity of digital networks and 
the prevalence of cheap consumer electronics. These attributes alarm experts in epaulettes. They are 
the key factors that underpin most of the ‘cyber-doomsday’ or ‘electronic Pearl Harbour’ scenarios 
which, hyperbolic as they may be, are certainly rhetorically effective. Take, for instance, the 
conclusion to James Adams’ 1998 book The Next World War, one of the earliest popular treatments 
of cyberwar, ‘As David proved against Goliath, strength can be beaten. America today looks 
uncomfortably like Goliath, arrogant in its power, armed to the teeth, ignorant of its weakness.’17 Or 
as it was put in a recent article in Joint Forces Quarterly:  
One reason for the imminent and broad-based nature of the cyberspace challenge is 
the low buy-in cost compared to the vastly more complex and expensive 
appurtenances of air and space warfare, along with the growing ability of present and 
prospective Lilliputian adversaries to generate what one expert called ‘catastrophic 
cascading effects’ through asymmetric operations against the American Gulliver.18 
Pick your metaphor, Goliath and David or Gulliver and the Lilliputians, the point is that cyberspace 
is regarded as potentially very disruptive of the existing asymmetry of power between the United 
States and its state competitors. In Richard Clarke’s recent book Cyberwar he describes a cyberattack 
on the United States that is utterly devastating: 
In all the wars America has fought, no nation has ever done this kind of damage to 
our cities. A sophisticated cyber war attack by one of several nation-states could do 
that today, in fifteen minutes, without a single terrorist or soldier ever appearing in 
this country.19 
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 But then in a further twist he adds the kicker—because of the inherent identity-obscuring effect of 
the Web… 
In cyber war, we may never even know what hit us. Indeed, it may give little solace 
to Americans shivering without power to know that the United States may be about 
to retaliate in kind. 
‘While you were on the line with the President, sir, Cyber Command called from 
Fort Meade. They think the attack came from Russia and they are ready to turn out 
the lights in Moscow, sir. Or maybe it was China, so they are ready to hit Beijing, if 
you want to do that. Sir?’20 
Indubitably, this is a scary scenario. However, is it not the same thing we observed with the 
prophets of airpower? Consider what Liddell-Hart said about the ‘nervous system’ of the country 
laid bare to attack then look at the apprehensions expressed in the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
from 2003:  
Our nation’s critical infrastructures are composed of… [a very long list of assets 
beginning with ‘public and private institutions’ and ending with ‘postal and 
shipping’]. Cyberspace is their nervous system—the control system of our country.21  
Of course it is possible that what was not true of airpower three quarters of a century ago may be 
true of cyberpower now; that said, again, reason would suggest some caution about the decisiveness 
of this new means, to which we shall return. First, however, it is important to point out that the 
‘attribution problem’ is not simply a problem; in fact, viewed from another perspective, it is the 
veritable Holy Grail of strategic calculation because it appears to solve an underlying strategic 
problem which has been bothering us for years: how to restore elusive decision in major war. If the 
identity of an attacker via cyberspace is unknown then retaliation is difficult—and perhaps, 
therefore, the process of escalation inherent to war that has largely held back major war since 1945 
might not be engaged. In short, cyberpower is even more seductive than airpower, in part because it 
appears to offer gratification without the need of any physical connection, let alone commitment, to 
other human beings whatsoever. 
This is not to diminish the ‘attribution problem’, which is quite obviously exploited by hackers and 
criminals who, as it states in USAF doctrine on Cyberspace Operations, constantly ‘amaze those in 
global law enforcement with the speed at which they stay one step ahead in the technology race.’22 It 
is to suggest that the attribution problem is really something which pertains to those activities, to law 
enforcement and to counter-espionage, because war is different. The false allure of ‘cyberwar’ lies in 
the notion that it provides a sneaky way to reassert decision in the context of major war. But when 
states use cyberpower against other states for the purposes of compelling them to do their will they 
still have to declare what it is (even if after the event). Anonymity is as much a problem for the 
strategic aggressor as it is the defender: how do you compel your enemy to do your will if you do 
not communicate it? To whom does the victim either submit or render ‘cash payment’, as Clausewitz 
put it? 
There is no sneaky way around this problem. If China were to kill several thousands of Americans, 
or vice versa, and profoundly disrupt the lives of many millions of others through cyberattack in an 
attempt to bend its government to its will then the prefix cyber would be superfluous to the 
requirement of describing the state of relations which would exist between the two countries. 
‘Cyberwar’ as a ‘pure play’ option for states is unrealistic because of the expanse and diversity of 
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 their interests and capabilities. As strategists we should be demanding that our colleagues show more 
discipline in their use of the term ‘war’. 
What of the alleged ‘low buy-in’ costs of cyberwar? Recent events do not lend credence to this idea, 
at least for the time being. To be sure, the physical instruments of a cyberattack are dirt–cheap. The 
Stuxnet virus which targeted the Iranian nuclear program accomplished relatively cleanly what a large 
air force might have struggled to do messily, and it fit comfortably in a ‘corner’ of a twenty dollar 
data stick. According to the best recent reporting Stuxnet was designed by the United States and 
Israel with the assistance, witting or otherwise, of Britain and Germany. Much attention has been 
paid to the remarkable sophistication of the weapon. For the purposes at hand, however, the 
significant thing about Stuxnet (which in historical perspective may be seen as the Zeppelin bomber 
of its day) is that its design required a large amount of high-grade intelligence about its intended 
target in order to work. It was not, according to experts who have analysed it, the work of hackers 
alone: 
It had to be the work of someone who knew his way around the specific quirks of 
the Siemens controllers and had an intimate understanding of exactly how the 
Iranians had designed their enrichment operations. In fact, the Americans and the 
Israelis had a pretty good idea.23  
In short, as with all other weapons systems (with the exception of the hydrogen bomb, arguably) it 
required the combination of significant other resources in order to achieve strategic effect. 
Moreover, far from demonstrating a smoothing of the existing asymmetry of power it actually shows 
a reinforcement of that asymmetry: cyberpower rewards already powerful states with even more 
capability and, when push comes to shove, it would appear that Western powers have thought hard 
about cyberattack and are pretty good at it. 
Again, a comparison to airpower is apt. Virtually unchallenged air supremacy and air-ground 
coordination has become more or less the sine qua non of the Western ‘way of war’; or what in his 
book Military Power Stephen Biddle described, in slightly different terms, as the ‘modern system’ of 
warfare—a system which, not incidentally, he claims was born in the tactical conditions of the First 
World War.24 The advent of the ‘modern system’ caused a bifurcation of military power between 
armies that ‘got it’ and armies that did not—with the latter being soundly thrashed by the former 
even when they possessed the same, or similar, weapons and numerical superiority.  
A similar process is likely with respect to cyberpower. Armies which are able to defend their 
networks will accrue distinct advantages from ‘network-enabling’ them, while armies that do not 
possess such ability will not enjoy any such advantage—and they will be punished harshly for trying 
to ‘network-enable’ practically anything. It is worth recalling that the seminal 1993 article by John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ which set off this debate, in contrast with the 
extant literature on cyberwar, was essentially tactical in orientation: 
Small numbers of your light, highly mobile forces defeat and compel the surrender 
of large masses of heavily armed, dug-in enemy forces, with little loss of life on either 
side. Your forces can do this because they are well prepared, make room for 
manoeuvre, concentrate their firepower rapidly in unexpected places, and have 
superior command, control, and information systems that are decentralized to allow 
tactical initiatives, yet provide the central commanders with unparalleled intelligence 
and ‘topsight’ for strategic purposes.25  
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 It was a vision about moving and shooting more adroitly than your opponent through the 
employment of better information systems—knowledge as power in a very literal and immediate 
sense. Military cyberpower is a real and important compliment to other military capabilities—it does 
not, as airpower did not, obviate those capabilities or change the objective nature of war.  
 
World of Warcraft  
The last word on cyberpower could easily go to H.G. Wells, who described airpower with the very 
apposite phrase: ‘neither unthinkable nor blessed.’ Except actually that will not suffice, for while it is 
true that in military terms cyberspace changes less than is often supposed, there is actually 
something significant happening today as a result of digital connectivity of which strategists should 
take account—just not in the frame of interstate war. A few years ago the British general Rupert 
Smith wrote in his book The Utility of Force, that “…war as cognitively known to most non-
combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in 
a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.”26 Smith goes way out on a limb here, 
but he has quite a lot of company perched on the branch alongside him, including the likes of 
Martin Van Creveld, Michael Mandelbaum, and most famously Norman Angell who wrote 100 years 
ago in The Great Illusion,  
…the believer in war justifies his dogmatism for the most part by an appeal to what 
he alleges is the one dominating fact of the situation—i.e., that human nature is 
unchanging. [but] Human nature is changing out of all recognition. Not only is man 
fighting less, but he is using all forms of physical compulsion less, and as a very 
natural result is losing those psychological attributes that go with the employment of 
physical force. And he is coming to employ physical force less because accumulated 
evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can accomplish 
more easily that which he strives for by other means.27  
Angell was wrong then, as the two world wars that followed within a generation showed with tragic 
force (Smith may be wrong now). Nonetheless, the belief in major war’s obsolescence has proved 
extremely persistent and has many current adherents—including the preeminent historian of the 
First World War, Hew Strachan, who observed recently that ‘the pole around which our ideas of war 
cluster should no longer be major war, itself a theoretical construct derived from the Second World 
War and scarcely encountered in reality since.’28 Moreover, the ideal of ‘war by other means’ which 
Adams claimed ‘cyberwar’ would bring has hardly lost its appeal for a minute since Sun Tzu 
immortalized it more than 2,500 years ago. 
Let us assume for purposes of argument that the long sought ideal is now a reality. This raises a 
question: if the skein of human history is no longer spun so much from threads of khaki, olive 
green, and field grey then from what is it spun, for surely, contra Angell, it is not because we have 
become all of a sudden more agreeable and less disputatious as a species by nature? My answer: 
wizards and demons. It sounds funny but is meant only somewhat playfully; in fact, it is based upon 
standard projection of well-established technological and social trends which are causing the 
emergence of networked social movements with an increasing ability to cause large economic, 
political, and security effects.  
Arthur C. Clarke, scientist, science fiction author and one of the most cautious and accurate 
futurists, offered three ‘laws’ of prediction. The third of these states ‘Any sufficiently advanced 
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 technology is indistinguishable from magic.’29 Our society is utterly suffused with technology, 
especially information technology, which the vast majority of us use for all intents and purposes as if 
they were magical artefacts: people consult Google the way the Greeks did the Oracle of Delphi; 
they use the ‘appear offline’ setting on MSN Messenger to be invisible to other ‘Netizens’ in the 
same way Frodo Baggins used the One Ring; there is a long-running gag on the comedy programme 
Little Britain which rests on the finality of the phrase ‘Computer says no’ (usually voiced by an 
uncaring travel agent or petty bureaucrat) as though like the judgments of Solomon there was no 
higher authority in this world than the impersonal net.  
There is scene in Daniel Suarez’s novel Freedom™, the sequel to Daemon—a near-future/alternate 
present depiction of a world in which a distributed, narrow artificial intelligence (the eponymous 
Daemon), created by a dying multi-billionaire computer game designer, radically reshapes society 
though manipulation of the network flows on which it depends, which illustrates this convergence 
of technology and magic perfectly.30 In this scene the book’s hero meets his ‘spiritual guide,’ who 
explains to him the workings of the ‘darknet’—the system created by the Daemon, which blends both 
the virtual and the ‘real’ worlds—and the quest on which he has been set: 
Where ancient people believed in gods and devils that listened to their pleas and 
curses—in this age immortal entities hear us. Call them bots or spirits; there is no 
functional difference now. They surround us and through them word-forms become 
an unlock code that can trigger a blessing or a curse. Mankind created systems whose 
inter-reactions we could not fully understand, and the spirits we have gathered have 
escaped from them into the land where they walk the earth—or the GPS grid, 
whichever you prefer. The spirit world overlaps the real one now, and our lives will 
never be the same.31 
Aside from the use of the words ‘spirit world’ instead of ‘cyberspace’ is there any difference between 
Suarez’s notion that ‘the spirit world overlaps the real one’ and Clay Shirky’s argument that the 
distinction between cyberspace and the real world is fading to irrelevance? Given Gibson’s 
acknowledgement of the semantic emptiness of the term cyberspace why should we be precious 
about it? The truth is that relatively few people understand how our new hybrid reality of ‘real’ space 
and cyberspace is constructed—they do not see the ‘Matrix’ in its raw code. In itself, this is a bland 
observation; the elite in all societal forms throughout history has always been composed in part by 
those who, in Marxist terms, were most au fait with the ‘dominant means of production’: 
Technology does not invent, install, or maintain itself, but needs human beings to 
bring it out into production. It is thus not the technology that matters but the human 
skill and social organization that lie behind it. In other words, it is the professional 
experts who have constructed the system, which in turn has created them.32  
It leads to an important question, however, which is that if cyberspace is generating a new social 
morphology in the form of the ‘network society’ then what is the nature of the new elite? 
Presumably a part of it will be composed of those with greater than normal ability to delve between 
the layers of hardware and software from which the ‘physical’ and ‘syntactic’ layers of cyberspace are 
constructed.33 In the early 1970s Daniel Bell in The Coming of Post-Industrial Society predicted 
something like this when he wrote of the emergence of ‘technical elites’.34 We could as well call them 
wizards—magic adepts, not magic in the sense of sleight of hand, but magic in the sense of being 
able to cause real world change through what seems to the non-adept as the casting of spells and 
invocations issued in arcane languages.  
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 From a security perspective, however, whatever we call the new elite, it must be recognized that it 
includes hackers. This is important for as Tim Jordan pointed out in his 1999 book Cyberpower: 
Hackers are some of the most dedicated and powerful inhabitants of cyberspace and 
their ability to act in cyberspace is defined almost entirely by their expertise. There 
are numerous examples of hackers using astonishingly outdated equipment to 
control the most powerful resources of cyberspace. After all, telecommunications 
does not need a powerful computer and a simple machine can control a powerful 
one. Hackers demonstrate the extreme end of the technopower elite, where material 
resources are close to zero, though never actually zero, and expertise is 
monumental.35 
In other words, hackers are a superb example of the phenomenon which software entrepreneur cum 
strategist John Robb describes as ‘super-empowerment’.36 However, we must be wary of 
generalization about them. The term ‘hacker’ itself is contested and has transformed over time from 
a term of respect to one more often of opprobrium; and the hacker community is populated by 
multitudinous subgroups that vary in aim, motivation, and profile. Sociological profiles of the 
hacking community are few and far between and inherently hard to keep up to date owing in part to 
its amorphousness, ambiguous legality, and predilection to identity-obscuring noms de guerre. Hackers 
are typically positioned in terms of male youth culture, disaffection, and rebelliousness, though this 
is more a stereotype of one segment of the community than a valid generalization of the community 
as a whole. One way of typologizing hackers is to adopt an evolutionary model with different 
‘animals’ branching off a common ancestor:  
• 1st evolution (from 1960s–70s): creative programmers usually working in academic institutions 
on mainframe computers, ethical computer ‘gurus’, e.g., MIT/Stanford; 
• 2nd evolution (from 1970s–80s): computer entrepreneurs involved in the shift from mainframe 
to personal computing, founding major computer companies and digital communities, e.g., 
Apple, The WELL; 
• 3rd evolution (from 1990s): copyright breakers using the web for file sharing largely for 
entertainment rather than profit, e.g., Napster, Pirate Bay, etc; 
• 4th evolution (from 1990s): criminals and ‘cyberpunks’ hacking for profit or ‘cyber-vandalism’ 
done for ‘lulz’ (fun). 
An important trend extracted from this typology is that hacking has become more objectively 
purposeful over time. The first evolution of hackers appears to have been interested in 
programming mainly for its own sake—their main preoccupation was to achieve total mastery of 
their machines, which were very limited devices, and to produce elegant code. Their milieu was 
largely academic and scientific—a small community of highly intelligent people trying to get the 
most out of relatively dumb machines. Subsequent evolutions of hackers appear, while not 
necessarily losing a love of good code, to be more interested in computing for profit (legitimate or 
otherwise) or fun (harmless or not). Another trend is the decrease in average skill level as the 
community has burgeoned with ‘script kiddies’ hacking with sophisticated software written by more 
technically-skilled others. Ultimately, their milieu is more broadly societal and mainstream—a large 
group of relatively unskilled people entertaining or enriching themselves with ever more powerful 
machines and sophisticated software. 
These trends are suggestive. Might the next evolution be hacking for politically subversive or 
revolutionary purpose? Does cyberspace create a ‘niche’ in the strategic realm that has not existed 
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 before for spatially disaggregated, materially weak, but high–expertise actors (groups, possibly 
individuals, and plausibly the software alone) to exert strategic effect? Perhaps, as with Wells’ War in 
the Air, science fiction has something to tell us. Suarez’s novels are a good place to start. Certainly, 
they are ‘ripping yarns’ full of cinematic touches such as robotic samurai-sword wielding 
motorcycles, and the plot unfolds in a sequence of ever larger and more violent car crashes. But they 
are more than that too. For one thing, the Daemon behaves in a strategically sound manner as a true 
Clausewitzean bent on compelling its powerful enemies—corporations and powerful financiers 
primarily, government agencies secondarily—to do its will through an admixture of means, including 
force applied by its various agents, both human and robotic. For another, there are no grossly 
implausible details in the technology described. As the author put it,  
The Daemon is, of course, fiction, but our world is increasingly automated, 
interconnected, and data-driven. Narrow artificial intelligence bots already make life-
changing decisions about and for large segments of the human population... These 
proprietary systems alter human behaviour as we strive to improve or maintain our 
scores within their framework—in much the same way players are driven to reach 
higher levels in games... As long as they are profitable, these systems eventually 
become institutions unto themselves, attended by a caste of high-tech priests who 
alone know their dark mysteries.37 
Moreover, the books’ appeal goes beyond those interested in mere techno-thrills. Indeed, the books 
can be read less as thrillers than as extended essays on sustainable economy, ‘eco-pragmatism’, and a 
new form of politics based upon massively parallel activism—punctuated by the occasional fiery car 
crash. In them the power of the network is normatively neutral while having the potential to be 
oppressive or liberating—neither ‘unthinkable or blessed’ as H.G. Wells might have said, and the 
‘wizards’ with the technical nous to exploit it can do so constructively or parasitically. In other 
words, the Daemon is not a true artificial intelligence; it does not possess the wherewithal to care one 
way or the other what humanity does with its new power—heaven or hell, the choice is ours. The 
point here is not whether Suarez’s imaginings are correct in detail—surely they are not; but whether, 
like Wells, he is capturing the big picture in ways that strategists should take on board. Considered 
from the perspective of ends, ways and means there is some ‘real world’ evidence, as yet tentative 
and easy to underestimate, that they should.  
For example, the Internet collective known as ‘Anonymous’, which has received a lot of attention in 
the press in the last half year, is tempting to dismiss because of the almost self-parodying rhetoric it 
employs and the capriciousness of its target selection. In the space of two years it ‘declared war’ on, 
inter alia: the music industry and its legal representatives for cracking down on file-sharing, i.e., theft 
of intellectual property; followed by the Church of Scientology ‘for the good of mankind and for our 
enjoyment’; the financial enterprises Visa, Mastercard, and PayPal, plus the governments of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, in order to punish them for the crackdown on Wikileaks 
and the persecution of its founder Julian Assange; as well as various regimes in the Middle East for 
being repressive. ‘Anonymous’ describes itself as: 
...not a single person, but rather, [it] represents the collective whole of the Internet. 
As individuals, they can be intelligent, rational, emotional and empathetic. As a mass, 
a group, they are devoid of humanity and mercy. Never before in the history of 
humanity has there once been such a morass, a terrible network of the peer-pressure 
that forces people to become one, become evil. Welcome to the soulless mass of 
blunt immorality known only as the Internet.38 
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 The nature of Anonymous’ leadership, if indeed it has any, is very unclear. There is no credible 
research done on its organization and structure; and the credibility of the few figures who have 
identified themselvesas leadership figures—such as Barrett Brown, who claims to be a ‘senior 
strategist and propagandist’—is difficult to judge.39 Nonetheless, its highly successful (and on-going) 
attack on the reputable data security and malware response company HBGary demonstrated that it 
has substantial technical capability to cause harm—that is to say, it has means to compel its enemies. 
The firm was targeted after the CEO of an associated company HBGary Federal, Aaron Barr, 
announced that his company had infiltrated Anonymous, discovered its members’ real names and 
was going to publicize them. In return, Anonymous hacked HBGary’s servers, defaced its website, 
downloaded tens of thousands of its corporate emails and posted them on the web, digitally 
harassed its CEO and other staff, and left a threatening note in its booth at the RSA security 
conference in San Francisco, which caused the cancellation of the launch announcement of a major 
new software product. As the Vice President Jim Butterworth put it, ‘They decided to follow us to a 
public place where we were to do business and make a public mockery of our company.’40  
The last exchange between HBGary’s CEO Greg Hoglund on Anonymous’ IRC channel in which 
he pleaded in vain for his e-mails to stay private lends some credence to the group’s claim for ‘blunt 
immorality’ and absence of mercy: 
<+greg> so you got my email spool too then 
… 
<@`k> greg we got everything 
<+Agamemnon> Greg, I'm curious to know if you understand what we are 
about? Do you understand why we do what we do? 
<+greg> you realize that releasing my email spool will cause millions in 
damages to HBGary? 
… 
<+Agamemnon> yes we do greg 
<@`k> greg is will be end of you :) and your company41  
Moreover, there is unmistakable evidence of a plethora of ways in which enemies may be attacked 
ranging from acts of subversion (e.g., propaganda, data theft, website defacement) and sabotage 
(e.g., denial of service, systems disruption, data loss) through to physical violence. It is true that thus far 
we have seen no instances of ‘cyber-terror’; ‘virtual’ groups like Anonymous have confined their 
activities to the virtual dimension. However, there are multiple examples of ‘real world’ social 
movements cottoning on to the power of networks to multiply their violent capacity for strategic 
effect. Al Qaeda, as has been richly described in the literature, is a superb example, having turned 
itself into what Mark Duffield has called a ‘non-territorial network enterprise’, which works in, 
through, and out of borderless, distance-killing cyberspace.42  
A key strength of al Qaeda is that the extremist community from which it draws energy lives and 
acts largely on the virtual plane; it has no territory but stretches around the world in geographically-
isolated but digitally interconnected groups which share a common cause driven by a shared sense of 
outrage. As John Mackinlay put it, ‘In these wispy, informal patterns, without territory and without 
formal command structures, they are not easily touched by the kinetic blows of a formal military 
campaign.’43 Naturally, the literature has dwelled lengthily on al Qaeda and its affiliates and imitators 
because of the spectacular violence that they employ. Violence, however, is not the be all and end all 
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 of the ability to coerce, particularly as we invest more and more value in our digital identities, threats 
to them become more potentially compelling. For instance, given a choice between a hard physical 
beating or the electronic assault he actually suffered, might HBGary’s CEO have gone for the 
former?  
The focus on al Qaeda perhaps obscures the larger phenomenon of which it is but one 
manifestation. In point of fact, there are many other networked social movements which use some 
or all of the same methods as al Qaeda—notably resource mobilization via propaganda and 
propaganda by deed, ‘flattened’ hierarchy, decentralization, and self-organization—which all depend 
on networks. Some of these networked movements, such as the environmental group Earth 
Liberation Front, use violence, though not yet on the scale or of the same viciousness as al Qaeda, 
and are similarly intent on destroying Western civilization which they regard as inimically hostile and 
destructive of the Earth’s environment. Many others use networks to enhance their ability to 
organize various forms of protest including demonstrations that may end, deliberately or 
accidentally, in violent street battles. A good example is the anti-capitalist movement/umbrella 
group ‘We are Everywhere’ which describes itself as,  
… the rise of an unprecedented global rebellion—a rebellion which is in constant 
flux, which swaps ideas and tactics across oceans, shares strategies between cultures 
and continents, gathers in swarms and dissolves, only to swarm again elsewhere. But 
this is a movement of untold stories, for those from below are not those who get to 
write history, even though we are the ones making it.44 
Thus, the question when it comes to such groups is not so much the ways and means by which they 
may behave as strategic actors, because these are already fairly clear and the trend of their likely 
developments is predictable; rather it is the ends to which their ways and means are or may be 
committed that are less clear and more worrisome. Again, it is worth starting with al Qaeda, about 
which there is relatively quite a lot known. The paradox of al Qaeda is its pairing of 21st century ways 
and means with a backward-looking end of restoring a 7th century Muslim empire, which fails to 
appeal to most Muslims who are interested in a very different promised land (as may be seen by the 
current ‘democratic’ revolutions in the Middle East) than the one with which Islamist ideologues try 
to tempt them. Similar in form, the Earth Liberation Front is a leaderless or quasi-leaderless 
movement that lacks central authority over its component cells, which act locally on their own 
initiative in accordance with the group’s overall aims. As a result the group requires a powerful and 
encompassing strategic narrative in order to mobilize adherents and guide them to actions that are 
strategically purposeful. And as with al Qaeda, the group’s ideology is not of its own making; rather 
it is a syncretic mix of beliefs formulated by more articulate others, including ‘Deep Ecology’, ‘Social 
Ecology’, and ‘Green Anarchism’ with an admixture of Neo-Pagan mysticism and anti-capitalism.45  
Moreover, the language they employ is startlingly familiar in its rhetorical structure to readers of 
Islamist rationalizations of their attacks. Consider, for example, this 11 August 2002 communiqué 
issued in response to the development of genetically modified organisms by several major 
corporations and universities: 
Their blatant disregard for the sanctity of life and its perfect Natural balance, 
indifference to strong public opposition, and the irrevocable acts of extreme violence 
they perpetrate against the Earth daily are all inexcusable, and will not be tolerated. 
IF they persist in their crimes against life, they will be met with maximum retaliation. 
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 In pursuance of justice, freedom, and equal consideration for all innocent life across 
the board, segments of this global revolutionary movement are no longer limiting 
their revolutionary potential by adhering to a flawed, inconsistent ‘non–violent’ 
ideology. While innocent life will never be harmed in any action we must undertake, 
where it is necessary, we will no longer hesitate to pick up the gun to implement 
justice, and provide the needed protection for our planet that decades of legal battles, 
pleading, protest, and economic sabotage have failed so drastically to achieve. 
The diverse efforts of this revolutionary force cannot be contained, and will only 
continue to intensify as we are brought face to face with the oppressor in inevitable, 
violent confrontation. We will stand up and fight for our lives against this iniquitous 
civilization until its reign of TERROR is forced to an end—by any means 
necessary.46 
With remarkably few changes in word choice this might be the text of a suicide bomber’s 
‘martyrdom video’. It remains to be seen whether extreme environmentalism and anti-capitalism can 
develop a plausible end state with a real chance of mobilizing a sufficiently large part of the 
population to achieve revolutionary change; or whether, as with Islamism, their eschatological 
rhetoric and murderousness will have the effect of alienating it from the population which they 
purport to represent. Without doubt, cyberspace enables such groups to take on forms that are hard 
to penetrate and to conduct attacks that are hard to defend against. At the same time, it does not 
change the fact that revolutionary groups need to do more than attack the status quo—they must 
also paint a convincing picture of a better future. It is significant, however, that as opposed to 
Islamism, which in the West appeals to a minority within a minority, environmentalism and anti-
capitalism (particularly after the banking crash of 2008 which has fuelled hatred of the financial 
sector) are viewed broadly much more positively in society.  
One of the things that make Anonymous interesting is that it is subversive in the sense of being 
disruptive of the existing order but its goals are not constructive in the way which genuinely 
revolutionary goals are thought to need to be. At present they are much more like the 19th and early 
20th century anarchists with whom many members seem to consciously identify. Whether there are 
more disciplined revolutionaries within the movement employing the dumb mass of other cheap 
‘clicktivists’ or ‘hacktivists’ as ad hoc ‘shock troops’ or not is unknown. As may be seen in the 
exchange with HBGary’s CEO Greg Hoglund, there is a distinctly rudderless fanaticism to the 
group; they clearly were not interested in accepting his surrender. When one of the participants in 
that discussion asked Hoglund ‘[do] you understand what we are about? Do you understand why we 
do what we do?’ he did not provide an answer.  
But the question is highly apposite. Why do they do what they do? The most common answer is for 
the ‘lulz’—Anonymous clearly makes it very easy for individuals to engage in high-impact but low-
cost/low-effort activism; but it is hard to see how ‘lulz’ can constitute the ‘sacred cause’ which 
revolutionary groups have thus far always required to sustain their movements over the long term. 
Anonymous’ championing of Wikileaks may be significant in this respect; it remains to be seen, 
however, whether this foray into political contest will outweigh the inherent capriciousness of the 
group—that is to say if it can adopt a coherent ideological identity. 
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 Conclusion: DIY Revolution 
Cyberspace alters much but it does not change everything. It enhances our ability as social beings to 
communicate, to collaborate, and to argue, not to mention consume—all traits as old as mankind 
itself. Connectivity has important implications for the practice of war but it does not substantially 
alter its nature as much as is commonly supposed. It does not with ‘cyberwar’ create a decisive new 
form of warfare that will reshape the international order in respect of the balance of power amongst 
states as we have come to know it. If anything it shores up the existing distribution of military power 
rather than undermining it.  
This is not an invitation to be complacent, however, because new forms of business, economic, and 
social practices, including subversives and revolutionaries, have emerged to shape and take 
advantage of connectivity. It is not that the state is irrelevant to these new forms; it is rather that the 
focus of their energies, for better or worse, is simultaneously far larger (i.e., civilizational) and much 
smaller (i.e., corporate or individual) than the position occupied by the state. Thus it begs the 
question, what does the discipline of strategy have to add? As it has been oriented for many years—
on the notions of ultima ratio regum, that power emerges from the barrel of a gun, and of states as the 
alpha and omega of discussion—perhaps not much; but in its essence as the combination of ends, 
means and ways by diverse social actors quite a lot. 
Right now, the networked social movement that has most exercised the interest of the strategic 
studies community for the last decade is a strategic misfire—unable to achieve its desired end state 
because of its inherent outlandishness and popular undesirability. There are, however, a number of 
other networked social movements which are best described as being in a state of ‘strategic latency’ 
that have received little attention. ‘Strategic latency’ is a term which some analysts have used to 
describe ‘a condition in which technologies that could provide military (or economic) advantage 
remain untapped.’47 The causes of the strategic latency of networked social movements are not 
technological: the means for them to exert power—to compel, or attempt to compel, their enemies 
to do their will—are available and growing in scale and sophistication. Nor are the causes of their 
latency to be found in their ways: various techniques ranging from disruption and sabotage, both 
real and virtual, to violent physical actions which resonate in the global mediascape, have been 
amply demonstrated and shown to be operationally effective. The cause of their latency is political: 
no networked social movements as of yet have attached existing, albeit new, ways and means to an 
end compelling enough to mobilize the masses. 
The problem for future war horizon-scanners is not the degree to which they correctly apprehend 
technological challenges; it is the degree to which they understand the human motivations behind 
the usages of that technology. In a short at the Salt Lake Ignite conference (‘a community event 
celebrating the passion and creativity of geek culture’ whose slogan is ‘Enlighten us, but make it 
quick’), Matthew Reinbold, Creative Principal of Vox Pop Design enjoined his listeners: 
When you organize your tribe and you’ve decided to tackle one of these problems 
make sure that you have a semi-permeable membrane made out of belief. That belief 
will tell you what ideas you should accept into your organization and what ideas you 
should reject. But ultimately it starts with you. You have to care. You can’t just idly 
sit back and decide that somebody else is going to solve your problems, that 
somebody else is going to come save you, that somebody else is going to be the 
champion that you’ve been waiting for; it is all up to you. The alternative is sitting in 
darkness, stumbling around victimized by boom and bust cycles. It’s imperative that 
you take action. You decide the problems that you want to solve, you decide the 
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 world that you want to make. You can keep calm and just hope that things get better 
or you can make the effort to get excited and make the world that you want. Find 
your tribe. Decide what you believe. Rally them around you.48  
As calls to arms go this is mild stuff—there is no question that Reinbold is talking about non-violent 
activism in pursuit of changes which most people would regard as normatively positive—e.g., energy 
independence. Yet the subtext here is subversive too. It begins from the premise that the existing 
authority, the government, is unable or uninterested in changing the status quo because it is enslaved 
to corporate interests which are the real enemy. It trumpets a grievance of ‘victimization by boom 
and bust’ which resonates with youth, particularly urban, educated and middle class youth whose life 
prospects have been hit hard by the global economic crisis. It implies an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-
group’ and it ends with a rousing call to make the world what you want it to be. There is no call to 
violence—nor is any implied; however, a world of do-it-yourself revolution is one which would 
possess multiple variants amongst disparate groups embracing different ways and means to similar 
ends.  
What is unclear is the ideology that might serve to focus the abundant dissatisfaction with the status 
quo to which Reinbold is reacting. What are the ‘sunlit uplands’ towards which he imagines us 
striving? If you could identify it would you fight it or join it? The pause which you require to 
consider that question is the reason that this historical moment is strategically significant. On the 
other hand, perhaps there is no overarching ideology; instead what will emerge from the 
informational turbulence in which contemporary international politics now finds itself is a world in 
which a multitude of passionately-held identity driven causes transcend the nation-state based ones 
which have underpinned strategic thinking for generations.  
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9. Watching Hainan, Remembering Murmansk 
Cold War Analogies, Maritime Access, and the Future of Warfare 
Adam Grissom 
 
Naval Race in the Western Pacific 
Naval races have long been a harbinger of great-power competition. Just as Lysander built Sparta’s 
first battle fleet to challenge Athenian naval mastery in the Aegean, and Tirpitz built Germany’s 
Riskflotte to challenge British naval mastery in the North Sea, so today China is challenging American 
naval mastery in the Western Pacific. We are in the early stages of a classic naval race pitting a rising 
continental power against an established maritime power for control of the approaches to the 
Eurasian landmass.1 
The first definitive move of the race occurred last year when China deployed a maritime 
reconnaissance-strike complex comprised of over-the-horizon surveillance radars, ocean 
reconnaissance satellites, and an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) version of the DF-21D Anti-
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM). Though a robust debate is occurring in the community of American 
experts over the maturity and implications of the DF-21D, its unveiling has precipitated a full-scale 
naval scare in the United States, reaching beyond the experts to the broader policy elite and popular 
culture.2 The Department of Defense (DoD) has, meanwhile, accepted China’s challenge by 
expanding certain naval acquisition programs, shifting additional assets to the US Pacific Fleet, and 
developing a new concept of operations it calls “Air-Sea Battle.”3 Both countries are preparing for a 
long-term competition for control of the maritime approaches to East Asia. The question posed 
here is how the Western Pacific naval race is likely to unfold and what it means more broadly for the 
future of warfare. 
The discussion in American defense circles about the rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) is often cast in terms of the most recent naval race in which the United States participated: 
the Cold War competition with the Soviets.4 Andrew Krepinevich, among many others, has drawn 
an analogy between the emerging situation in the Western Pacific and the US-Soviet naval race over 
the northern maritime approaches to Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO’s) “Northern Flank”) between 1960 and 1990.5 It is this experience, and its agreeable 
outcome for the United States, that provides the prism for current American thinking about China 
and maritime access in the Western Pacific.  
This article unpacks the Northern Flank analogy and explores its implications for maritime access 
and denial in future warfare. It first describes the terms of the debate in the United States and, in 
particular, the “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) label that has been coined to describe the 
operational problem of maritime access in contemporary conditions. It then examines the Northern 
Flank analogy in as much detail as space limitations will allow, highlighting key aspects of the Cold 
War naval arms race that are sometimes overlooked in today’s debates. It closes by assessing the 
validity of the analogy and its potential implications for maritime access and the future of warfare. 
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 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) in American defense planning 
Transoceanic force projection has been the sine quo non of American military power for more than a 
century. With its transition from a continental power to a global power in the aftermath of the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States began to perceive interests and obligations outside 
its hemisphere. Military commitments and requirements naturally followed, entailing the twin 
problems of force projection and access to potential theaters of operation. The ensuing century of 
military expansion — from the Great White Fleet and frontier constabulary forces to global 
maritime supremacy and a permanent overseas presence on four continents — redefined the United 
States as a global military power that is uniquely secure in its own continental position and both 
interested and capable of projecting power onto the Eurasian landmass.  
Today, the implicit assumption throughout American defense planning is that all future major wars 
involving the United States will occur outside the Western Hemisphere, requiring the projection of 
military power across the Atlantic and/or Pacific oceans.6 The US armed forces are shaped and 
structured around this requirement, from US Transportation Command’s massive transoceanic 
mobility and sustainment capability to the design of tactical units in the four services, all of which, 
from brigade combat teams to fighter wings, are designed to be deployed across the ocean and 
employed on foreign territory.7 Thus, the question of access and denial is central for American 
defense planners.  
During the recent post-Cold War “interwar” period it would have been easy for anyone reading 
official DoD planning documents to believe otherwise. American air and maritime supremacy 
appeared so total that the problem of securing access for expeditionary force projection began to 
fade from view.8 This began to change at the turn of the new century when analysts from think 
tanks such as the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA) began to take a fresh look at US force-projection plans and capabilities.9 They found 
troubling vulnerabilities, including trends in the development of land-based, medium-range ballistic 
and cruise missiles that could soon pose a major threat to American facilities overseas and perhaps 
surface ships.10 Concern gradually mounted within American’s expert community, until Andrew 
Krepinevich crystallized the issue inside the Washington, DC, Beltway in 2003 by giving it a label 
and an acronym: Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD).11  
For reasons that remain obscure, Krepinevich separated the access-denial challenge into two 
categories in his 2003 study. “Anti-Access” was defined as “actions that inhibit movement of 
military forces into a potential or current theater of operations.”12 “Area Denial” was defined, on the 
other hand, as “actions that inhibit the movement of military forces within a theater of 
operations.”13 Thus the same actions would fall into a different conceptual category according to 
whether or not they occurred within an area that DoD defined as a “theater,” a geographic construct 
that in the past has often been granted on political or bureaucratic grounds rather than substantive 
military considerations. Though neither term is officially recognized or defined by DoD, A2/AD is 
now routinely used by those in government as well as the expert community. Few observe the 
distinction between “Anti-Access” and “Area Denial,” however, and many use the label A2/AD 
without knowing precisely what the letters represent. Moreover, the terms have in recent years 
acquired a distinctly maritime dimension that is not reflected in Krepinevich’s original wording. In 
practice, the longstanding American defense planning challenge of maritime access has been recast 
as A2/AD.14 This article will observe current convention without attempting to resolve these issues. 
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 Watching Hainan… 
Though think tanks succeeded in raising awareness of the A2/AD challenge within the expert 
community, the raging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan kept “next-war” issues, such as maritime access, 
on the back burner in DoD during the first decade of the 21st century. This changed in late 2010, 
when the Chief of Naval Operations reported that the PLAN had fielded an Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) version of the Dong Feng (East Wind) missile, the 21D.15 China’s DF-21D is a road-
mobile, two-stage, solid-propellant, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with an estimated 
maximum operational range of 800 nautical miles. It is believed to carry a maneuverable reentry 
vehicle (MaRV) warhead equipped with a terminal radar seeker to guide the final stages of an attack 
on a ship target. It was developed from the DF-21A MRBM, itself a development of the 1960s-era 
JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile.16  
In recent years the PLA has also deployed several constellations of satellites that could potentially 
provide reconnaissance and targeting data to the DF-21D. These are reported to include electro-
optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence satellites. The Yaogan 9 constellation of 
three radar satellites launched in March 2010 appear to fly in distinctive orbital formation, leading 
some to suspect they are dedicated ocean reconnaissance platforms. The Yaogan 11 constellation of 
three radar satellites launched in September 2010 and the Shi Jian-6 pair of electronic intelligence 
satellites may also have a naval role.17 
The scenario that concerns many American planners is that of a crisis in the Western Pacific 
requiring an American military response in support of a regional ally, such as Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan, or the Philippines. Should Beijing find American military involvement unacceptable, the 
PLA’s conventional MRBMs land-attack cruise missiles have the capability to effectively prevent 
large-scale air operations from existing US airbases in the region.18 US Navy (USN) Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSGs) are therefore expected to carry most of the burden of an American response. The 
advent of the DF-21D, as a supplement to existing air, surface, and subsurface capabilities, 
substantially raises the potential risk to CSGs operating in the Western Pacific. 
The strategic implications of the Western Pacific A2/AD competition are potentially quite serious. 
If China demonstrates the ability to limit or deny access to the Western Pacific, American options 
for supporting its allies in the region — whether against China or some other threat — would 
become contingent, to some degree, on Chinese acquiescence. The value of American security 
guarantees would decline, raising fundamental questions for regional stability. The United States has 
demonstrated that it wishes to avert this situation by, among other things, shifting additional naval 
assets to the Pacific Fleet and adjusting its research and acquisition programs to account for growing 
PLAN capabilities. The United States and China are, therefore, beginning a closely coupled 
action/reaction dynamic in the development of naval capabilities in the Western Pacific. In other 
words, they are beginning a naval race. 
How will this naval race unfold over time? No one can say for certain, of course, but many in 
American defense circles point to the extended US-Soviet Cold War competition for access to the 
Norwegian Sea as an analogy for understanding the dynamics of today’s emerging naval 
competition. We turn next to examine this “Northern Flank” analogy and its potential implications. 
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 …Remembering Murmansk 
The strategic outlines of the Northern Flank naval race may be familiar to readers. The military 
fulcrum of the Cold War was Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces 
faced each other across the inner German border. NATO considered it possible that the Soviet 
Union might be tempted to invade Western Europe unless NATO maintained sufficient 
conventional forces to deny a quick victory to Moscow without resort to nuclear weapons. The 
conventional balance in Central Europe was, therefore, a matter of primary concern to policymakers 
and planners.19 
An essential element of the conventional balance in Europe was the ability of the United States to 
reinforce NATO with heavy ground units stationed in the continental United States. Some of these 
units would deploy by air and draw equipment from pre-positioned stocks in Europe, but the bulk 
would move by sea with their equipment and supplies. These reinforcements would be necessary to 
sustain NATO resistance over time in the face of large-scale Soviet mobilization of its reserve forces 
and to throw back the Soviets from territorial gains that they would undoubtedly make in the initial 
weeks of a war.20  
As a result, the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrent rested in some measure on the ability 
of the United States to move reinforcements to Europe by ship. This meant that NATO was forced 
to take seriously the defense of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the United States 
and Western Europe, particularly West Germany’s ports on the North Sea. The Soviet Union had a 
concomitant interest in denying, or at least appearing able to deny, those SLOCs to NATO in order 
to prevent these reinforcements from influencing the correlation of forces.21  
Access to those SLOCs turned on maritime access to the northern approaches to Western Europe. 
To the extent that NATO could control the Norwegian Sea it could defend the SLOCs and the 
North Sea ports required for reinforcing the continent. This was NATO’s so-called “Northern 
Flank.” If the Soviets could control the Norwegian Sea they could turn this flank and jeopardize 
NATO’s conventional reinforcements. At stake was not just wartime effectiveness but also 
peacetime NATO-alliance cohesion, the bargaining power of the two blocs, and stability during 
crises.22 
The control of the Norwegian Sea was also important to the Soviets for reasons other than access to 
NATO SLOCs. The Soviet Navy operated a key portion of its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 
bastion from ports near Murmansk. During the early years of the Cold War, these SSBNs transited 
the Norwegian Sea to operate off the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. As the Soviets fielded 
longer-range, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the SSBNs could operate from the Barents Sea 
itself. In both cases the Soviets needed to prevent NATO from controlling the Norwegian Sea in 
order to protect SSBNs transiting to mid-Atlantic launch areas during the early Cold War period and 
protect later SSBNs operating in the Barents Sea bastion.23 The Norwegian Sea, therefore, played an 
important role in the security and stability of Soviet second-strike capabilities. 
An unfortunate byproduct of the close proximity of NATO SLOCs and the Soviet SSBN bastion 
was that Soviet naval capabilities required to protect the bastion naturally created the ability to deny 
the SLOCs to NATO. The reverse was also true. The NATO capabilities required to secure the 
SLOCs naturally created the capability to jeopardize the Soviet SSBN bastion and, therefore, the 
invulnerability of its second-strike capability. The US intelligence community debated for decades 
whether the Soviets really intended to conduct a denial campaign against the SLOCs or were merely 
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 positioning themselves to protect their SSBN bastion.24 Ultimately NATO was obliged to act as if 
the latter were true because Soviet intentions were unknowable and subject to change.  
Figure 1, below, indicates the consensus position among US intelligence analysts regarding Soviet 
naval operating areas during a future conflict. The area shaded darkest on the map corresponds to 
the projected Soviet SSBN bastion, incorporating the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. This area 
extends approximately 2,000 km from the main Soviet naval airfields on the Kola Peninsula. Inside 
this zone, the intelligence community expected the Soviet Navy to conduct “sea control” operations, 
effectively denying access to Western naval forces and using the area themselves for strategic strike 
operations.  
 
Figure 1: Projected Soviet Naval Operating Areas 
 
 
Source: “Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,” National Intelligence Estimate NIE11-15-84, 21 
December 1984. Originally classified Secret, declassified as sanitized on 29 October 1999. 
 
The part of the map shaded more lightly, extending some 3,000 km from the airfields on the Kola 
Peninsula, is the area in which the intelligence community expected the Soviet Navy to conduct 
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 “denial” operations, denying or disrupting Western naval operations sufficient to prevent those 
forces from accomplishing their missions, which the Soviets expected to be air and cruise missile 
strikes on Soviet land targets. Note that the denial area incorporates the approaches to ports in 
Western Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands that would be used to disembark US 
reinforcements.  
Very broadly speaking, the story of the US-Soviet competition for maritime access to the Norwegian 
Sea began in the mid-1950s and unfolded in three major phases.25 Prior to this, the Soviet Navy was 
primarily designed to protect the coastal areas of the Soviet Union from attacks by Western naval 
forces. Its inventory comprised mostly short-range diesel attack submarines (SSs) and surface patrol 
craft (the OSA and KOMAR classes) equipped with torpedoes and short-range SS-N-1 and SS-N-2 
anti-ship missiles.26 Soviet Naval Aviation was equipped with Tu-95 BEAR and Tu-16 BADGER 
bombers with limited anti-ship capabilities.27 The Soviet Navy of the early 1950s was, therefore, a 
coastal defense force with a limited capacity for contesting the immediate approaches to Soviet 
waters. It did not possess the capability to threaten NATO SLOCs beyond a few long-range 
submarines and potential mining operations in Western harbors.28  
During the mid-1950s, and particularly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev decided that the Soviet Union should have a blue water navy. In 1956, he issued the 
order to expand the Soviet Navy into a force capable of carrying out four missions: protecting the 
new class of YANKEE-class SSBNs as they operated abroad, defending the homeland against US 
carrier attacks, conducting power-projection operations in the “Third World,” and operating against 
NATO SLOCs in a time of war. A subsequent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate described 
the decision as follows: 
With Khruschev’s ascent to power in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Navy undertook to 
develop new capabilities to meet the threat posed by the carrier strike fleets. The 
course adopted was to develop anti-ship cruise-missile systems for surface ships, 
submarines, and aircraft, and to institute long-range surveillance of US aircraft carrier 
movements at sea. … By about 1960 the Soviet Navy had developed capabilities to 
counter the carrier strike fleets, defend the maritime approaches to the USSR, and 
supplement the emerging strategic strike capability of the newly-formed Soviet 
Strategic Rocket Forces.29  
Khrushchev’s decision inaugurated the first phase of US–Soviet competition for control over the 
Norwegian Sea. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the Soviets significantly modernized their 
surface, submarine, and naval aviation to implement the new strategy. In particular, the Soviet Navy 
created a reconnaissance-strike complex capable of targeting Western carrier strike groups at 
extended ranges. The key elements of this reconnaissance-strike complex were the KRESTA-class 
cruisers (CGs); KOTLIN-class, guided missile destroyers (DDGs); and ECHO-class, nuclear-
powered cruise-missile submarines (SSGNs). All of these carried the long-range (250 nautical miles) 
SS-N-3 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).30 The SS-N-3 was a large, turbojet-powered missile carrying 
1,000 pounds of explosives and a terminal attack radar.31 Several could be carried by each of the new 
classes of ships. The SS-N-3 created a serious naval scare in the West, not unlike the DF-21D is 
doing today, because it appeared to create the capacity for the Soviet Navy to engage and destroy the 
US Navy’s key capital ships at extended ranges. By the end of the decade, US intelligence sources 
estimated that the Soviet Navy would find and sink most US carriers in the initial stages of a war.32 
The Soviets also introduced the sensor and targeting network necessary to employ the SS-N-3 
against Western naval forces. In the late 1950s, the Soviets developed an over-the-horizon electronic 
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 support measure (ESM) capability that allowed their Navy to monitor the location of NATO naval 
forces from their radars, communications, and other electronic emissions.33 The BEAR-D variant of 
the Tu-95 bomber was also introduced, carrying a large maritime radar to track and target Western 
naval forces, along with “trawlers” that tailed these forces during peacetime to provide an initial fix 
should war erupt.34  
The Soviet concept of operations was that the ESM would provide a general indication of the 
location of Western naval units, particularly carrier groups emitting unique radar and radio 
signatures. “Tattletale” trawlers would supplement this picture during peacetime. In the initial hours 
of a conflict, BEAR-D reconnaissance aircraft and submarines would fix the locations of Western 
naval forces and pass this data to ECHOs, KRESTAs, and KOTLINs, which would then launch 
coordinated waves of SS-N-3s at the predicted locations of the targets. When the ASCMs arrived in 
the vicinity of the Western naval units, they would activate their onboard terminal-attack radars and 
strike key targets, ideally the strike carriers.35  
The United States developed and implemented countermeasures against this capability during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. The central element of this response was the improvement of fleet air 
defense capabilities against ASCM-type targets. The US Navy fielded the TRUXTON and 
BELKNAP classes of CGs designed to accompany carrier strike groups and provide air defense 
with the Standard Missile 1 (SM-1), which was capable of intercepting air targets out to 40 nautical 
miles.36 The USN also fielded the E-2A Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft and the Navy 
Tactical Data System to link the E-2As with F-4 Phantoms flying combat air patrols with AIM-7E 
Sparrow medium-range, air-to-air missiles against Soviet aircraft and cruise missiles.37 The USN 
improved its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities by upgrading its fixed sonar system in the 
North Atlantic, fielding the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft equipped with an advanced magnetic 
anomaly detector and sonar-equipped buoys, and fielding the STURGEON class of quiet, long-
range nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).38  
The US-Soviet competition, therefore, turned on the issue of range. In the air-surface domain, it 
became a competition between the range of maritime search radars against US air surveillance 
radars. In terms of airborne weapons, it was the range of the SS-N-3 against that of the F-4s and 
SM-1s. In the sub-surface domain, it became a competition of the SS-N-3 against the P-3 and 
STURGEON SSNs hunting the ECHO SSGNs. Both sides actively sought to out-range their 
adversary’s sensors, platforms, and weapons, thereby gaining a key advantage in naval engagements 
conducted by heavily armed but poorly protected units. 
Phase two of the competition began in the late 1960s as the Soviets reacted to US countermeasures 
against the Soviet maritime reconnaissance-strike complex. Their response was to extend the range 
of their sensors, strike platforms, and weapon systems. The most important innovation was the 
development of the Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) constellation that extended 
Soviet maritime sensor coverage to the entire globe.39  Though the initial generation of RORSAT 
was primitive by Western standards, it provided a useful complement to the ESM and airborne 
elements of the sensor system.40 
The Soviets also expanded their arsenal of anti-ship missiles, developing the air-launched AS-4B 
(250 nm), AS-5 (100 nm), AS-6 (250 nm) missiles to complement the SS-N-3 in the counter-carrier 
mission. The new generation of anti-ship missiles (ASMs) were much faster and more difficult to 
target than the SS-N-3. They were guided by improved radar seekers, passive receivers for anti-radar 
operations, and, in some cases, passive infrared seekers. All flew profiles that were more difficult to 
intercept with SAMs.41  
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 Finally, the Soviets increased the range and capability of missile-carrying platforms. The KARA class 
CGs, KRESTA CGs, and KRIVAK FFGs were all introduced during this period and carried the 
new SS-N-14 dual anti-submarine and anti-ship missile.42 The Tu-95 BEAR F was upgraded to carry 
the AS-3 and new ESM and reconnaissance variants were introduced, the Tu-16 BADGER was 
similarly upgraded to carry the AS-4 and act as an improved sensor platform, and the Tu-22 
BLINDER was introduced as another AS-4 carrier.43   
Together these improvements represented an enhanced threat to NATO operations in the 
Norwegian Sea. The United States responded in phase two by again increasing the range of its own 
sensors, platforms, and weapons. The 1970s saw the introduction of the VIRGINIA and 
CALIFORNIA-class CGs and SPRUANCE DDGs equipped with longer-range (90 nm) SM-2s,44 as 
well as the long-range air defense team of the E-2C Hawkeye and F-14A Tomcat equipped with the 
AWG-9 long-range, air-to-air radar and the AIM-54 long-range (100 nm) air-to-air missile.45 The 
United States also improved its anti-submarine capabilities by introducing the LOS ANGELES-class 
SSN, upgrading the fixed sonar array system in the North Atlantic, and developing an improved 
version of the P-3 Orion.46 Finally, the Navy fielded its own AGM-84 Harpoon ASM carried by 
surface ships, aircraft, and submarines capable of striking Soviet surface targets.47  
Together these improvements greatly expanded the range at which US naval forces could detect and 
engage Soviet airborne, surface, and subsurface platforms and the missiles carried by those 
platforms. The concept of operations was to “shoot the archer.” E-2Cs would detect an inbound 
Soviet air raid at extended range, which would then be engaged by F-14s before they could launch 
their ASMs against US surface ships. E-2Cs, satellites, and surface sensors would detect Soviet 
surface units before they could launch their missiles, which would then be engaged by US platforms 
carrying Harpoons. Soviet submarines would be detected by fixed sonar arrays and prosecuted by 
the long-range P-3s and SSNs before they could engage US surface ships.  
NATO also countered the growing Soviet threat against its SLOCs by expanding the geographic 
scope of the Northern Flank. The alliance began planning to operate land-based fighters and 
maritime aircraft from airfields in Norway, secured by US Marines as well as Norwegian forces, to 
attrite Soviet aircraft as they transited to the Norwegian Sea. Capabilities in Scotland were similarly 
expanded, as were US air and maritime patrol capabilities based in Iceland. These redeployments 
further adjusted their air and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) umbrella north of the SLOCs.48  
In retrospect, it is clear that the US response really began to gather momentum in phase two of the 
competition. The breadth and technical sophistication of the response are notable, as is the level of 
effort and cost involved. What is less clear is how the US and Soviet responses influenced the 
overall balance in the Norwegian Sea. Though the technical systems fielded by the United States and 
NATO were quite impressive, the mid-1970s were also a period of significant hollowness within the 
force. Training hours and steaming days declined even as the Soviet Navy continued to increase its 
equivalent operations and training activities. 49 Had the situation devolved to a test of arms during 
the 1970s it is not clear which side would have been more capable of adapting the potential of their 
technical tools to the particular operational context of the conflict. The interactions between the two 
sides were limited, as were observable exercises, making the assessment of a net balance quite 
complex. 
Phase three of the competition began in the early 1980s. The Soviets again sought to offset 
American responses through increasing the range of sensors, weapons, and platforms. The 
RORSAT constellation was substantially expanded and upgraded during this period. The Soviet 
Navy also fielded the KIROV class of heavy cruisers armed with long-range (300 nm) SS-N-19 
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 ASMs and long-range SA-N-6 SAMs, along with the SLAVA-class DDGs armed with 300-nm range 
SS-N-12s and the SOVREMENNY-class DDGs armed with very long range and fast SS-N-22 
ASMs.50 The surface ships were complemented by the SIERRA and AKULA-class SSNs, which 
were much quieter and armed with the 1600nm SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missiles.51 The Soviets 
also fielded a quieter SSGN, the OSCAR, equipped with the SS-N-19.52 Essentially, the Soviet 
submarine fleet significantly reduced the range at which they could be detected while extending the 
range at which they could strike US surface units. 
In the aerial domain, the Soviets fielded the Tu-22M (sometimes referred to as the Tu-26) 
BACKFIRE-C armed with the 400-nm range AS-6 ASM.53 The Soviets also deployed the Su-27 
FLANKER long-range fighters for the first time to protect the BEARs, BLINDERs, and 
BACKFIREs against US fighters.54 Finally, the Soviet Navy also began constructing a conventional 
large-deck carrier that some believed would be tasked with contesting air superiority of the 
Norwegian Sea during a time of conflict.55  
For the United States, phase three of the competition occurred during the years of the Reagan 
buildup. The USN fielded the TICONDEROGA and ARLEIGH BURKE classes of AEGIS-
equipped surface combatants, the block 3 version of the SM-2 to operate with AEGIS, the B and C 
models of the AIM-54, the F/A-18 Hornet, and the ASM-135 anti-satellite missile for targeting 
Soviet RORSATs.56 Perhaps more importantly, however, the DoD again filled the coffers for 
training, maintenance, and steaming days. US forces became substantially more battle ready, and 
declassified intelligence sources from the period suggest that the intangible factors of experience and 
adaptability began to tilt heavily in favor of the United States.57 An example of this is the exercise 
conducted by the United States in 1986, during which a carrier strike group adopted emissions 
control measures that prevented the Soviets from detecting or tracking the strike group until it 
began simulated strike operations against Soviet bases near Murmansk.58  
 
What can be learned from the Northern Flank analogy? 
This examination of the US-Soviet naval race on NATO’s northern flank suggests five potential 
insights for the emerging naval race in the Western Pacific. First, the United States and the Soviet 
Union clearly engaged in a dynamic of coupled action/reaction innovation that substantially 
accelerated the state of the art in maritime access and anti-access operations. The development of 
anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, long-range SAMs and air-to-air missiles, ocean 
surveillance satellites, and a number of other capabilities occurred far more quickly than they would 
have if the US-Soviet competition had not existed.  
The emerging US-PRC competition in the Western Pacific fits this description as well. China has 
integrated anti-ship MRBMs with over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations in an 
innovative manner that harkens back to the reconnaissance-strike complex built around the SS-N-3 
in the 1960s. It has developed MRBMs, particularly the DF-21C, and land-attack cruise missiles for 
striking airbases ashore in an integrated counter-access campaign. The PLAN’s KILO, YANG, 
SONG, and SHANG classes of SSNs are ASCM-capable, as are its long- and short-range strike 
aircraft. The PLA is developing the J-20 stealth fighter or strike aircraft, the role of which is not clear 
in public sources, and a conventional aircraft carrier. All of this has occurred in the same amount of 
time required for the Soviets to complete the first phase of the Cold War competition for access to 
the Norwegian Sea. The United States has responded by developing the Air-Sea Battle concept; 
shifting LOS ANGELES SSNs, SEA WOLF SSNs, TRIDENT SSGNs, and ballistic missile 
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 defense-capable (BMD) AEGIS ships to the Pacific Fleet; expanding the number of BMD-capable 
ships it will acquire; and adjusting its basing posture in the Western Pacific. The action/reaction 
dynamic of a naval race clearly already exists.59 In coming years, this dynamic will drive forward the 
state of the art in access/anti-access capabilities at a rate, and in directions, they would not have 
otherwise.  
Second, to the extent that the Western Pacific naval race follows a similar trajectory to the Northern 
Flank naval race, innovation can be expected to occur rapidly along multiple axes in multiple 
domains. “Vertical innovation” will pivot on the interaction of the range of sensors, platforms, and 
weapons. Successive generations of sensors will have greater theoretic detection ranges while 
platforms and weapons will become stealthier to reduce the de facto range of sensors. Platform and 
weapon ranges will be extended, and speeds accelerated, on both the offensive and defensive ends 
of the competition. “Horizontal” innovation will occur as the adversaries seek advantages in new 
domains: air, surface, subsurface, space, electromagnetic, geographic, and cyber. As during the Cold 
War, the interaction of these innovations will become quite complex and difficult to model and 
understand. This complexity lends uncertainty and instability to naval races, since the platforms are 
relatively small in number and lacking in survivability while, at the same time, being highly lethal to 
each other. A single comparative advantage can turn the relative naval balance of power on its head, 
but the cross-domain effects of vertical and horizontal innovation are very difficult to predict. As a 
result, the emerging naval race in the Western Pacific is likely to produce periods of apparent 
instability and resulting naval scares. Cold War alarm over the Soviet’s SS-N-3 and current worry 
over China’s DF-21D are instructive in this regard. 
Third, the innovations pursued by the competitors will not be driven solely by objective assessments 
of the technical military balance, to the limited extent these are possible in the first place. Though 
space limitations for this paper prevent a detailed discussion of the complicated factors that shaped 
Soviet and US naval innovation during the Cold War, sources make clear that the actual processes 
that produced key innovations in the US-Soviet competition were influenced by a combination of 
perceived military requirements and politics at the national and bureaucratic levels of both 
countries.60 This echoes the academic literature on military innovation and arms races, which 
emphasizes the complex relationship between the capabilities a nation “should” develop under 
objective conditions and the capabilities actually developed in practice.61 To understand how the 
emerging naval race in the Western Pacific will unfold, it will be necessary to understand the political 
and bureaucratic systems on both sides.62  
Furthermore, the actual balance of military capabilities “in the field” is highly dependent on 
innovation and adaptability within operational units. The technical systems fielded by the 
competitors are merely potential until they are translated into action by operational units. The ability 
of those units to adapt their technical systems to the needs of the moment, and innovate, is the 
primary determinant of the true balance of capabilities, yet this is extraordinarily difficult to analyze 
and predict.63 As Robert Angevine has described in his path-breaking work on naval innovation 
during the Cold War, the USN was able to substantially reduce the effectiveness of Soviet ASCMs 
during the 1960s by experimenting with dispersed formations and emissions-control procedures. 
Senior US officers of the period concluded that these new tactics would alter the naval balance in 
the initial days of a future conflict. However, the impact of these bottom-up innovations was not 
evident to those assessing the naval balance from inside the Beltway. Adaptation and bottom-up 
innovation of this sort distorts the actual balance from the purely technological balance, adding 
further uncertainty and instability to naval races.64  
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 87
Grissom Watching Hainan, Remembering Murmansk: Cold War Analogies, Maritime Access, and the Future of Warfare
 Fourth, the innovations that occur in the context of a naval race are not limited to that area or those 
competitors. The US-Soviet naval race accelerated innovations that quickly leaked to other powers 
and other regions of the world. For example, the Soviet Navy supplied the SS-N-2 to more than 25 
countries and sold the SS-N-3 to Angola, North Korea, and Syria.65 Indeed much of China’s own 
advanced naval weaponry, from KILO-class submarines to the Shilang, was originally developed by 
the Soviets during the Cold War.  
The combination of rapidly advancing state-of-the-art military technologies and proliferation of 
these developments can have serious consequences for states that are not involved in the 
competition itself. For example, in 1967 the Egyptian Navy sank the Israeli DDG Eilat with SS-N-
2s provided by the Soviet Union. Indian Navy ships did the same to a Pakistani DDG and 
merchantmen in 1971. The 2006 Lebanon War featured a Chinese C-802 ASM employed by 
Hezbollah, a non-state actor. This suggests that the fruits of the Western Pacific naval race are likely 
to proliferate to other actors in the international system. For the United States, the implications of 
this proliferation should be manageable, because the USN will be involved in the cutting edge of 
these developments. For allies and others who are not involved in the competition, however, the 
ramifications may be more serious as the state of the art accelerates and proliferates. 
The Falklands War of 1992 provides an example from recent history. Both the British and 
Argentines possessed small numbers of advanced naval systems but neither was directly involved in 
the Cold War naval race. Despite the rudimentary nature of the Argentine anti-surface threat, the 
Royal Navy suffered 15 ships damaged and six major ships sunk (SHEFFIELD, ARDENT, 
ANTELOPE, COVENTRY, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, and GALAHAD). Had the USN been 
conducting the operation instead of the British Royal Navy, with CSGs supported by AEGIS ships 
instead of “through-deck” carriers and ASW-oriented surface ships, there is little question that the 
Argentines would have enjoyed little if any success. Strictly speaking, the United States was no more 
capable than the Royal Navy, but it had been preparing to repel serious air and missile attacks for 
decades and invested in the necessary capabilities. The Royal Navy had not and paid a tremendous 
price for falling behind. 
Another analogy might be drawn from the development of suppression of enemy air defense 
(SEAD) capabilities over the past four decades. During the 1960s there was an intense competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the air defense domain. In Southeast Asia, the 
United States lost hundreds of aircraft to Soviet-supplied (and sometimes Soviet-operated) air 
defenses over North and South Vietnam. The integrated air defense system (IADS) protecting 
North Vietnam was particularly vexing for the United States. As a result, the United States devoted 
enormous resources and energy in ensuing decades to overcome such IADSs. By doing so, it rapidly 
advanced the state of the art in SEAD, fielding stealth aircraft, land-attack cruise missiles, stand-off 
precision weapons, advanced anti-radar weapons, jamming and spoofing techniques, and tactics for 
quickly “taking down” an IADS. While some Western allies also invested in SEAD capability, all 
began to lag substantially behind US capabilities. By 1990, the United States was essentially required 
to participate in any Western air operation confronted by ground-based air defenses, because it alone 
had developed the capability to neutralize air-defense systems at little risk. The operation currently 
underway in Libya is a notable example of otherwise advanced Western forces requiring the United 
States to “kick the door down” against quite modest and dated air defenses. It is conceivable that a 
similar dynamic might evolve in the maritime access realm, in which the United States ends up far 
ahead of its allies because it is and will be for the foreseeable future competing directly with China. 
As anti-access capabilities proliferate, Western navies may find themselves more dependent on the 
United States than they are today.  
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 This dynamic may be most problematic for European navies, which are accustomed to possessing a 
technical edge over non-Western navies, yet are unlikely to become involved in the Western Pacific. 
If China continues to proliferate advanced systems to developing states, European navies may find 
that they are outclassed in some respects by the anti-access capabilities possessed by some of these 
recipients. Given the pointed nature of European refusals to consider supporting the United States 
in a future confrontation with China, the United States may feel little inclination to share its 
advanced countermeasures with Europeans or support European operations when confronted by 
proliferated advanced anti-access systems. One indirect result of the Western Pacific naval race may 
be the obsolescence of European naval power. 
Finally, during the cold war the Northern Flank naval race was simply one aspect in a grand strategic 
competition that already dominated the relationship between the two superpowers. Earlier examples 
of naval races, such as the Anglo-German naval race at the turn of the twentieth century, suggest 
that these races can influence the broader political relationship between the competitors, particularly 
when naval scares become political and social issues.66 The concern remains that a narrow military-
technical competition in the Western Pacific may drive the broader political dynamics of the 
international system, rather than the other way around. 	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10. Irregular Warfare and Future War: Strategy and Defense Planning 
James A. Russell 
 
The purpose of this paper is threefold: to speculate on the role and prominence of irregular warfare 
in the strategic environment over the next quarter century, to comment on the impact that 
phenomenon may have on shaping the postulated scenarios addressed in the US National 
Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (2025 Report), and to evaluate the 
relationship of this strategic environment to US defense-planning assumptions that will shape the 
capacities of the Defense Department to address threats to US interests over the next quarter 
century. 
What is irregular warfare? Irregular warfare also goes under a host of other pseudonyms, such as 
guerilla war, insurgency, and terrorism. A cottage industry has grown over the last decade purporting 
to describe the modern variation of this phenomenon as a kind of discrete form of warfare. Terms 
such as 4th generation war, 5th generation war, and hybrid war have appeared, all with the avowed 
purpose of lending greater definitional specificity to term in its most modern iteration. The Defense 
Department’s Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept states: “Irregular warfare is defined as a 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
populations. IW favors indirect or asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.”1 
It is generally believed that in this construct one or more of the adversaries involved is using 
terrorism, subversion, sabotage, insurgency, and criminal activities or other asymmetric tactics.2 To 
fight adversaries, both state and non-state, that are using these tactics the Department of Defense 
identifies a number of critical core competencies for organized military forces: counterterrorism, 
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.3 
The United States and its coalition partners have been engaging in two such wars over the last 
decade—one in Iraq and another in Afghanistan—in which both US forces and its adversaries could 
be said to be engaging in irregular warfare. Senior US decision makers have stated that this is likely 
to be the kind of warfare confronting the United States in the future. Former US Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates recently stated: “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations 
should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that 
spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the 
terrorists recruit.”4 Since the 9/11 attacks, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
promulgation of terms like the “long war” and the “war on terror,” the Department of Defense has 
generated an enormous amount of reports, directives, and planning and training guidance that has 
sought to reorient US capabilities away from conventionally oriented war toward irregular warfare, 
which take into account the strategies suggested by Gates. 
This is for a reason—the US has been increasingly engaged in these kinds of operations since the 
end of the Cold War, finding itself involved in various policing and humanitarian missions over the 
last 20 years. The vast enterprise of the US military increasingly finds itself as the only viable 
government instrument in any state to carry out these kinds of missions around the world. The 
United States Air Force and the US Navy today constitute the most comprehensive freight service in 
the world; the Army and Marine Corps can be moved to virtually any part of the world courtesy of 
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 this global logistics and freight-forwarding network. No other state in the international system 
possesses such organizational capacities. 
Predicting the future nature of war is impossible, but it is not so difficult to draw inferences from 
the current strategic environment. These inferences can then be used to draw some speculative 
conclusions about the prominence of irregular warfare in the strategic environment in the next 
quarter–century.  
 
Today’s strategic environment5 
As previously noted, the international system remains characterized by persistent conflict, albeit at 
reduced levels since the end of the Cold War. Without prejudice to the postulated scenarios 
identified in the NIC’s 2025 Report, we can predict with some certainty that the future strategic 
environment will flow from trends in the current strategic environment. The trends in global warfare 
are reasonably well known and are well documented by rigorous empirical research. These trends 
seem relatively predictable and overwhelming: to change them would require some kind of systemic 
global shift. It is unlikely that the world will somehow see a dramatic change in the frequency and 
types of wars over the next quarter–century.  
As indicated in Figure 1 below, there has been a decline in interstate war since 1990. The decline in 
interstate warfare since the end of the Cold War has been nothing short of remarkable. There is 
today an absence of war between developed states, which have decided the consequences and costs 
of war do not warrant the generalized use of force against each other either to solve disputes or to 
increase influence over friends and rivals. It is increasingly unlikely that the world will see a 
reemergence of wars like the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. Rather, to the extent that states go to 
war, the 1973 war in the Middle East may have been a forerunner of the future, where a state applies 
limited use of force for the purpose of achieving a favorable negotiated settlement. This does not 
mean that developed states will not go to war with each other in the future, but it does suggest that, 
in terms of planning assumptions, this is a much more remote possibility than other forms of 
warfare. 
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 Additionally, warfare in today’s international system is statistically much more likely to be intra-
societal and ethnically organized in nature. Since the end of the Cold War, while the numbers of 
inter-state wars have fallen, intra-societal and ethnic wars have remained more or less constant. 
Overwhelming incidences of use of force over the last 15 years have involved ethnic or intra-societal 
conflict in many parts of the world: Shaped by political disputes, we have witnessed multiple 
attempts at ethnic separatism through violent means and clashes created by Islamic militants 
pursuing an anti-globalization and anti-modernity agenda. These wars tend to involve actors waging 
what could be characterized as irregular war in that the war is not waged between organized state-
based militaries. 
Behind the numbers, there are trends that bear highlighting for the purposes of this analysis. Trends 
in the early 21st century indicate that downward trends of certain kinds of armed conflict may be 
leveling off. Another way of looking at this is to suggest that there may be a persistent background “clutter” 
of war that we can expect to continue for the foreseeable future. Today there are 11 protracted societal conflicts 
in the world that have lasted more than a decade and which seem to defy efforts to solve them. 
These include conflicts in Afghanistan (30 years), Colombia (33), D.R. Congo (16), India (56), Iraq 
(28), Israel (43), Myanmar (60), Nigeria (11), the Philippines (36), Somalia (20), Sudan (25), Turkey 
(24), and Uganda (37). Sri Lanka only just ended its protracted war with ethnic-Tamil separatists in 
2009 after 26 years of fighting. On average, during the contemporary period, interstate wars lasted 
about three years, civil wars lasted just over five years, and ethnic wars lasted nearly 10 years. 
The other salient feature of today’s environment is that we have a statistically good chance of 
predicting where wars will be. Over the last 20 years wars have tended to occur in the lesser 
developed countries, areas that lack strong governing institutions and a correspondingly strong sense 
of state identity, and places with existing ethnic and/or societal tensions. As shown below in Figure 
2, there is a high degree of correlation between the likelihood of armed conflict and state fragility. The eight most 
“fragile” countries today are all experiencing armed conflict of some kind or another (Somalia, 
Congo, Chad, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Burma, and Ethiopia). This is not a coincidence.6 
  




Other shaping factors 
There is also a correlation between a state’s ranking on the state fragility index and the absence of 
strong states with established standing armies. In other words, weak states tend not to have standing 
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 armies waging more conventionally oriented military operations. Over the last ten years, the world’s 
zone of “turbulence,” so to speak, has remained relatively constant. This zone of turbulence has 
been in parts of Africa, Central and South America, South Asia, and the Middle East. It seems 
reasonable to predict that warfare over the next quarter century will overwhelmingly occur in this 
zone and that this warfare will not be conducted by organized militaries insofar as conflict involves 
the actors in these parts of the world. 
Another prominent feature of the environment likely to shape the character of war over the next 
quarter century is the precipitous decline of power-projection capacities of conventionally structured 
standing armies around the world. This means the capacities of states to engage in conventional war, 
in which standing armies engage in protracted military operations in distant places, is likely to be 
reduced. It is also not unreasonable to suggest that over the next quarter century, developed and 
developing states may follow the lead of Europe and start spending less on defense with a resultant 
reduction in the sizes of their conventionally structured militaries. Global defense spending reached 
an estimated $1.6 trillion in 2010, an increase of over 50 percent since 2001. The United States is 
mostly responsible for this increase in defense spending in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks; 15 
states accounted for over 80 percent of global defense spending in 2010.7 
While defense spending is increasing in much of the developing world, militaries in the developed 
world increasingly are focused on border and internal security. Armies of the developed world have 
generally followed in the path of their sister-service navies, which are now largely comprised of 
coastal-patrol and coast-guard forces. 
There are several interesting illustrative examples of large standing armies in the developing world 
that have invested heavily in their land forces, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. In 
each of these cases, however, the large numbers of personnel in uniform have not created credible 
conventional military capabilities. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have heavily invested in their air 
forces and have acquired new and sophisticated equipment, but remain unable to use them on the 
battlefield. A characteristic of militaries in the developing world is that regimes tend to not actually 
want their militaries well trained for fear of potential threats to the regimes. In countries like Turkey 
and Egypt, for example, the militaries are seen as pillars of social and political stability, not as power-
projection instruments to influence adversaries or friends.  
More generally, outside the United States, the number of competent conventionally structured 
armies is limited and is likely to decrease over the next quarter century. Western European militaries 
are in decline due to political decisions to decrease the size of their armed forces and may cease to 
be able to conduct even policing missions in the future. Outside Europe, Columbia, Israel, and 
Pakistan have militaries engaged in continuous operations. China and India both have large standing 
armies, but their ability to move these forces over great distances for extended periods of time is 
virtually nonexistent. This paper postulates a generalized decline in the abilities of conventional 
militaries around the world to conduct sustained operations. It is not that large standing armies will 
go away in these states, since they are institutions that perform important political and social 
functions in these societies. But, sustained conventional warfare will not be among the principal 
functions of these organizations. 
It is also worth noting that the zone of turbulence that seems likely to remain with us is largely 
confined to littoral areas. Stated differently, those engaging in war will be on land, not at sea. The 
world’s maritime domain has statistically never been safer. While the global economy is still 
recovering from the downturn of 2009-2010, and despite episodic and well-publicized incidences of 
piracy off the Horn of Africa, economic growth has resumed.8 The global level of twenty-foot 
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 equivalent unit (TEU) container traffic tripled between 1996 and 2009 (from 137 to 432 million 
TEUs), and it is expected to continue to grow.9 One projection forecasts a growth in traffic to 731 
million TEUs by 2017.10 As the world’s seaborne trade continues its exorable climb, developed 
states in particular will continue to police critical waterway chokepoints. These waterways are policed 
by a diverse collection of formal and informal naval task forces. The stakes of developed states in 
the orderly functioning of the globe’s maritime domains are overwhelming and are likely to motivate 
them to continue these policing functions. 
To be sure, there are additional important factors shaping the strategic environment that could 
change the ways in which states view their militaries. These include perceived changes in global 
balances of power that affect actor calculations on military spending and use of force; the transfer of 
wealth from West to East that could change decision making around the world; and the rise of 
China and India economically and politically, both of which have large standing armies and 
conventional military capabilities. There is also the decline of the US in relative terms to China and 
India that may cause regional states in South and East Asia to increase the size and competence of 
their armies and the decline of European militaries to handle anything other than peacekeeping 
operations. Other systemic-level variables induce additional layers of unpredictability, including 
population growth, unforeseen developments in global markets (financial, energy), environmental 
climate-change stresses, other sources of global competition for resources such as energy, water, and 
other stressed and vital commodities. All these additional shaping factors point to the prominence of 
irregular war as a form of global conflict over the next quarter–century. 
 
Defense Planning Assumptions  
The factors shaping the strategic environment over the next quarter century suggest that this period 
will not look dramatically different than it does today. Intra-state and societal conflict will prove a 
persistent feature of the international system while interstate conflict is less likely. These forms of 
conflict will likely occur in what is today’s zone of instability (turbulence) and will take the form of 
irregular warfare conducted by state and non-state actors vying for power and influence. The actors 
engaged in these struggles all have objectives, regardless of the tactics used. They will likely rely on 
the tried and true tactics and equipment of the past. In other words, conflicts over the next quarter 
century will look much like they have looked over the last 15 years, and they will not emphasize 
mass destructive weapons and technologies or cyber warfare.  
Despite the continuity, this suggests an alternative future scenario in which the international 
community will increasingly have to rely on the United States for policing actions in this zone of 
turbulence. While, as postulated by the NIC, there will be a political “concert” of powers that will 
provide a supporting backdrop, these powers will become steadily less capable of exercising military 
influence within this zone. Influencing events in these zones of turbulence will organizationally fall 
to the United States. Over the next quarter century, the United States is likely to remain the sole 
state capable of using force in the unstable parts of the world as referenced above: Africa, the 
Middle East, and parts of Asia.  
The United States is systemically reorienting its military institutions away from predominately 
conventional military operations to meet the challenge of irregular warfare. The political leadership 
within the US Department of Defense over the last decade has made a concerted effort to direct its 
military departments to develop irregular warfare one of its six main mission areas. Myriad reports, 
directives, new doctrine, new organizations, and additional funding have been committed to the 
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 effort. The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report established irregular warfare as one of the six 
critical core mission areas for the Department of Defense.  
Top-down direction from the civilian leadership to the executing elements in the military 
departments has helped build new organizational capacities over the last decade. The land force 
today has new doctrine and training not to mention a huge reservoir of experience over the last 
decade in fighting irregular war. Moreover, both the US Navy and Air Force have played strong 
supporting roles in supporting littoral operations. The Air Force has produced new doctrine 
designed to build organizational competency in irregular warfare. The Navy established the Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command in part to consolidate its organizational elements engaged in 
irregular warfare operations (Seabees, Riverine, and the like).  
As repeatedly noted by senior civilian leaders like Secretary Gates, however, persistent doubts 
remain over the institutional commitment in the military departments to the irregular warfare 
mission. The institutional preferences for the military departments remain predisposed for 
conventionally structured military operations. Their budgets – the true measure of institutional 
interest and intent – remain focused on equipment intended for conventional war. The entrenched 
institutional interest in fighting conventional war is, in some ways, more powerful than the ever-
changing civilian management structure that attempts to provide managerial direction. Stated 
differently, institutional and bureaucratic interests are longer-lasting than their ephemeral civilian 
political masters who lack the staying power to take on these entrenched interests. 
Despite the myriad top-down directions from political leaders proclaiming the dawn of a new 
strategic environment oriented toward irregular warfare, that leadership has shown little interest in 
aligning the overall budget with the capabilities needed in the supposedly new environment. As 
argued in this paper, irregular wars over the next quarter century will be on land, yet the Defense 
Department budget remains roughly equally divided between the Navy, Army/Marine Corps, and 
Air Force. This rough equivalency in budget share has been a constant in the Defense Department’s 
budget in the post-World War Two era. Civilian political leaders have either been unwilling or 
unsuccessful in reorienting this budget to be better aligned with the strategic environment. The 
Navy’s budget is overwhelmingly driven by its preference for carrier battle groups; the Air Force’s 
budget is driven by its institutional interest in high-performance aircraft. The US Congress has been 
a supporting element in this complex equation, converging to prevent the systemic realignment of 
US defense capabilities. The Congress has successfully shoehorned expensive equipment into the 
Defense Department’s budget that bears a tangential relationship to likely real-world military 
requirements.  
In addition to organizational and institutional factors affecting US capacity to wage irregular war, 
domestic politics will continue to strongly influence whether and/or how often the United States 
commits its forces to these kinds of operations. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq must be seen in 
the context of a decision-making environment shaped by the 9/11 attacks and do not represent 
some sort of sea change in American politics that represents a broad embrace of a more general 
policing responsibility. Domestic politics, which undergirds foreign-policy decision-making, has, if 
anything, become more fractious in the last decade. The centrist domestic political coalition that 
supported a relatively consistent foreign-policy decision-making calculus throughout the Cold War 
and its immediate aftermath has largely vanished. This induces yet another uncertainty that makes 
any predictions about America’s propensity to commit its forces to far flung conflicts around the 
world more difficult. 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 97
Russell Irregular Warfare and Future War: Strategy and Defense Planning
 Certainly the last decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a certain institutional fatigue that 
will affect the willingness of military departments to make additional long-term commitments. This 
institutional fatigue, in combination with national fatigue and a changed domestic political 
environment, may make the United States even less interested in applying force in general policing 
missions that are likely to surface over the next quarter–century. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper argues that warfare in the next quarter century will bear a strong relationship to the wars 
of today in their type, frequency, and location. These wars will occur in the word’s zone of 
turbulence characterized by weak states and enduring political and/or ethnic and societal disputes. 
Inferences from current data suggest that irregular war will be a persistent phenomenon in parts of 
the world that are well known to us. The phenomenon of persistent irregular war will be further 
reinforced by the general decline of large conventional armies capable of power projection or 
sustained operations of any kind other than border and internal security.11  
This paper further argues that the United States is likely to remain the world’s only power capable of 
conducting sustained military operations in the zones of instability but that it faces institutional and 
political challenges in intervening militarily. This suggests that the parts of the world that are today 
prone to instability and irregular warfare are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 	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11. African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century 
Gérard Prunier 
 
Africa was decolonized between 1956 and 1975, with the bulk of African states reaching 
independence during the 1960s. Since then, Africa has become—and remains today—the most 
violence-prone of the five continents. In spite of that fact, African wars are often understudied and 
considered negligible. When the Rwandan Genocide burst upon international attention in 1994, few 
people seemed to realize that it was the consequence of a war that had been going on for three-and-
a-half years. And when a war involving 14 states eventually broke out in central Africa in 1996 as a 
result of that genocide, and lasted six years, it barely seemed to affect international opinion, even 
though it was the most murderous conflict since World War Two. A terrorist attack in Europe or 
Israel immediately makes the headlines even if only a handful of victims die. But hundreds or even 
thousands can die in Africa without making it to the front pages of newspapers. This is due to a 
mixture of racism, lack of perceived strategic significance, and cultural isolation. But all these factors 
are now changing, and African conflicts in the future will tend to become more and more relevant to 
the way the world works, and how it looks at itself. 
In this essay we will be placing ourselves in a perspective where, out of the four possibilities outlined 
in the NIC’s Tomorrow’s Security Challenges: The Defense Implications of Emerging Global Trends report,  we 
will consider a combination of two of the global trends presented: a rise in non-state networks and a 
fragmented international system. The one scenario we cannot see as relevant overall is the concert of 
powers, a choice it would take too long to justify within the framework of such a short paper. As for 
the possibility of seeing a return to great power confrontation, even though it may be a more 
realistic systemic possibility than the emergence of a global concern, it is hard to foresee significant 
great power confrontation arising in Africa. The emerging powers, particularly China, will not fight 
for Africa. Even if this trend occurs—and we cannot see it dominate—it will most probably create 
conditions similar to those of the 19th century. The Soviet Union’s Vladimir Lenin was sure that an 
inter-imperialist war would come out of colonial competition in Africa.1 It did not, and when the 
great inter-imperialist war came, it came out of a European confrontation. If renewed great power 
rivalry were to bring about a major military confrontation in the 21st century, the trigger is much 
more likely to be found in the Middle Eastern or Asia than in Africa. 
 
The way it used to be 
African conflicts in the 20th century started from a combination of causes, some of which were 
specific to the continent, while others pertained to the Cold War environment. Specific causes had 
to do with: 
• Administrative and political weakness of the states. 
• Absence of a coherent, long-standing national cohesion, the African “countries” being, in fact, 
arbitrarily cut chunks of the continent, parceled out according to prevailing relationships among 
the colonizing powers. 
• As a consequence, the main problem was the coexistence of tribes with varying degrees of access 
to modernity (depending on colonial policies), different size, different cultures and economic 
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 weight, leading to the dominance of some of them over others and to the exacerbation of 
previous relationship of hostility or exploitation. A common “national” good was an abstract 
notion. There was the good of one’s tribe and, within that precinct, the good of one’s clan or 
family. The “nation” remained an abstract point of reference, used in dealing with the non-
African world. 
• This situation of institutional weakness and lack of coherence was exacerbated by the fact that 
politics, i.e., the control of the state apparatus, was the only way to achieve riches and status. 
There was no entrepreneurial class worth the name (only traders) and, even for those in 
business, the state was the key factor to obtain foreign currency, lucrative public contracts, and 
preferential access to raw materials. The state was the key to everything and, as a result, fighting 
for its control was the main concern of politics. 
• Politicians with a realistic view were few and far between. Those who had one were, in general, 
anti-colonialist ideologues who resented the short shrift their communities had been given by 
the former colonial masters. They tended to point the politics of their new countries toward an 
“anti-imperialist” line hostile to both the US and the former colonial powers alike. 
• Because of colonial education policies, the public had been kept broadly ignorant of political 
issues. It was, therefore, easy prey for demagogues and military dictators, such as Idi Amin Dada 
and Bokassa. Rational politicians, such as Julius Nyerere and Tom Mboya, had a hard time. 
• As a result, most African wars, if not all, until the massive Central African Wars of the 1990s, 
were civil wars.  
All these factors played out against a Cold War background. Local quarrels were immediately probed 
to see who was a “Communist” or Communist ally, which were considered the same, and who was 
“a friend of the West.” As a result, the strangest judgments were passed. Patrice Lumumba was 
dubbed a Communist because he was anti-colonialist and the US saw Belgium as a close and 
necessary ally, while Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was toasted as a “friend of the West” in spite of his 
brutal and thieving dictatorship. France supported a series of abominable dictators because they 
were des amis de la France, and France had been subcontracted for the anti-communist control of 
Francophone Africa by the United States. Conflicts in such cases—or political repression, two sides 
of the same coin—were practically on automatic: the pro-Western camp being awarded immediate 
support by Paris or Washington while Moscow supported the “anti-capitalist” side. “Anti-
imperialism” could produce strange policies on the Soviet side as well, such as praising Somali 
dictator Siad Barre for his “socialism” when he did not know what the word meant, and supporting 
General Idi Amin Dada for his alleged “anti-imperialism” when he expelled the Indian communities 
from Uganda.  
As a rule, African conflicts were rooted in local problems and grievances (about which neither the 
West nor the Communists usually had any clear understanding), and tended to escalate, or at least 
continue unabated, as the contestants sought to align themselves with one side or the other in the 
Cold War as a means of seeking outside support. There were some ambiguous cases, such as 
Nigeria’s Biafran war of the late 1960s, where Great Britain and the Soviet Union ended up as 
uneasy allies of the Federal Government, while Portugal and France supported the secessionists.2 
But such ambiguities tended to be the exception, not the rule. 
Such conflicts achieved no lasting results because they were linked to, and partially caused by, 
ineffectual development policies. These kept the tribal gaps open, did not provide African societies 
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 with power bases independent from the state, and kept the local economies subject to foreign 
interests. These acted as boosters to the state’s interests, therefore making its conquest all the more 
attractive.  
Grand ideological narratives acted both as camouflage and as mobilizing factors for the fighters and 
for their civilian constituencies. The conflicts were deeply local, even at times sub-national. They 
typically involved large numbers of combatants. Most conflicts were financed and equipped by one 
of the two Cold War blocs or by their local proxies. The weaponry tended to be relatively simple or 
even makeshift. The media provided very little coverage for these conflicts, which, in contrast to 
conflicts in Asia, Latin America or the Middle East, did not usually inflame world opinion. The 
protracted civil conflict in South Africa, which never broke into open warfare, was the only one that 
proved capable of mobilizing Western public opinion, because one of its contending parties was 
white and could thus provide a locus for foreign identification, be it “the defense of freedom” (US) 
or “the brutality of racism” (USSR).  
 
The new dispensation 
The end of the Cold War had a massive impact on African conflicts. After 1989, the rules of the 
game changed:  
• The one-party state, which had been the rule whether it dubbed itself “progressive” or promoted 
a form of right-wing Leninism, suddenly became obsolete.3 “Democracy” became the order of 
the day and, just as the one-party state had mimicked Bolshevism, new systems appeared to be 
mimicking Western multi-party democracy. But this was without any of the social, economic, or 
cultural factors actually underpinning democracies elsewhere. The Rwandan Genocide was one 
of the unwarranted consequences of this “democratization without a democratic base.” 
• Fitting this new political dispensation, human rights became a new ideological norm. The human 
rights bandied about by the “new democracies” often had no more reality than the “socialism” 
previously displayed by “progressive” regimes. But a ritual homage was now paid to the concept 
of elections, even if they were flawed and even if the contenders did not represent any clear 
democratic alternative to whomever they were pitted against. 
• Democratic paraphernalia, especially when it was used by a regime that had recently replaced an 
obviously autocratic one, was often sufficient to gain worldwide acceptance. The conflicts of 
these new “democracies” with either their internal opposition or their neighbors, were usually 
looked upon with benevolence by Western opinion. When these “new democracies” violated the 
dominant human rights ideology, they tended to be only mildly reprimanded. Rwanda under 
President Paul Kagame became a prime example of this aspect of the new dispensation. 
• Grand narrative ideologies, usually a variety of socialism but at times hyper-nationalism or some 
form of ethnic fundamentalism, waned and faded away.  
• Open declarations of ethnicity as a political marker started to regress, due to the unifying 
influence of modern media and growing urbanization. But where it persisted, it did so under the 
guise of “pride,” “roots,” and “cultural heritage,” an Africanized version of political correctness. 
Post-Apartheid South Africa exemplified this trend. 
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 • Conversely, the importance of religion grew, particularly in the case of Islam. But this trend also 
affected Christianity. Protestant fundamentalism, often supported by US churches, began to 
challenge both Islam and older established forms of Christianity. This has particularly been the 
case in Ethiopia where the Pentacostal churches bit deeply into täwahädo “orthodox” territory. 
Religious violence grew apace.  
• Syncretic cults and witchcraft movements (re)appeared, recycling elements of larger religions 
into a semi-coherent body, allowing them to win or browbeat converts and marshal them to 
action. The best-known example of this phenomenon is the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army, 
an initially Ugandan cult, whose members later migrated to Southern Sudan, the Northeastern 
Congo, and finally the Central African Republic.  
• The media started to cover African conflicts a bit more seriously, though global coverage 
remained far behind that of contemporary wars in the Middle East or South Asia.  
• As a result of this deeper coverage, it became possible for smaller armed groups to have an 
influence far beyond what their numbers would otherwise have allowed. Guerilla movements 
were re-designated as “terrorist groups,” i.e., the case of the Afar and the Somali in Ethiopia, as 
were bandits with a thin ideological veneer, such as al-Qaida au Mahgreb Islamique (AQMI) in 
the Sahel. Given the American fixation on terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, “terrorist” became an oversimplified, catch-all category in which to fit armed movements 
nobody understood too clearly. African states lobbied to get their enemies put on the terrorist 
list in order to attract additional aid, while rebels accused states of carrying out repressive 
policies against so-called terrorists. The net result has been a general overestimation of the 
relevance of terrorist attacks, such as the May 2011 bombing in Marrakech, Morocco.  
• These smaller armed movements, at times, still had foreign sponsors. But the acceleration and 
greater ease of transport, even in very remote places, enabled the movements to capitalize on 
local natural resources. The new global market provided them with ready customers who could 
operate through various shadow companies and recycle their money in tax havens. Armed 
movements patterned their logistics on those of the drug gangs and, at times, the two could 
meet. This gave armed movements a degree of freedom from foreign sponsors that they had not 
previously enjoyed and also made the complete mavericks more dangerous, since they did not 
have to satisfy the minimum requirements of organizing around an ideology or political stance. 
• The spread of information technology also allowed for greater coordination between disparate 
groups that could make, or later break, tactical alliances with an ease their forerunners did not 
enjoy. 
• The role of popular feeling in political mobilization increased even as use of ideological frames 
decreased. This emotional attraction was a raw, gut product of a world, which was trusting 
political philosophy less and less and feelings more and more. Popular feeling tended to be re-
packaged as human rights and in cultural terms, which substituted for the obsolete 
ideology/ethnicity previously used. The transformation of the militant Oromo Liberation Front 
in Ethiopia over the years is very revealing from is point of view. 
• These lighter and more nimble forms of conflict opened up avenues not previously used for 
violent action, such as hostage taking, sexual violence, and the displacement of refugees. These 
forms of action depended on media coverage, which would not have been afforded previously, 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 102
Prunier African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century
 but which was now more readily available for these violent repertoires than for “classical” armed 
action, both because of a shift in contemporary sensibilities toward a greater concern with 
human rights made them more distasteful for public opinion, and because they were less 
dangerous for the reporters covering them. 
• Low-technology weapons persisted and became even more readily available than they had been 
in the past, since transport was easier and the former USSR, in economic ruins in the 1990s, 
provided a cheap and almost unlimited supply of small arms. High-technology weapons wielded 
by better-equipped armed forces only had a moderate advantage over their older counterparts, 
because they were (a) expensive and, therefore, less easily available; (b) fragile, hence dependent 
on a sophisticated chain of maintenance not readily available in Africa; and (c) complicated to 
operate properly, thus not easy to pass on to friendly local militias, whose members were often 
technologically illiterate. 
But a number of features persisted: 
• The African continent’s balance did not grow any stronger. Some of its technological and 
administrative capacities were strengthened. But this was more than offset by the rise in power 
of non-state actors, such as religious groups, civil society organizations, ethnically organized 
militias, opinion pressure groups, and bandits, which increasingly usurped the powers of the 
state. Some were still practicing the old game of trying to remove the state and replace it with 
their own power. But others preferred to take the shortcut of acquiring wealth, power, and 
privilege directly, rather than using the peripheral and more complicated road of regime change.  
• As a result of persistent state weakness, salaries were often not paid to the agents of the state, 
thereby facilitating the challenges non-state groups could pose. 
• Africa’s armed forces tended to remain unprofessional, undertrained in the use of modern 
weapons, and politically divided in their loyalties. It, accordingly, remained difficult for the state 
to retain its monopoly of legitimate violence, since it possessed neither the legitimacy nor 
controlled the violence. The worst Africa case today is probably the Forces Armées de la République 
du Congo (FARDC), the DRC’s “army.” This force is probably more dangerous to its own 
population than several of the non-state actors it is supposed to fight in the Kivus.  
 
The global overview 
It is clear from what we have just read that the dominant situation in Africa is likely to be the 
continued growth of non-state networks, which would be made easier by a fragmented international 
system. The Central African wars may prove a portent of things to come, and are a perfect example 
of this situation.4 For all its appetite for African raw materials, China is unlikely to fight a big 
international war over them.5 Rivalry over raw materials is likely to remain muted and under the 
horizon, mostly because the African states do not have the capacity to become autonomous enough 
to force the hand of their protector/driver/minder, as do, at least, some states in Asia and the 
Middle East.6 As a result, atomization and localism will remain characteristic of African conflicts. 
And solutions, to the extent that they exist, will remain extremely specific. There cannot be a one-size-
fits-all approach to African warfare. But some recommendations can be made here for the benefit of 
US forces.  
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 • For use in Africa, US forces are over-equipped and too heavy. Their logistics are enormous and 
preclude use in heavy terrain. In many ways, operations would be easier if their gear was closer 
to what was used in the Pacific theater during the Second World War or even the Vietnam War.  
• Conversely, US forces are politically and culturally underprepared. Their behavior often grates 
on local sensibilities, particularly in Muslim-majority areas. A volunteer army should allow for 
better preparation for operations in culturally different terrain.  
• Mobility in Africa is very much the heart of the matter, particularly when faced with an enemy 
that neither looks nor feels like a conventional army, i.e., the case of AQMI in the Sahel or what 
could have happened in the case of an intervention in Darfur, where the janjaweed looked like 
“normal” camel nomads.  
• Mobility in Africa means good, old-fashioned mobility on foot. Helicopters are fine for combat 
support but not for transport where their noise is too easily detected from a great distance. In 
many ways, African warfare is and will remain archaic for the foreseeable future.  
• Cultural adaptation to the context on the ground should not only be defensive, it should also 
allow for the possibility to use the counterforce of groups that are opposed to the ones the US is 
fighting. But such choices have to be thoroughly investigated. The April 2006 CIA-sponsored 
coup in Somalia, supporting a highly unpopular warlord alliance, was a massive error that was 
due to a poor assessment of the internal political situation in that country. Incorrect analysis, in 
turn, was due to poor intelligence gathering. 
In any case, African situations will remain a secondary feature on the world stage. No African 
country is equipped with nuclear weapons, and no African country has the capacity or the will to 
brutally intrude on the world scene and use a form of violent blackmail to bend local geopolitics to 
its desired views. The one form of quasi-violent tactics Africa could use to capture the world’s 
attention is disease epidemic and/or migrant invasion. Disease and the migration of masses of poor 
people could be considered Africa’s nuclear bombs. HIV-AIDS came out of Africa, and the present 
North African revolutions-cum-civil-wars triggering large refugee flows are viewed as a direct threat 
to the northern Mediterranean shores.7 But, can we see these threats as likely to be managed by a 
hostile political force or are they just the uncontrollable consequence of political spontaneous 
combustion? In many ways, such threats are closer to natural catastrophes than to warfare as 
normally understood. 
                                                
1 He based this view on events such as the Franco-German tension over Morocco and the near-war situation after the 
Fashoda incident in the Sudan in 1898.  
2 When the Federals won, they chose to ally themselves solidly with the US. 
3 The ideal type of right-wing Leninism had been Mobutu’s MPR.  
4 See Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford 
University Press America. 2009. 
5 Beijing’s attitude concerning the 2011 Southern Sudanese secession is typical of this.  
6 No African country, not even South Africa, has the capacity for dangerous autonomy displayed by Israel, Iran, 
Pakistan, or even Afghanistan.  
7 Back in 1987, when working in the presidential African unit in Paris, I heard then-Senegalese President Abdou Diouf 
voice this possibility, adding bitterly that, given Africa’s weakness, this was its last weapon.  
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 104
Prunier African Conflicts in the Early 21st Century
12.  21ST Century Peacekeeping and Future Warfare  
Efrat Elron 
 
The UN was designed not to bring humanity to heaven but to save it from hell. 
Dag Hammarskjöld 
 
There is a vast, sensible middle ground between those who see the United Nations as 
the only hope for the world and those who see in it the end of the world. 
Madeleine Albright 
 
In an interdependent and interconnected world values can represent interests. The 
reality is that they are not polar opposites. We have an interest in peace process and 
it is in our interest, but it will not succeed in assisting if its not based on values. 
Helping people is a moral cause but also in our long term interest, otherwise we will 
find that part of the world is turned against us. And problems never stay fixed in one 
part of the world … . 
Tony Blair (Jerusalem, 2011) 
 
Two distinct worlds of international security have emerged in the post-Cold War era: that of US 
power and that of international institutions. It is “a story about the changing nature of power, and of 
careful adaptation and surprising innovation in international governance” (Jones, Forman, & 
Gowan, 2010). Conflict and cooperation among states on matters of peace and security have been 
increasingly managed, regulated, or implemented by and through multilateral security institutions. 
The most visible manifestation of this evolution in the practice and form of international politics has 
been the vast expansion of the work of the UN Security Council; the enormous expansion of tools 
such as international mediation, peacekeeping, and post conflict operations to manage civil wars; the 
proliferation of new instruments for tackling conflict and security challenges; and new mandates for 
older institutions to adapt themselves to changing security realities (Jones, Forman, & Gowan, 
2010).  
While different in their responses, peace and stability operations are embedded in similar 
environments and face some similar difficulties. The majority of UN peace operations are embedded 
in complex intrastate conflicts, corresponding with terms such as “wars amongst people” and 
“irregular warfare” (the latter rarely used by the UN stakeholders). These deployments, then, face 
warfare that is non-linear, complex, and about “winning hearts and minds,” Hence, a significant part 
of their role is to create conditions for political solutions, on the one hand, while putting an 
emphasis on force protection and not only mission accomplishment, on the other (Dandeker, 2009). 
In possible future scenarios, the US will benefit from a deeper knowledge of the parallel world of 
international institutions and their efforts at keeping and making global security and peace.  
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This paper will focus on peacekeeping operations as a form of intervention by the international 
community over the next 15 years. Like it or not, it may fall to the United Nations and the 
international community to keep the international system from descending into more generalized 
armed conflict. This presents an initial overview of recent of peacekeeping and peace operations, 
areas in which militaries from around the world play a crucial role. It will conclude with 
recommendations for US policy makers on how to better understand, cooperate, and enhance these 
tools, making the two worlds of international security less separate, arguing that they are mutually 
dependent for better managing the transition from warfare and conflict to stability and peace.  
 
Recent UN peacekeeping initiatives  
The first months of 2011 brought with them several momentous events that signify possible 
important trends in multilateral peacekeeping-related efforts. Notable are the new interim peace 
operation in Sudan’s Abyei region, military intervention in Libya, and the peace operation in South 
Sudan. All involve the UN as well as other global and regional organizations trying to develop 
innovative solutions to reduce the threat of conflict to civilians. The multilateral efforts to assist 
Haiti after the 2010 earthquake is a lesson learned in the success of new strategies of US military 
cooperation with a UN peacekeeping force as well as a multitude of partners on the ground. Reading 
into these seemingly separate events is a valuable way to understand the most recent thinking, doing, 
and un-doing of multilateral institutions in their efforts to enhance global security, to estimate the 
main trends related to their future participation in warfare, and to assess the US ability to best 
partner with peacekeeping operations and the organizations responsible for them.  
On June 27, 2011, a novel and temporary conflict-management mechanism was set in place for the 
Sudanese Abyei region, combining national, regional, and global initiatives and capabilities. The UN 
Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved a US-drafted resolution authorizing the 
deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian troops to this disputed hotspot for a six-month period. The 
resolution establishes a new UN peacekeeping force—the United Nations Interim Security Force for 
Abyei, or UNISFA. Abyei has been the scene of heavy fighting, forcing tens of thousands of people 
from their homes in the weeks preceding the June 19, 2011, agreement between the two sides on the 
need for a third party to monitor the area as they pull out their forces. The agreement was mediated 
by Thabo Mbeki, the former South African president, and overseen by the African Union (AU). 
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC authorized UNISFA, within its 
capabilities and its area of deployment, to take the necessary actions to protect civilians in the Abyei 
area who are under imminent threat of physical violence. It also authorized the use of force to 
protect the area “from incursions by unauthorized elements,” as defined in the agreement between 
the parties. The resolution further charged the interim force with facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid and the free movement of relief workers in and around Abyei. When necessary, 
and in coordination with the Abyei Police Service, UNISFA troops were also asked to provide 
security for the region’s oil infrastructure. 
While usually it takes at least three months for UN peacekeepers to deploy, an advance force of 
some 1,300 Ethiopian troops were expected to be on the ground in Abyei before July 9, 2011, the 
day South Sudan received its independence through secession from Sudan. An issue for the Security 
Council will be how the precedent of establishing a peacekeeping mission around a sole troop 
contributor from a neighboring state may affect command and control and leadership requirements 
and, in the future, the relationship between peacekeeping operations and host governments in other 
situations. While South Sudan’s situation is unique, it has been the way the African Union has 
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chosen to guide the process. (Security Council Report, Update Report No. 3 on Sudan, 17 June 
2011). 
Three months earlier, on March 17, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) on the 
response to the events in Libya. It was the first time that the term Protection of Civilians (PoC) was 
used as the primary stated objective in a non-consensual intervention, rather than its previous use 
for consent-based peacekeeping missions. The resolution authorized Member States “to take all 
necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory….” Two days later, 
a coalition including the United States commenced attacks via aircraft and missiles on Libyan 
military targets. The US-led attack was later transferred to NATO Command, continuing with 
Operation Unified Protector.  
A day before, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his deep worries about the Alliance’s 
will and capabilities (Gates, 2011), noting NATO members' widespread refusal or inability to 
participate in actual strike missions and difficulties in sustaining intense operations—a reminder of 
what the world's most powerful military alliance cannot accomplish (Haas, 2011). US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton took part in the third meeting of the international Contact Group on Libya 
held in Abu Dhabi. The group, seeking a resolution to the conflict through a variety of means, 
included foreign ministers from 22 countries and six international organizations, including the 
unique combination of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, UN, African Union, European Union, and NATO. In this unique and novel coalition, 
the group pledged to support a new funding mechanism set up in May.1 
In the third case of multinational cooperation in the face of a crisis is the aftermath of the 
earthquake in Haiti in early 2010. The humanitarian response effort included a unique partnership 
between the US military, Haitian government, UN, and members of the NGO community. 
SOUTHCOM established Headquarters, Joint Task Force (JTF), to conduct humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief operations. As a few examples of collaborative work, US senior planners and 
leaders worked alongside their counterparts to develop detailed plans for moving internally displaced 
persons who were in danger, while engineers worked with the UN’s Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) to identify camps in Port-au-Prince that were in direct danger of flooding and mud 
slides. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell facilitated this essential and early 
coordination and collaboration, interfacing with every facet of the joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational environment to ensure synchronization, which greatly helped 
identify and minimize duplication of effort and other inefficiencies. Many lives in Haiti would have 
been lost if not for Operation Unified Response and the access NGOs had to DoD information and 
vice versa, as well as the joint use of online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, to 
disseminate information and correct misinformation quickly (United States Southern Command, 
2010; Sodberg, 2011). 
In the meantime, discussions and planning are taking place in the UN headquarters in New York on 
establishing a new mission to replace the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), 
the current UN mission that has been monitoring the peace agreement between North and South 
Sudan since 2005 and which was terminated July 9, 2011. UNMISS is likely to have a military 
component of 5,000 personnel and a police component of around 900 officers. Its mandate will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Online at http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/pr-2011/secretary-clinton-at-the-libya-contact-group-meeting/secretary-
clinton-at-the-libya-contact-group-meeting.html 
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soon be determined. At present, UNMISS staff are being screened for deployment in the new 
mission, yet again an innovative practice. Hopefully, this new peace operation, deployed in the newly 
independent South Sudan within a fragile political situation—which poses a possible threat to 
international peace and security and faces a government that will most probably not be able to 
protect civilians—will be appropriate to the threats presented and will embody a multidimensional 
peace operation with emphasis on PoC, Chapter VII, robust military and police 
components, effective leadership, and a sound and detailed strategy and campaign plan (Giffen, 
2011; personal conversation, Deputy to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in South 
Sudan, June 26).   
These recent events are important in that they may signify the dawn of a new era in the international 
community’s attempts to regulate and control warfare around the globe. As the United States and its 
NATO partners retreat from their collective deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq, the international 
community faces the prospect of even more active involvement in addressing the consequences of 
persistent warfare around the world without the states best equipped to intervene militarily around 
the world, e.g., UK, Canada, and Australia. The ability of the international community to muster the 
resources and political will to address this issue will have profound consequences for the nature of 
warfare around world over the next quarter century.   
These three seemingly separate conflicts and UN initiatives serve as an indication of the current and 
future trends and changes multilateral organizations like the UN and NATO are going through, as 
well as the possibilities and challenges they present for US policymakers in their thinking on how to 
best enhance national and global security. These trends include UNSC resolutions that are fine-
tuned to adjust to new situations and allow a variety of uses of force, an emphasis on the protection 
of civilians, policymaking and defense budget cuts directed toward the limiting of military 
capabilities in a multitude of countries, different and sometimes innovative formats of peace 
operations to allow greater effectiveness in urgent situations, an emphasis on partnerships with a 
wider variety of government and nongovernment partners with crossing of organizational 
boundaries, and creating flexible forms to facilitate these partnerships. If the US, the UN, and their 
various partners can consolidate and capitalize upon these trends, it may suggest that the 
international community as a whole may be able to more effectively regulate armed conflict. 
As the United States retreats from Afghanistan and Iraq, it may inevitably find itself participating in 
new multilateral mechanisms if it wishes to remain part of the “global police force.” Yet, for all its 
unrivaled power and direct or indirect involvement in the four conflicts described above, e.g., as a 
permanent security council member, the United States is a limited partner in the shaping of the 
evolution of this new multilateral security architecture. While influential in some areas and decisive 
in others, the United States has allowed others to drive some of the significant evolutions that have 
occurred. This is mostly true in the areas of “soft” security threats, largely related to internal conflict 
and humanitarian crisis (Jones, Forman & Gowan, 2010). The Pentagon has recently identified 
peacekeeping as an essential and high priority area for needed investment, yet US roles remain 
limited. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlights peacekeeping capabilities through a 
commitment to assist “partners in developing and acquiring the capabilities and systems required to 
improve their security capacity . . . [and enhancing] US capabilities to train, advise, and assist 
partner-nation security forces and contribute to coalition and peacekeeping operations.” Moreover, 
since taking office, the Obama administration has paid off peacekeeping arrears accumulated over 
the previous four years. In 2009, the United States also provided more than $600 million in training, 
equipment, and logistics assistance to 55 nations to help bolster their capacity to contribute troops 
and police for peacekeeping operations. Dr. Susan Rice, an African expert, was made US 
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Ambassador to the UN and a member of Obama's Cabinet, a first for a UN Ambassador (Sodberg, 
2011). 
 
Trends in UN peacekeeping 
Over the past two decades the UN has evolved into the principal instrument for the management of 
armed conflict. Deployment of personnel in 2011 peace operations of the UN and African Union 
(AU) surpassed record levels, with over 200,000 military, police, and civilian personnel operating in 
16 missions in the field over the year (Annual Review of Peace Operations, 2011). Military troops 
from 114 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are the backbone of these operations. The five 
largest missions, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Timor-Leste, Lebanon, Liberia, and 
Sudan, account for 77 percent of total UN troop deployments. Additional forces to Sudan, Côte 
d'Ivoire, and Somalia reflected continuing demand for UN and regional peacekeeping arrangements. 
Overall, the expansion of peacekeeping operations over the last decade is a five-fold increase. At the 
same time, the rate of UN increase slowed significantly due to phased drawdown in stable 
environments, as well as diminishing and, in some cases, denial of national consent for operations, 
resulting in mission closure or downsizing, e.g., Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast. 
In order to perform their core functions, the significant quantitative increase in UN peacekeeping 
missions in the last decade is intertwined with the transformation of their qualitative profile, which 
can be detected in their expanded mission spectrum. Although there are continuous widespread 
debates regarding the nature and responsibility of peace missions operating under the UN (for a 
review see Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin 2004, and Hebeger 2007), on the ground these operations 
extend far beyond the monitoring and verification tasks of their predecessors, and their mandates 
are expanding on multiple horizons. 
The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers are increasingly charged with nation-
building tasks, such as economic rehabilitation, democratization, building civil institutions and 
working police forces, humanitarian aid, and repatriation of refugees. Since 2003, UN peacekeepers 
have deployed to no fewer than eight complex “multidimensional operations.” 
In order to help peacekeeping missions focus on their most essential goals, the 2008 Capstone 
Doctrine (officially titled United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines) 
identified their core functions: “Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the 
State’s ability to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; facilitate the 
political process by promoting dialogue and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective 
institutions of governance; provide a framework for ensuring that all UN and other international 
actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.” These core 
functions reflect some of the major trends in peacekeeping mirroring the trends in modern warfare, 
including a shift from dealing with interstate to intrastate conflicts and, hence, coping with whole 
states via complex lines of operation (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) and complex 
mandates, as well as being embedded in zones where irregular warfare is abundant. 
These shifts are accompanied by the changed emphasis from UN Charter Chapter VI to Chapter 
VII—from observing and monitoring the end of conflicts to actively protecting civilians caught in 
them. Beginning in 1999 with UNSCR 1270 regarding the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), PoC mandates have routinely been included in UN resolutions and typically authorize 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 109
Elron 21st Century Peacekeeping and Future Warfare
 	  
peacekeeping forces to protect civilians from imminent violence within UN-force areas and 
capabilities. At the same time, the UN has yet to clarify what is meant by expressions such as 
“imminent violence,” “all necessary means,” or “prejudice to the responsibilities” and more specific 
guidelines as well as oversight mechanisms are still missing, partially because of national interests 
regarding its actual implementation (Security Council Report on the Protection of Civilians, 2011; 
Dwight, 2011). Agreement is needed as to how far these mandates should go and how compelling 
they are to peacekeepers. 
Multidimensional peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve 
conflict, because they have a high degree of international legitimacy and because the representation 
of the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the 
conflicting parties. They are also being deployed in settings considered less and less ripe for conflict 
resolution, where the state’s capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order 
is often weak and political violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic 
infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed in many of these situations while large sections of the 
population may have been displaced. Society may have divided along ethnic, religious, or regional 
lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further 
complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation. 
Although longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts are normally the work of 
development actors such as the UN, they also involve partners outside the UN that have the 
resources and technical expertise required to effectively undertake such missions. Experience has 
shown that in the short-term UN peacekeeping operations may have little choice but to initiate 
longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts, due to the inability of other actors to take the 
lead. Moreover, in the past few years, peace operations were also involved in dealing with growing 
transnational risks such as organized crime, as well as with assistance with security-sector issues and 
preventive action. Where no effective local police capacity exists, UN police (UNPOL) have 
assumed primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. Across all missions, they play diverse 
and critical roles in the effort to (re)establish the rule of law. 
 
Challenges for the UN and possibilities for the US 
UN peacekeeping has many shortcomings in implementing the complex tasks it is mandated to 
perform. This section is not meant to berate the existing state of play, but to point out further 
opportunities where the US may enhance the capabilities of this parallel and intertwined universe. A 
broad overview reveals that, despite overall growth and demand in deployment numbers, 
peacekeeping continues to suffer from political and operational challenges: overstretched resources, 
weak or nonexistent peace agreements, and minimal or absent consent by some of the states in 
which it is deployed. Political violence in some theaters still overwhelmingly targets civilian 
populations as well as peacekeepers under many of the classic tenets of irregular warfare, while 
political support for continued deployment is waning in many missions, and enhanced PoC 
mandates are not always fully implemented (Sherman 2011). 
Taking a closer look, capability challenges that reflect the difficulties of an organization representing 
192 member states exist in the complex and variable support provided by troop-contributing 
countries and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs). Often with a clear dividing line between 
TCCs from the developing world and PCCs from the developed world, peacekeepers provided by 
member states often lack sufficient training or equipment. Lack of interoperability and standardized 
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doctrine present additional challenges. Member states often fail to fill the gaps in civilian and military 
requests by the UN for these missions. Additionally, UN peace operations’ effectiveness can be 
decreased by command relationships, bureaucratic systems of accountability, limited capability of the 
UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) as superior HQ, influence of interests by 
member states, difficult transfer of information within silo-like structures, and lack of coherent 
doctrine for fighting irregular war when necessary. Given the extraordinary growth in UN 
peacekeeping, and no reduction in need on the horizon, the ready stocks and funds to deploy 
missions have not been sufficiently adjusted. As is the case with NATO, member states have failed 
to provide the necessary additional capacity to reinforce missions during crises. Moreover, the UN 
still lacks sufficient capability to manage the massive peacekeeping tasks handed to it by the Security 
Council, with only 900 staff members in UNDPKO/DFS headquarters to manage this massive 
undertaking (Stodgers 2011). Other areas where progress is needed include the strengthening of 
linkages to peace building and mediation and improvement in the policy, financial, administrative, 
and logistics support required to successfully deploy the full range of international instruments 
addressing post conflict situations. 
Overall, however, there is a trend for more robust and proactive responses, and the UN is engaged 
in devising specific training for peacekeepers on PoC and its implementation. In the past decade, 
beginning with the Brahamini report in 2000, the UN responded to its shortcomings with reform 
initiatives elicited by the UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and individual member states. These 
have included efforts to improve doctrine, planning, management, and oversight mechanisms for 
peacekeeping operations, as well as initiatives to expand the base of troops, police, and civilian 
peacekeepers and strengthen the capacity of those willing to contribute. (Sherman, 2011). Many of 
the recommendations have been implemented to various degrees. One notable example is the 2009 
“A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping.” This 
document set forth a plan to address the complex and evolving nature of demands placed on UN 
peacekeeping and its diverse military, police, and other civilian elements. Key proposals outlined in 
the document focus on the enhancement of peacekeeping partnerships, helping to “build common 
ground among those who participate in peacekeeping operations: those who contribute to 
peacekeeping with personnel, equipment, and financial resources; those who plan, manage, and 
execute operations; and those who partner with UN peacekeeping operations to deliver on the 
ground.” As one implementation example, since its publication, the DPKO has dramatically 
increased the number of consultative meetings with TCCs on the missions in which they are 
deployed.  
One area that has taken on greater importance is the role of police engaged in policing missions in 
all their forms and capacities, which is crucial for stabilizing fragile and conflict-torn states. Of 
special note are the efforts to develop baseline capability standards for the policing functions and to 
build on recent successful innovative experience with the Formed Police Unit. A comprehensive 
police doctrine has been developed to help define the roles, responsibilities, and appropriate tasks—
as well as expectations—of policing within a peacekeeping context. Discussions are underway on 
improving the current system for recruiting and deploying individual police for service in order to 
deliver high-quality personnel to missions quickly and efficiently (Durch, 2010). 
Recently, a senior advisory group appointed by the UN wrote an important document to the 
General Assembly on enhancing the work of the Security Council and the peace operations it 
deploys. Recognizing the unique role of the UN in dealing with the aftermath of conflict and that 
situations change quickly as a community moves from war to peace, the advisory group called for a 
more flexible system that will also be more efficient. Leaders in the field, who are closest to needs, 
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must be able to draw on a menu of resources and capacities located within mission structures, the 
UN country team, and resources outside the UN in order to allocate resources based on 
comparative advantage. Whenever feasible, local capacities are recommended to be used. New ways 
of working include future missions that are leaner in terms of civilian staff and more flexible.  
The Group uses a framework it calls “OPEN,” which refers to four key principles—ownership, 
partnership, expertise, and nimbleness. These principles are aligned with already existing efforts to 
enhance peacekeeping and peace-building capabilities stated in previous documents, and much of its 
thinking could be reflected in numerous US documents, such as the Department of State’s 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) and various counterinsurgency 
documents. For example, international assistance needs to be aligned with nationally identified needs 
and priorities, as well as identifying, protecting, nurturing, and supporting national capacities, core 
government functions, and national ownership. This includes ensuring a stronger role for women, 
whose active participation is essential for lasting peace. Specialist capacities outside the UN are 
crucial, and these niche skills can be found in UN Member States—in their governments, civil 
society, and private sectors.2 There needs to be an easy process to access these capacities at short 
notice in response to demand. Additional recommendations include strengthening the quality and 
scope of training for senior leaders, as well as an adoption of a results-based performance audit 
culture that seeks to enable and improve implementation, rather than just punish administrative non-
compliance. 
In what ways can the US engage in more significant ways to allow the UN as well as regional 
organizations like the AU to stand up to challenges in the next 15 years in conflict areas around the 
world? All trends suggested above could be assisted by US capabilities. The US has been a 
prominent actor in facilitating peace agreements; Security Council resolutions; reform to create a 
culture of economy, ethics, and excellence; and “budget discipline, transparency, internal ethics 
rewarding talent, and retiring underperformers” (Rice, 2011). The Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) program was initiated in 2004 and is funded through the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
account, which is managed by the US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in 
cooperation with the Department of Defense. Its aim is to address major gaps in international peace 
operations via “security assistance program[s] intended to enhance international capacity to 
effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace operations by building partner country 
capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies; increasing the number of capable military 
troops and formed police units (FPUs) available for deployment; and facilitating the preparation, 
logistical support, and deployment of military units and FPUs to Peace Support Operations (PSOs).” 
While the program’s first five years focused on significantly increasing the number of trained and 
equipped peacekeepers available for deployment, current program emphasis will shift to building 
sustainable, self-sufficient, local peace operation training capabilities in targeted partner countries, 
particularly via the establishment and strengthening of partner countries’ training infrastructures. 
Additional activities include enhancing the capacity of regional/sub-regional organizations and 
institutions to train for, plan, deploy, manage, sustain, and obtain and integrate lessons learned from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Capability gaps exist especially in the areas of: (a) basic safety and security: disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration; police; and security sector reform and governance; (b) the area of justice: corrections; criminal justice; and 
judicial and legal reform;  (c) inclusive political processes: political party development; and public information; (d) core 
government functionality: aid coordination; legislative branch; and public financial management; (e) economic 
revitalization: employment generation; natural resource management; and private sector development. 
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PSOs; and supporting the continuation and enhancement of multilateral approaches and 
partnerships to coordinate PSO capacity-building efforts.3 
Yet more can be done to allow the peace operations to best address the conflicts they are embedded 
within. In a series of discussions between US and UN officials (Sodberg, 2011), participants pointed 
to areas in which the United States might be able to do more. These included providing support for 
intelligence, command and control, specific interoperability training, and regionally based centers of 
training; and better integrating the training of potential UN troop contributors into its own training 
efforts, perhaps through the combatant commands. Other recommendations included providing 
systems to better coordinate efforts by donors and strengthening an international peacekeeping 
coordination and support mechanism. Such a worldwide and systematic initiative could help the US 
identify countries with the capacity to be high-quality contributors. 
Other important areas of influence are increasing the number of US experts in peacekeeping 
frameworks and enhancing partnerships with TCCs that have the potential to contribute more 
troops. To fill gaps in needed expertise, especially for overcoming political sensitivities, the US can 
organize a cadre of experts who can work outside the UN on short- or long-term contracts, have 
acquired expertise in conflict zones like Iraq and Afghanistan, and possess the senior leadership 
training that is highly prevalent in the US public and private sectors. Such a cadre should include a 
strong presence of professional women who can work specifically in roles empowering women in 
the host countries. With its performance-oriented culture and high-quality education and military 
training systems, the US contribution can be invaluable and is well aligned with America’s currently 
high unemployment rates. With drawback from Afghanistan and Iraq, more officers can be deployed 
in key positions, such as logistics. Deployment of police is perhaps another crucial way to enhance 
the quality of peace operations. Seven US federal agencies collectively spend billions of dollars 
annually on training and equipping police in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia, and 
elsewhere abroad in order to enable local police to better deal with terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
and crime.  This assistance could be extended directly to UN missions by actual deployment, either 
for the purpose of training or for actively engaging in policing activities with the local population.  
To be able to target assistance more accurately, knowledge of trends of TCC deployment needs to 
be mapped accurately. In a recent study, global capacity has been compartmentalized into two 
groups—the UN and CWA clusters—that accounted for 85 to 90 percent of all contributions from 
2001-08 (Daniels, 2011). There is little overlap between them, with the CWA mostly including 
troops from the US and Europe, one consequence being that the UN group does not have many 
contributors with highly resourced forces, while the CWAC group that could provide those forces is 
so strained quantitatively that it must make major trans-regional shifts to meet its needs beneath a 
ceiling of about 75,000. The study’s finding support the initial statement of this paper—that two 
parallel worlds exist, and that they complement each other in tasks—yet have the capacity to 
cooperate in a number of ways, on the ground and beyond. 
With the withdrawal of US troops there could be a change in the strict boundaries between the two 
groups, and while the US has been reluctant to serve under UN command, the recent flexibility of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The support provided by GPOI by the end of 2010 was active in 58 selected countries around the world, especially in 
Africa and South America. Over 120,500 peacekeeper trainees and peacekeeper trainers have been trained, and GPOI 
has facilitated the deployment of over 110,500 personnel from 29 countries to 19 operations around the world. In 
addition, GPOI has directly or indirectly supported the training of over 3,500 police trainers from 49 countries at the 
Italian-run Center of Excellen-ce for Stability Police Units in Vicenza,Italy.  
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command and control  (the re-integration of European into UNIFIL is one example) can perhaps 
allow a partial reintegration into peacekeeping. With worldwide changes in militaries, an added 
advantage for the US is finding new partners with whom to operate in its own missions, those done 
in the NATO framework, or help the UN recruit more troops. Daniels (2011) suggests several 
indicators to look for and discusses the proposal that the US lead and set up an effort to link states 
together to fill a critical capability gap: the formation of quickly deployable, mission-planning and 
headquarters battalions, ideally at least two Standing High Readiness Battalions (SHIRBATs) that 




The international community’s response to armed conflict may be more promising than is generally 
believed. The global system is increasingly policed by its multilateral institutions—indeed one of the 
principal ideas behind the founding of the UN. The US may be forced into this position by its own 
strategic, budgetary, and political circumstance as well as the changing circumstances of the global 
order and strength of other states. There is evidence to suggest that the UN may be slowly but surely 
filling the vacuum left by the US, as it has been doing for years, perhaps presenting a promise that 
the global system will not break down after all. Moreover, the UN’s multiple capabilities—from a 
global and sound health organization, refugee sheltering capabilities, humanitarian assistance, and 
development agencies, and expertise in transitioning countries to democratic governance—afford 
leverage and legitimacy that go beyond what the US alone can offer.   
For shorter-term action with long-term effects, as well as from a legitimacy point of view, the UN is 
the global responder of choice. From an effectiveness perspective, its strength lies in responding to 
the immediate aftermath of conflict rather than being an actor in the conflict, preventing a 
recurrence of the devastation, and helping civilians get their lives back into new order with the aid of 
multidimensional peacekeeping. The other part—effectively enforcing a stop to the devastation in 
the first place—is almost exclusively reserved for non-UN operations that, more often than not, are 
the province of a cluster of states and of one idiosyncratic actor, e.g., as in Afghanistan and Timor-
Leste. 
The two parts constitute a whole when the UN and non-UN operations occur in sequence or in 
parallel, the result being a division of labor that, at the end of the day, is a net plus for civilian 
protection (Daniels, 2011). Despite European military decline, NATO is still the only organization 
that can currently take on the peace enforcement portion.4 The US needs to watch closely Asian 
alliances as potential regional contributors to peacekeeping, keeping note that Asia, “with its 
dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago” (Haas, 2011). 
In African conflicts, the AU is getting more prominent in its involvement in peace operations. Here, 
enhanced training and equipment assistance from the US as well as NATO will continue to be 
needed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As a warning note however, the Defense Secretary indicated he is “worried openly about NATO turning into a two-
tiered alliance:  Between members who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, 
and those conducting the “hard” combat missions.  Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens 
of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or 
headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs.  This is no longer a hypothetical worry.  We are 
there today. And it is unacceptable.” With the UN, currently there are no participants with a taste for the hard combat 
missions. 
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For the US, this means, in the words of its ambassador to the UN, that “We are far better off 
working to strengthen the UN than trying to starve it—and then having to choose between filling 
the void ourselves or leaving real threats untended… yet we need to continue to lead the charge for 
serious and comprehensive reform.” No less important is that the US needs to venture beyond its 
educating and training role, and be able to learn best practices from its partners around the world in 
how to conduct multidimensional operations in post-conflict areas. The UN and its TCCs have 
gathered invaluable experience throughout the last decade that too often sits below the radar for 
deployed US units and personnel as well as policymakers.  With so many uncertainties around future 
warfare and responses to it, multilateral cooperation, capabilities, and reforms in the world of 
peacekeeping and international security will unfold in ways that will profoundly affect the world’s 
ability to address organized violence in inter and intra-state disputes. 
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The following paper examines Israel's views toward future armed conflicts. It discusses four main 
themes: Israel's traditional security doctrine since the days of its establishment; the emergence of 
new threats over the last decade and their future significance; Israel's evolving response; and the 
question of what, if any, relevance this has for the United States. The main argument of this paper is 
that, while one could conceive Israel's situation as a window to the future and benefit from studying 
various aspects of its force structure and employment, one should also be very cautious in making 
comparisons to Israel's unique situation and responses.  
 
Israel's traditional security doctrine 
Israel's original security doctrine was shaped by its geostrategic position and a host of constraining 
factors, such as demographics. David Ben Gurion, the architect of Israel's security doctrine was 
mindful of the need to tailor a “unique response to a unique situation.” Ben Gurion's analysis led 
him to form the following basic assumptions:  
• Arab hostility toward the State of Israel will likely continue for decades  
• Israel suffers from chronic inferiority in both territory and demographics  
This basic asymmetry in resources, combined with Arab hostility, led him to conclude both that 
Israel cannot afford to maintain a huge army and that only a series of decisive defeats on the 
battlefield might convince Arab regimes to accommodate the notion of Israel’s permanence.  
The major threat during Ben Gurion’s years as prime minister (1955-63) was a potential invasion of 
Israel by strong conventional forces of one or more Arab armies effectively occupying and cutting 
off major centers and, thus, ending the life of the young Jewish state. In addition, these early years of 
the state of Israel saw the rise of terror attacks against settlements along Israel’s borders disrupting 
normal life.  
Under Ben Gurion's leadership, Israel's security tenets were shaped by the following principles:  
• Exhibiting conventional superiority and self-reliance on the battlefield in order to achieve a 
quick decision by quickly transferring the war into enemy territory, annihilating its main forces, 
and threatening its capital. In the absence of a big standing army, most units would be 
comprised of reservists.  
• Develop and maintain a special relationship with a superpower (initially France, later the United 
States) for the sake of diplomatic and material support. 
• Obtain technological superiority grounded in top-flight academic and research institutions in 
order to nurture a thriving industry. The concept of nuclear ambiguity appeared later.  
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• Possess moral and ideological certainty that Israel's struggle is inherently just, which is critical for 
mobilizing society to endure a long struggle.  
Ben Gurion believed that sustaining the above qualities would generate superior battlefield 
performance and secure Israel's existence.  
These security tenets were then translated into three organizing operational concepts: deterrence, early 
warning, and decision.  Deterrence was not understood as absolute deterrence, but rather as accumulative 
deterrence. It is different from the concept employed by the two superpowers during the Cold War. 
Israeli deterrence meant postponing each round of violent conflict as much as possible, but realizing 
that, since conflict is unavoidable, deterrence is inherently destined to fail at one point or another. 
When this happens, early warning capabilities will enable a quick mobilization of Israel's reserve units, 
which comprise the bulk of its ground forces. This process operates with minimal interference due 
to the Israel Air Force’ air superiority. Reserve forces that have been quickly assembled into brigades 
and divisions will then reinforce standing army units that have been both blocking an enemy 
advance on the border and maneuvering inside enemy territory for the sake of neutralizing its main 
forces. Operationally, this is achieved by employing a classic maneuver that aims to envelope or 
encircle the primary forces of the enemy. A quick and decisive outcome is critical also due to the 
deployment of reserves that are needed desperately to perform their regular civil functions. 
This approach was also characterized in US Army doctrine as a “maneuver approach,” one that 
seeks to neutralize or strike critical enemy targets and thus paralyze an opponent’s entire system. It 
emphasizes speed and the independence of commanders who are able to exploit fleeting 
opportunities on the battlefield, virtues, which the Israel Defense Force (IDF) perceives that it 
possesses as an advantage over its adversaries.2 
According to this doctrine, the outcome of every round of violence should leave no room for 
interpretation. The victorious should be undisputed and the price paid by the vanquished in prestige 
and material should be sufficiently heavy that they lose their appetite for another round in the 
foreseeable future. Ben Gurion hoped that, after a few rounds with exclusively negative outcomes 
for Israel’s adversaries, the Arabs would understand that they had reached a strategic impasse and 
thus desist. This is the thought that underlies accumulative deterrence—gathering more deterrence with 
each additional round of fighting. 
Israel's security doctrine served the country well during the first four decades of its existence. 
However, there were also some interesting deviations. For example, in both 1956 and 1967, Israel 
initiated preemptive strikes when it felt threatened, demonstrating that the interpretation of early 
warning in its doctrine was an elaborate one. In 1956, Israel went to war only after it secured the 
direct military cooperation of two European powers, Great Britain and France. In 1960, its early 
warning system failed when the Egyptian army was deployed in the Sinai during what is known as 
the Rotem Affair. Later, in 1973, the early warning system failed again, this time when enemy 
intentions were misinterpreted. Although enemy troop mobilization offered a clear signal, the Israeli 
government refused to order a preemptive strike out of fear for the political consequences and Israel 
came under a surprise attack. But, other components of its security doctrine worked magnificently 
well and enabled Israel to turn the tables in this conflict. These included American political 
assistance and shipments of military hardware, quick mobilization of reserve units, and the ability of 
IDF commanders to seize the initiative after the initial surprise and transfer the battle to enemy 
territory.  
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Paradoxically, Israel's early warning failed after territorial expansion, which followed the Six Day 
War in 1967. On the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the option of a preemptive strike was 
considered by the government, but rejected by then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan due to the 
heavy diplomatic costs involved. The enhanced territorial buffer gave Israel a sense of security and 
allowed risk-taking that it otherwise would have avoided prior to the Six Day War. 
It can be argued that Israel's security doctrine, including the idea of accumulative deterrence, has 
been successful. Egypt, Israel's main and most dangerous rival, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 
1979, followed by Jordan in 1994. Syria has upheld the 1974 ceasefire agreements on Golan Heights 
in spite of serious tests, such as the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon Wars and other more recent operations 
reported in the media. However, the transformation of the strategic landscape during the 1990s and 
2000s has witnessed the rise of new types of adversaries, posing various new and additional threats.  
 
Israel's evolving threats 
In the past, primary threats to Israel's security would be divided into two main groups: threats posed 
by conventional militaries from bordering states to Israel's territorial integrity and threats posed by 
non-state terrorist organizations, chiefly involving disruption of daily life. However, since the 1990s, 
Israel has seen the emergence of new types of threats, which have taken a more dominant role. That 
said, Israel cannot completely exclude the risk of traditional threats—witness recent events in the 
Arab world, such as the so-called Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt. The landscape requires the 
incorporation of new threats into Israel’s pre-existing security doctrine in such a way as to provide a 
response to both old and new types of threats.  
What are these new types of threats? One categorization compartmentalizes them according to 
geography: Israel and the Palestinian territories under its control, Israel's immediate neighbors, and 
its outer circle. 
 
Israel and the Territories 
Should the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations fail or continue to languish, a disappointed Palestinian 
population could mount a popular uprising similar to the 'slingshot and stone' intifada of 1989-93. 
This scenario was already much discussed before the September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks in the 
United States and the unilateral Palestinian drive toward statehood at the UN. Palestinian terrorist 
organizations might also emerge and launch a suicide bombing campaign similar to the one of the 
2001-03 second intifada. 
 
Israel's immediate neighbors 
As mentioned above, the probability of a conventional attack by an immediate neighbor has been 
reduced dramatically during the last two decades, but should not be excluded completely. This 
assessment could change once the dust finally settles on the Arab-Spring movement that has 
engulfed Arab states, such as Syria and Egypt, and will determine the fate of these countries. 
An additional evolving threat that Israel has experienced is the rise of strong non-state actors, such 
as Hezbollah and Hamas. As masters of a territory and population, these actors combine religious 
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ideology, a political agenda, and armed struggle. They rely on the support of both local populations 
and foreign powers, such as Iran and Syria, existing almost as states within states, thus enjoying the 
advantages of statehood while not being held accountable for their actions as states are.  
Hezbollah has evolved as a prototypical champion of what some characterize as “hybrid warfare,” 
incorporating a mixture of tactics seen in guerrilla warfare, urban terror, and conventional combat 
with the objective of neutralizing Israel's operational and technological advantage. This construct has 
been described in a study published by the IDF's Dado Center as the “Other RMA” (Revolution in 
Military Affairs).3 Conceptually, it encompasses three main principles—deterrence, survivability, and 
attrition—with large quantities of cheap and easy-to-maintain concealed projectiles poised against 
Israeli population centers. These projectiles are camouflaged and defended from an Israeli ground 
incursion in tough-to-maneuver terrain and protected against Israel’s sophisticated defense systems 
that include well-trained light infantry equipped with mortars, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), 
and advanced Command and Control (C2) systems.  
This hybrid-warfare system with its offensive and defensive capabilities achieves deterrence by holding 
Israeli civilians hostage and raising the cost of mounting an operation within the enemy territory. 
Survivability is achieved through redundancy, concealment, and invisibility as IDF forces incur 
casualties while attempting to crack the defenses safeguarding the rockets that fire on Israel's 
population. In this manner, attrition is then achieved and the terrorist groups can proclaim a ceasefire 
as having resisted surrender, unlike the large Arab armies in the past. In such as conflict, the 
terrorists survive and keep firing their missiles until the end, inflicting terror and casualties on Israel. 
The conflicts in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008) exposed some of the strengths and weaknesses 
inherent to this condition. Both Hezbollah and Hamas were able to fire rockets into Israel until the 
last day of hostilities. Both suffered enormously, but survived.4 Both succeeded in manipulating the 
narrative of the conflict—in the media and public eye—to their own benefit. The lesson they 
learned seems clear: keep it up in both quantity and quality. Their goal is now to increase missile 
payloads and accuracy to the point where they cannot only terrorize Israeli civilian centers, but also 
hit strategic civilian infrastructures and military installations, thereby disrupting the IDF as it 
mobilizes its reserves and tries to function effectively. 
An interesting phenomenon of recent years has been the doctrinal convergence between 
organizations such as Hezbollah and states like Syria. Impressed by the success of the Hezbollah 
model and aware of its own limitations, the Syrian armed forces have increasingly adopted the 
Hezbollah model. The Syrian state, however, possesses a much larger and much more accurate 
missile arsenal capable of accurately striking on critical assets in Israel. At the same time, Syria is also 
a state and thus does not enjoy the same immunity as Hezbollah. 
 
Israel's Outer Circle 
During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel, marking a new era in Israel security. 
Previously Iraq and other countries lacking a mutual border with Israel had dispatched ground 
forces as reinforcements to help their Arab neighbors fight Israel. Such was the case in both 1948 
and 1973. The introduction of ballistic missiles later provided the means to hit Israel from afar. 
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the neutralization of its strategic capabilities, Iran has taken the 
lead in developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities. Syria also possesses a large arsenal of these 
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missiles. It would take 60 seconds for a Syrian Scud and 10 minutes for the same missile launched 
from Iran to strike Tel Aviv. 
New missile capabilities by those in Israel’s Outer Circle are now being coupled with an increased 
WMD potential and enhanced nuclear program. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was suspected of pursuing 
this course and thus was invaded by a US-led coalition. At present Iran remains undeterred, 
continuing its own nuclear program.  
 
The Rival System: Creating synergy 
Another way to view these emerging threats is to conceptualize the various hostile entities as one 
system with different components that reinforce each other and create a synergetic effect. Hezbollah 
and Hamas are proxies of Iran and Syria; all these actors are dependent on each other, playing 
different roles and utilizing their relative advantage. Hezbollah and Hamas are well trained and 
benefit from access to state-of-the-art weapons, deep bunkers, ATGMs, and C2 systems precisely 
because they are supported, equipped, and trained by states. Without state support, these 
organizations would not pose the same threat level to Israel. It is the merger between states and 
non-state organizations that generates such a wide spectrum of threats: WMD, standoff fire, suicide 
bombings, international terror, guerilla insurgencies, and conventional warfare.  
 
Israel's doctrinal response  
Israeli defense planners have taken note of this changing landscape and have been working to 
update Israel’s defense thinking over the past decade. Some of Israel’s defense tenets will remain the 
same, others will be reinforced, and others are destined for change.  
In Israel, unlike in Europe or even the US, the defense budget is likely to grow over the next few 
years. Fortunately, the Israeli economy has remained robust and has experienced steady growth, 
despite the current global economic turmoil that began in 2008, thus allowing a budget increase 
without applying unbearable strain to the economy.  
Israel will continue to rely on the US as its major ally, with increase dependence on collaboration in 
the field of military technology (e.g., future JSF F-35 procurements) and the need for critical US 
support in the international arena. Moreover, in contending with an adversary as large and distant as 
Iran, Israel continues to invest in long-range capabilities, such as submarines, space technologies, the 
Joint Strike Fighter, and enhanced Special Forces capabilities. Despite these enhanced capabilities, 
Israel understands it still requires the assistance of a super power in some areas. For example, US 
radar systems deployed in Israel are designed to detect incoming ballistic missiles from a distance of 
2,000 km and allow Israel's missile defense systems additional critical response time. 
Israel will continue to depend upon its technological edge to develop new technological solutions for at 
least some of its main security challenges. This was demonstrated after the 2006 war, when Israel 
built both the Trophy system to counter ATGMs and Iron Dome to intercept short-range rockets. 
Both systems have already proven themselves operationally.  
In terms of force, design versatility is key. Facing a large spectrum of threats, Israeli force planners 
prefer those means which can operate in numerous different scenarios and be optimized, even if not 
ideally, in both counterterrorism and conventional battlefield situations. For example, the IDF only 
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employs main battle tanks (MBT) that are most suited to conventional engagements, but also 
employs these tanks in counterterrorism and guerrilla warfare scenarios.  
Changes and modifications have been made in the deterrence–early warning–decision concept. Deterrence 
has become a key tenet. In some scenarios, it is unclear whether a decisive victory can be achieved; 
when fighting against hybrid organizations, the goal is to hit them hard and as quickly as possible. At 
the same time, the Israeli home front will be exposed to a barrage of missiles and rockets, giving rise 
to another key concept: defense.  
The doctrine speaks of two types of defense: active and passive. Active defense includes multiple 
layers of anti-missile defense systems, like the Arrow (against long-range missiles), David’s Sling 
(mid-range), and Iron Dome (short-range rockets and missiles). However, these are expensive and 
can provide protection to only critical installations, ensuring that the state and the military can 
continue functioning. In parallel, the doctrine calls for investments in passive defense, building 
installations to protect the population but also educating them how to behave in such scenarios. 
This requires enhanced cooperation between Israel’s various organizations and agencies, including 
local municipalities, police, and ministries responsible for and during crisis situations.  
Israel also invests heavily in its conventional forces. The Merkava 4 and the Namer, a heavily 
protected armored personnel carrier based on the Merkava chassis, are both equipped with the 
Trophy system and are designed to enable the IDF to conduct combined arms operations—fire and 
maneuver—in order to penetrate even the most fortified lines as on the Syrian front. No less 
important, the IDF is conducting additional training and maintaining high force readiness. The IDF 
is still comprised of conscripts and reserves with a professional officer corps, but, due to growing 
technological and professional requirements, an increased number of positions are filled by career 
soldiers.  
 
What are the relevant take-aways? 
Of the four scenarios presented in the workshop materials, the only one capable of genuinely 
enhancing Israel’s security by reducing the spectrum of threats is the concert of powers. The major 
source of instability in the region is Iran. If the leading world power were to contain the Iranian 
regime through effective sanctions and a credible military threat, the current radical regime could 
collapse, possibly destabilizing all radical elements in the region. This, in turn, might facilitate the 
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and pave the way for a possible Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement. The other three scenarios offer no real potential for increased pressure on the Iranian 
regime. As such, one can surmise that the security trends described above are likely to continue.  
Strategically, Israel's prevailing security doctrine is designed for deterrence. Israel may be the only 
country in the world, with the possible exception of South Korea, facing an imminent threat on its 
borders from strong militaries and a parallel missile threat to its main population centers. In 
contrast, at least for now, the US is focused on nation-building abroad and, thus, mobilizing forces 
and engaging in activities that are mostly counterinsurgency and population-centric in nature. For 
the IDF, civilians in battlefield areas are essentially a "nuisance," interfering with pursuit of the 
enemy. In contrast, for US forces, winning the hearts and minds of the people is the current 
mission. These conflicting goals engender a host of other differences in force composition, tactics, 
and operations.  
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Yet, there are a number of similarities as well. Both militaries fight regularly in urban areas where the 
enemy hides among the civilian population. Both lock horns with various radical Islamist groups 
that advocate deep hatred for the West and its belief system. Some tactical challenges are common 
to Israel and the US as well, including threats posed by improvised explosive devices, rocket-
propelled grenades, mortars, other small arms, and suicide bombers. 
Notwithstanding, in 2006, and to a lesser degree in 2008, the IDF confronted a much more 
sophisticated opponent than that which the US has faced in both Afghanistan and Iraq.5 Given this 
state of affairs the IDF resolved to restore and improve its conventional combined arms fighting 
abilities, having concluded that its infantry and armored units require greater firepower and 
protection for the task of maintaining mobility on the battlefield. If Iran now equips US adversaries 
with some of the same capabilities as Hezbollah, or if in the near future the US military is tasked to 
conduct deterrent/punitive expeditions that involve ground forces rather than the current focus on 
counterinsurgency and nation-building, it is advisable to carefully study the lessons learned by Israel 
in 2006 and 2008 and adjust accordingly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 I wish to thank Shalom Lipner for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
2 See the chapter on the IDF tradition of command in Eitan Shamir, “Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission 
Command in the US, UK and Israeli Armies,” (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011). 
3 The Study can be found in: BG Itai Brun, 'While You Were Busy Making Other Plans: "The Other RMA," Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 33:4, 2010, 535-565.  
4 See: Martin van Creveld, “The Second Lebanon War: A Re-assessment,“ Infinity Journal 3 (Summer 2011), 4–7. 
5 See the paper by David Johnson (RAND) on Israel's war against Hezbollah and Hamas.  
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14. Minding the Middle: Insights from Hezbollah and Hamas for 
Future Warfare 
David E. Johnson 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the relevance of Hezbollah and Hamas to current and future forms of warfare. 
A brief review of the literature, however, makes it clear that Hezbollah, particularly during its 2006 
war with Israel, has already had a significant impact on US military thinking. 
In the aftermath of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, considerable attention was paid to the 
implications of that conflict for the future of warfare. Frank Hoffman and others started a 
discussion in 2007 that, in the beginning, was quite useful in examining what many began hailing as a 
new form of warfare: so-called “hybrid war.” Hoffman’s initial definition framed hybrid war, based 
on the Hezbollah example, as a “blend of the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and 
protracted fervor of irregular war.”1 Others argued that it was nothing new, citing the Vietnam War 
and other precedents. 
Over the next few years writing on hybrid warfare became somewhat of a cottage industry, with 
each successive article—trying to appear ever more insightful—perhaps generating more heat than 
light. By late 2009, Hoffman had expanded his definition of a hybrid adversary to “any adversary 
that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, 
terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.”2 He also 
added the category of “compound wars” to explain the 2008 Georgia War, defining them as 
“conflicts with regular and irregular components fighting simultaneously under unified direction.” In 
his view, while the Russian Federation used armored formations and bombers, it also relied on cyber 
attacks and “irregular Chechen units, including the notorious Vostock Battalion” to defeat the 
Georgians.3 Hoffman’s description, while interesting, tended to ignore the principal determinant of 
Russian victory: what crushed the Georgian military was overwhelming Russian force, which 
included Russian air, naval, ground, and special forces units.4 In many ways the debate about future 
warfare became similar to one often attributed to academics: It works fine in practice, but what 
about the theory?  
One final point that is important to mention about the 2006 Second Lebanon War before moving 
on. The “lessons learned” from the conflict became central to the debates about future US military 
capabilities during the Quadrennial Defense Review and about operational doctrine at the US Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM). In short, the Second Lebanon War was used by some to challenge 
the views since the Kosovo War of the ascendance of America’s air and network-centric, high-tech 
notions of warfare—which were already under assault after three years of tough, post-Operation 
Iraqi Freedom operations. Indeed, the Second Lebanon War became the basis for General James 
Mattis, USJFCOM Commander, to mandate “Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, 
or export the terms and concepts related to EBO [effects-based operations], ONA [operational net 
assessment], and SoSA [system of systems analysis] in our training, doctrine development, and support of 
JPME.”5   
Thus, one could argue that Hezbollah and the 2006 Second Lebanon War have already had a 
significant impact on current and future US military thinking, doctrine, and capabilities. This essay 
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will argue that the practice is perhaps more nuanced than the accepted theory, that it does matter, 
and that Hezbollah and Hamas provide insights into the challenges in future warfare that the United 
States could face in the next 20 years. 
 
Hezbollah 
Hezbollah is a Shi’a Islamist political and paramilitary organization that rose to prominence largely in 
response to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. It is classified as a terrorist 
organization by the United States and others.6 Perhaps its most memorable act of terror was the 
1983 suicide bombing of the Marine barracks that killed 299 American and French servicemen.7 
Hezbollah seeks to eliminate “the influence of any imperialist power” in Lebanon, desires Israel’s 
“obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem,” and wants to establish an 
Islamic regime in Lebanon.8 Hezbollah was inspired by Iran’s leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
the Ayatollah Khomeini, and receives training and weapons from the Iranian Republican Guard and 
Syria.9  
Hezbollah advocates and practices military jihad. Jihad, in the words of Sheik Naim Qassem, one of 
Hezbollah’s founders and its Deputy Secretary General “is thus another form of appraising life: 
death with surrender and shame versus a life of jihad ending with martyrdom for the sake of virtue’s 
victory and national pride. In this context, Commander of the Faithful Imam Ali . . . said ‘Death 
shall defeat you in life, and you shall defeat life through death.’”10 
Martyrdom was also viewed since the inception of the organization as a means to confront the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) with an asymmetric challenge by providing “compensation for military 
imbalance and infliction of painful losses on enemy ranks. . . . This was realized through simple and 
humble technologies that, on the one hand, shook the Israeli army’s ability of defend itself and on 
the other unsettled its ability to retaliate.”11 In the furtherance of its strategy, Hezbollah conducted 
raids and suicide attacks against IDF troops and other targets in Lebanon. 
By 2006, Hezbollah was the dominant power in Southern Lebanon, providing education, health 
care, and other social services. Over time, Hezbollah, currently led by Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah, developed into a political organization, holding seats in the country’s parliament and 
wielding considerable power in Lebanon’s fractured political landscape.12 Indeed, as a key member 
of the “March 8 Alliance,” a coalition of political parties formed in 2005 and currently the ruling 
coalition in Lebanon, Hezbollah enabled the nomination of Najib Mikati as the Lebanese Prime 
Minister. 
Hezbollah also has significant military capabilities. In 2006, the Israelis estimated Hezbollah had 
10,000 fighters. Although active throughout Lebanon, Hezbollah was concentrated in South 
Lebanon, Beirut, and Baalbek. The headquarters and Nasrallah’s offices were located in the Dahiye 
neighborhood in the Shiite section of Beirut. The majority of Hezbollah’s fighters were located in 
the Nabatieh region and south of the Litani River. Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, 
published sources state that Hezbollah relied almost exclusively on the 3,000 fighters in the Nasr 
Brigade in Southern Lebanon during the 2006 war.13 
Hezbollah’s military wing is hierarchically organized, but operates in a cellular manner with good 
operational and communications security to avoid detection from Israeli sensors and aerial attack. 
Additionally, Hezbollah established bunkers and fighting positions in Southern Lebanon, taking 
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advantage of the complex terrain and villages in the area, before the 2006 war. They also integrated 
effective standoff weapons, such as antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), mortars, and short-range 
rockets, with mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and competent fighters to stymie IDF 
advances into Lebanon in 2006. Finally, Hezbollah relied on cached materiel to avoid exposing its 
resupply efforts to Israel Air Force (IAF) interdiction.  
Within and behind its ground defenses, Hezbollah deployed the rockets shown in Table 1, which 
ranged into Israel, as shown in Figure 1. This enabled Hezbollah to conduct a tactical defense—
essentially an “anti-access” approach—to support a strategic rocket-based offensive. 
 
Table 1: Hezbollah-deployed Rockets (2006) 




122-mm Extended Range Katyusha 
240-mm Katyusha 
7–40 7 13,000 
Mid-Range: 




45–70 50–175 ~1,000 
Long-Range: 
610-mm Zelzal 2 
200 400–600 Dozens 
 
Figure 1: Range of Hezbollah Rockets (2006) 
 
Source for Table 1 and Figure 1: “Hezbolla’s Rocket Force,” BBC News, July 18, 2006, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5187974.stm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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The 2006 Second Lebanon War 
The 2006 Second Lebanon War began when Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, an 
act that was preceded by at least four other attempts to capture IDF personnel.14 Initially, the IDF 
tried to decide the issue with standoff air and artillery attacks, but this did not stop the rocket attacks 
on Israel, nor result in the return of the soldiers whose capture had precipitated the war. Israel 
largely stumbled into ground operations in Lebanon, where it had no desire to renew a long-term 
presence having removed its ground forces from there in 2000.  
Although the IDF was successful in finding and attacking medium- and long-range rockets that had 
hit major population areas like Haifa—largely because of their size and need to be in relatively open 
areas to fire—targeting and attacking short-range rockets proved an elusive proposition from the air. 
The evolving nature of targets the IDF has faced and solved over the years, shown in Figure 2, is the 
challenge to high-tech, standoff warfare posed by concealable rockets and adaptive adversaries. 
 
Figure 2: Adversary Adaptation to High Technology Warfare 
 
Source: IAF Doctrine Branch. 
 
Throughout the war, short-range rockets rained down on Israel. Eventually, Israeli ground forces 
entered Lebanon to deal with the short-range rocket threat and confronted serious difficulties. One 
of the key deficiencies was that the Israeli Army, highly conditioned by its low-intensity combat 
(LIC) experience during the first and second intifadas, was initially confounded by an enemy that 
presented a stand-off fire challenge with its mortars, ATGMs and man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADS), which required joint combined arms fire and maneuver and a combat mindset 
different from that used to address Palestinian terrorists, even though Hezbollah did not present 
large formations. The central issue was one of closing with the enemy. The irregular Palestinian 
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weapons gave Hezbollah the capability to engage with mortars and ATGMs at extended ranges (as 
much as five km with AT-14 Kornet-E ATGMs). For the IDF to have been successful, it would 
have had to use combined arms fires to suppress Hezbollah stand-off weapons to enable IDF 
infantry to maneuver to close combat ranges. One IDF Israeli observer noted that: “Prior to the war 
most of the regular forces were engaged in combating Palestinian terror. When they were transferred 
to Lebanon, they were unfit to conduct combined forces battles.”15  
The IDF ground force performance in Lebanon was poor, and most units did not achieve their 
objectives by the end of the war. This created a significant issue for Israel: For the first time the IDF 
did not seem invincible, raising concerns domestically about deterrence. Finally, by staying in the 
fight until the ceasefire, Hezbollah was able to say it had won by not losing. The Second Lebanon 
War was a wake-up call for the Israelis. 
In the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War, the IDF went “back to basics.” Training on high-
intensity, combined arms combat was markedly increased, as were procedures to integrate air and 
ground forces. Additionally, the IDF procured more Merkava IV tanks, began producing an 
armored personnel carrier based on the Merkava chassis (Namer), and started fielding active 
protection systems for its armored vehicles to mitigate the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and 




Hamas17 is a Sunni Palestinian militant organization that was formed in 1987 at the beginning of the 
first intifada (uprising). Hamas has become a key player in Middle Eastern politics. Hamas is an 
offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that “combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic 
fundamentalism. Its founding charter commits the group to the destruction of Israel, the 
replacement of the PA [Palestinian Authority] with an Islamist state on the West Bank and Gaza, 
and to raising ‘the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine.’"18 Article 8 of the Hamas Charter is 
“The Motto of the Islamic Resistance Movement:” 
God is its goal; 
The messenger is its Leader. 
The Quran is its Constitution. 
Jihad is its methodology, and  
Death for the sake of God is its most coveted desire.19  
Hamas’ founder and leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, was killed by an Israeli missile in March 2004. 
Ismail Haniyeh, the Gaza government’s prime minister, is the organization’s senior figure in Gaza; 
Khaled Meshaal, Hamas’ leader, lives in Damascus, Syria.20 
Hamas broke from the nonviolent activism of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1988 when it committed 
itself to the objective of driving Israeli forces from the occupied territories and placing itself at the 
forefront of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. Hamas’s tactics include suicide bombing 
and rocket attacks against civilians. Its founding charter calls for the destruction of Israel and for the 
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establishment of an Islamic state on all of historic Palestine, including Israel. The United States, 
European Union, and Israel have all designated Hamas as a terrorist organization.21  
In January 2006, Hamas defeated Fatah, the party of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
president, Mahmoud Abbas, in parliamentary elections. In the summer of 2007, tensions between 
Hamas and Fatah erupted and “Hamas routed Fatah supporters, killing many and sending others 
fleeing to the West Bank. The result was a de facto geographic division of Palestinian-held territory, 
with Hamas holding sway in Gaza and Fatah maintaining the internationally recognized Palestinian 
Authority government in the West Bank town of Ramallah.”22  
The relationship between Hamas and Fatah appears to be changing. On April 27, 2011, Fatah and 
Hamas announced their reconciliation and prospects of forming a temporary unity government. 
This situation is alarming to Israel, as seen in the comments on the deal by Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu: “The Palestinian Authority must choose either peace with Israel or peace with 
Hamas. There is no possibility for peace with both."23 
Since its inception, Hamas divided its activities into three main spheres of operation: (1) a political 
section, involved in Palestinian politics; (2) a social section, providing basic social services to its 
constituencies such as hospitals, schools, and religious institutions (modeled on the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Lebanese Hezbollah); and (3) a militant section, represented by its paramilitary 
wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, which engages in acts of terror against Israelis and also 
participates in conflict against other Palestinian factions.24  
The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades is the main militant-terrorist organization in the Gaza strip. It is 
organized into several semi-military echelons, including brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, 
and teams, with more than 10,000 operatives.25 These reinforce the regular hard core of several 
hundred skilled fighters, supplemented by others.26 The force is organized into four regional sectors: 
Northern sector (one brigade), Gaza City sector (two brigades), Central sector (one brigade), and 
Southern sector (two brigades).27 Hamas’s skilled fighters, numbering several hundred, are mainly 
trained in Lebanon by Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. Hezbollah provides specialized training in the use 
of standoff weapons such as ATGMs, MANPADS, and rockets. 
Hamas has procured weapons and ammunition with the help of Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. It also 
has manufactured Qassam rockets and a variety of IEDs. Getting weapons into Gaza is difficult. 
They must enter either through tunnels from Egypt or over the Mediterranean shore, which is 
closely monitored by the IDF. Hamas’ rocket capabilities in 2008 are shown in Table 2, and their 
range into Israel is shown in Figure 3. 
Table 2: Hamas Rockets in 2008 
 Qassam-1 Qassam-2 Qassam-3 Grad WS-1E 
Length (cm) ~80 ~180 ~200 283  294 
Diameter (mm) ~60 ~150 ~170 122 122 
Weight (kg) ~5.5 ~32 ~90 72 74 
Payload (kg) 0.5 5-9 10-20  18 18~22 
Range (km) 3-4.5 8-9.5 10-12 18-20 34-45 
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Figure 3: Range of Hamas Rockets in 2008 
 
Source: Rocket and Population Map, 21 Jan 2009, at http://idfspokesperson.com/2009/01/21/rocket-and-
population-map-21-jan-2009/, accessed May 21, 2011. 
 
Moving large rockets via the tunnels is challenging, and the larger 122-mm Grad rockets reportedly 
have to be disassembled into four pieces to enable their transit. The indigenously produced Qassam 
rockets suffer from limited accuracy, poor reliability, and short shelf lives. None of the rockets used 
by Hamas are guided; as with Hezbollah, the goal is simply to hit Israel.28 The introduction of Grads 
and longer-range rockets is an important development because of their militarily significant 
payloads; the fact that they will put over one million citizens in range (including the towns of 
Ashqelon and Ashdod) and put critical infrastructure at risk (ports, a desalination plant, and a major 
electric power plant). The recent fall of the Egyptian government may make more and better 
weapons available across the Egyptian border. 
Hamas, however, has several key military limitations when compared to Hezbollah, as demonstrated 
during Israel’s offensive into Gaza during Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 to January 2009). 
First, they do not have Hezbollah’s quality and quantity of weapons. Second, there is an inherent 
terrain constraint in Gaza that limits Hamas’ operational depth and ability to use standoff, direct-fire 
weapons, e.g., ATGMs. Additionally, the ground is generally flat and open; the only complex terrain 
is in urban areas, which are relatively easy to isolate. Third, Israeli intelligence agencies have a much 
clearer understanding of Hamas, and targeting of key assets and individuals is much more effective 
than in Lebanon. 
 
Operation Cast Lead 
Operation Cast Lead was an operation with carefully limited objectives, designed to create 
conditions for a better security situation in southern Israel, by the following: 
• Inflicting severe damage to Hamas 
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• Decreasing terror and rocket attacks from Gaza 
• Increasing Israel's deterrence while minimizing collateral damage and avoiding escalation 
on other fronts 
• Desiring an end state of long-term cessation of terror attacks from the Gaza strip.29 
Operation Cast Lead began with a weeklong air campaign that began on December 27, 2008, when 
88 IAF strike aircraft hit 100 preplanned targets in 220 seconds.30 The air campaign was followed up 
a week later with a ground operation consisting of four combined arms maneuver brigades. Three of 
these brigades (Paratroopers, Golani, Givati) rapidly pushed Hamas fighters out of their prepared 
positions and into Gaza City. The fourth brigade (401st “Tracks of Iron” armor brigade) cut off 
Gaza City from the supply routes from the Egyptian border. Israel also called up reserve units for 
Cast Lead. On January 18, 2009, an Egyptian-brokered ceasefire went into effect and the IDF 
withdrew from Gaza. Israel believes it met its principal objectives of harming Hamas and increasing 
its deterrence. 
 
Why are Hezbollah and Hamas important? 
Hezbollah and Hamas are important for several reasons. First, they both pose a clear and 
increasingly potent threat to Israel, a state whose security the United States has underwritten since its 
founding in 1948. This is a largely contextual issue related to the overall Palestinian question. Until it 
is resolved, the threat to Israel from Hezbollah and Hamas will likely continue. Thus, it is somewhat 
unique. Second, Hezbollah and Hamas might also represent a category of potential adversaries— 
state-sponsored hybrid adversaries—that the United States itself could encounter in the future. 
Indeed, one might see these types of actors emerge from the ongoing turmoil in North Africa and 
the Middle East, or elsewhere. These actors would be nationalistic, Islamic, and potentially more 
subject to being influenced, and perhaps supported, by regional actors—like Iran—than by the 
West. Finally, both show the relatively rapid transition an irregular actor can make in military 
capability with outside state assistance. Thus, Hezbollah and Hamas provide insights into the four 
questions that framed the May 17–18, 2011, Global Trends and the Future of Warfare 2025 
workshop. Each will be addressed in turn. 
 
What features of war and warfare in the present can we expect to persist into the future, and which can we expect to 
fade or transform into something new? 
Hezbollah and Hamas show that there is a “middle area” in the range of military operations between 
irregular warfare and state conflict. These state-sponsored hybrid adversaries create a qualitative 
challenge, despite their smaller size, because of their:  
• Training, discipline, organization, and command and control  
• Standoff weapons (ATGMs, MANPADS) 
• Use of complex terrain (natural and/or urban) and fighting among the people. 
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Figure 4 shows this category of adversary relative to irregular and state actors. 
 
Figure 4: Types of Adversaries with Characteristics and Historical Examples 
 
State-sponsored hybrid adversaries, like Hezbollah, have acquired effective standoff weapons: 
rockets, mortars, ATGMs, MANPADS, and even shore-to-ship cruise missiles and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs). They are generally trained, disciplined, and cohesive forces that operate in a semi-
centralized manner to avoid detection and attack, but can use terrain and urban areas to construct 
challenging defenses and hinder access.  
What the IDF realized during the 2006 Second Lebanon War is that hybrid, state-supported 
adversaries like Hezbollah present a qualitative problem that is not scale dependent and that 
“precision, standoff fires are critical, but not sufficient, to cope with hybrid warfare opponents, 
particularly if they are operating ‘among the people.’”31 
Furthermore, hybrid adversaries force changes to operational concepts that are relevant to irregular 
opponents. For example, because the adversary has MANPADS, the ability to use helicopters will 
likely be limited. This will constrain the ability of light forces to operate and will increase reliance on 
ground lines of communication. Heavy forces—with their protection, off-road mobility, and 
firepower—are key in this ATGM and RPG-rich environment. That said, the absence of advanced 
air defenses means that fixed-wing air power will still be able to operate with relative impunity above 
MANPADS range and, consequently, will become the key means for finding and attacking high-
value targets (e.g., medium and long-range rockets, cruise missiles), destroying UAVs, and 
preventing the adversary from massing forces or resupplying forward units.  
Irregular adversaries require state sponsorship to make the transition to hybrid capabilities. 
Consequently, providing advanced weapons to a non-state actor is clearly a policy decision for a 
state, because the source of the weapons will likely be traced back to them. This was the case when 
Non-State Irregular
• Organization: Not well-trained; 
little formal discipline; cellular 
structure; small formations  
(squads)
• Weapons: Small arms, RPGs, 
mortars, short-range rockets, 
IEDs/mines
• Command and Control: Cell 




sized formations  (up to 
battalion)
• Weapons: Same as irregular, 
but with stand-off capabilities 
(ATGMs, MANPADs, longer-
range rockets)
• Command and Control: 
Multiple means; decentralized                  
State
• Organization: Hierarchical; 
brigade or larger-sized 
formations
• Weapons: Sophisticated air 
defenses; ballistic missiles; 
conventional ground forces; 
special operations forces; 
air forces; navies; some 
with nuclear weapons
• Command and Control: All 
means; generally centralized
• Mujahideen (Afghanistan 1979)
• PLO West Bank (2001)
• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (2007)
• Taliban Afghanistan (2009)
• Mujahideen Afghanistan (1988)
• Chechnya (1990)
• Hezbollah Lebanon (2006)
• Hamas Gaza (2008)
• Soviet Union (Afghan 70s-80s)
• Russia (Chechnya 1990s)
• Israel ( Lebanon 2006)
• Georgia (2008)
• Russia (Georgia 2008)
• Israel ( Gaza 2008)
• United States (Afghan/Iraq 2010)
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the United States provided Stinger MANPADS to the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. There seems to be a public perception that these weapons, particularly MANPADS, are 
available on the black market if one has the money to buy them. Although it may be possible to buy 
a small number of weapons to create an “event,” i.e., shooting down a commercial airliner, it is not 
possible to attain an operational capability without state support.32 Military capability, like that 
possessed by Hezbollah in Lebanon, requires weapons, a supply chain, and training. Or, as in the 
case of the Chechen militants who confronted the Russians in the 1990s, the weapons and trained 
operators were left behind when the Soviet Union broke up. Either of these origins of hybrid 
capability is possible in the future, particularly in the changing landscape in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
Interestingly, the capabilities Hezbollah employed in the 2006 Second Lebanon War have not shown 
up in Afghanistan or Iraq, presumably because Iran and Syria have decided not to provide them.33 
Thus, preventing the transfer of these standoff capabilities to non-state irregular actors to prevent 
them from becoming hybrid adversaries should be central to how we think about deterrence regimes 
in the future.  
 
What current, emerging, or foreseeable social, economic, and political trends, within and beyond the traditional security 
arena, will drive changes in warfare and conflict over the next 15-20 years?  
One of the key characteristics about Hezbollah and Hamas is that they are not insurgencies. They 
are nationalistic, Islamist political parties that also have military capabilities. Their goal, in addition to 
securing historical Palestinian territory, is to obtain political power. One could speculate that 
emerging Middle Eastern and North African regimes may look more like Hezbollah and Hamas than 
Western democratic states and that they might turn to other Islamic powers, for example Iran, for 
support. Indeed, as recent events in the Middle East have shown, the United States has, not 
surprisingly, found its interests mixed, if not conflicted. It supports repressive regimes such as those 
in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while also recognizing and assisting internal rebellions as it has in 
Egypt and Libya. 
 
How is American thinking on the evolution of modern warfare perceived internationally?  
This question is perhaps best answered by comparing how Israel was perceived before and after the 
2006 Second Lebanon War. Like the United States now, Israel before that war was largely convinced 
that the era of major wars with large ground forces was past and that “the main challenge facing land 
forces would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts.”34 The IDF’s interpretation of US air 
operations in Kosovo and the opening stages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq convinced it that 
standoff attack by precision fires (principally air power), enabled by advanced intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) can deter the state or defeat its adversaries. This was highly 
attractive at the time and promised lower IDF casualties, a key domestic consideration; less collateral 
damage than ground operations, which was vital for managing international and regional opinion; 
and budgetary savings. Furthermore, since 2000, the Israeli Army had been highly stretched by the 
demands of dealing with the second al-Aqsa intifada terrorist attacks inside Israel.  
The IDF became highly competent at LIC and largely shut down the intifada. In the process, 
however, Israeli ground forces became largely incapable of the combined arms fire and maneuver 
operations needed to contend with a hybrid adversary like Hezbollah. Thus, Israeli ground forces 
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looked incompetent and suffered unnecessary casualties that only heightened this perception in 
Israel and the region.  
The US military is perhaps not that different from the IDF in 2006: It has highly reliant air power to 
deter state adversaries while its ground forces have adapted to the irregular challenges in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Former US Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, reinforced this view recently during a 
speech at West Point: “Looking ahead, though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within 
and between the services, the Army also must confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end 
scenarios for the US military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian 
Gulf, or elsewhere.”35 It is worth remembering that the IDF employed elements of five divisions in 
Lebanon because of the size of the operational area and the complexity of the terrain. If the mission 
is to clear dispersed and hidden adversaries from complex terrain in an area the size of Southern 
Lebanon—roughly 45 km deep and 45 km wide—significant numbers of ground forces are needed.  
One could reasonably assume that America’s potential adversaries have gone to school on the 
Second Lebanon War and will seek to adapt their capabilities to avoid US strengths. Indeed, the 
tactics used by the Serbs in Kosovo and those thus far employed by Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi’s 
forces in the current stalemated conflict in Libya show that an adaptive adversary can avoid Western 
military strengths by blending into the population or using complex terrain to hide forces.  
There is also the sense, at least in Kosovo and thus far in Libya, made explicit by statements from 
Western political leaders, that there is little stomach for introducing ground forces into these types 
of conflicts. What the IDF learned in Lebanon was that a determined, adaptive adversary can avoid 
targeting and attack from the air if it is not forced to react to pressure on the ground by competent 
land forces capable of combined arms fire and maneuver. Operation Cast Lead showed that they 
learned from the Lebanon experience.  
Operation Cast Lead also shows the limited options a state has in dealing with committed 
adversaries with hybrid capabilities. Israel faced three broad military options when confronted with 
the continued rocket attacks from Gaza: 1) do nothing, 2) execute a large-scale operation to defeat 
Hamas (and own Gaza again), or 3) execute a limited operation to damage Hamas and deter it from 
future rocket launches. These options are not that different from those that the United States might 
face in future security environments. Indeed, Edward Luttwak and Martin van Creveld have both 
argued that Israel’s bombing during the Second Lebanon War did achieve the desired strategic effect 
of damaging and deterring Hezbollah. During Operation Cast Lead, Hezbollah stayed silent and 
even disavowed responsibility for a small number of rockets fired from Lebanon.36 Luttwak views 
this reliance on US/Israeli high-end capabilities as a solution for problems in the future, extending 
his argument to Afghanistan: 
The better and much cheaper alternative [in Afghanistan] would be to 
resurrect strategic bombing in a thoroughly new way by arming the 
Taliban's many enemies to the teeth and replacing US troops in 
Afghanistan with sporadic airstrikes. Whenever the Taliban 
concentrate in numbers to attack, they would be bombed. This would 
be a most imperfect solution. But it would end the costly futility of 
‘nation-building’ in a remote and unwelcoming land.37 
Nevertheless, what does seem clear is that America’s potential adversaries understand Western 
capabilities and are adapting. 
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What new concepts and doctrine for future warfare are emerging among current and prospective violent actors (both 
states and non-states) around the world?  
The United States has not faced the challenges posed by hybrid adversaries since the Vietnam War. 
The US military, largely like the IDF before 2006, has adapted its ground forces to irregular warfare, 
with the expectation that its dominance in high-end, air-centric warfare is what is needed for future 
high-end challenges. One should expect future adversaries to go to school on the 2006 Second 
Lebanon War and attempt to acquire standoff fire capabilities, both direct (e.g., ATGMs, 
MANPADS, and shore-to-ship missiles) and indirect (e.g., rockets and mortars), that are concealable 
in complex terrain, particularly urban areas among civilian populations, to complicate their 
acquisition and attack from the air. These adversaries also believe, rightly or wrongly, that the 
quickest way to unhinge the strategies of Western military states is by creating large numbers of 
casualties, capitalizing on mistakes (e.g., bombing the wrong target, killing noncombatants) in the 
media, and protracting conflicts.38  
These types of adversaries are also capable of creating difficulties for ground forces, because they 
will use standoff weapons to expand engagement areas far beyond what irregular adversaries with 
lesser weapons are capable of, thus making it difficult to close with them. If precision guidance 
becomes available for indirect-fire weapons (e.g., rockets and mortars), the standoff fires challenge 
will only become more dire and make adversary anti-access operations even more problematic. What 
is essentially a close combat fight of generally less than a kilometer against an irregular adversary 
becomes a five (or more) kilometer combined arms fire and maneuver fight to get to close combat 
ranges with a hybrid adversary. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
In closing, there are several key points about the IDF’s experiences with Hezbollah and Hamas that 
are relevant to the United States as it looks to the future. First, America’s potential adversaries are 
working to counter US strengths with asymmetric approaches. Second, non-state hybrid adversaries 
are combining state capabilities with irregular organizations. This is not necessarily new. There was a 
hybrid war in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War, pitting US forces against well-armed Viet 
Cong insurgents and North Vietnamese Army units, largely armed and supplied by Russia and 
China. Third, although hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon, we have not thought enough 
about how we are going to adapt our capabilities to deal with this problem, which is persistent for 
Israel and could become a problem for the United States and other nations. We have largely become 
a bipolar military: highly capable in irregular and state warfare, but with little recent experience “in 
the middle.” Fourth, the likely challenges the United States will face in the future will require highly 
integrated air-ground-ISR capabilities whose tailoring must be highly relevant to the specific enemy 
and operational context to be effective. What worked on the West Bank against the intifada did not 
work in Lebanon; what toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein did not bring stability to Iraq. 
Clearly, we need to continue to develop the joint doctrines, processes, organizations, and 
interservice and interagency relationships that will enable success across the full range of military 
challenges. 
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Introduction:  Emerging Global 
Trends   
 
In November 2008, the National 
Intelligence Council published Global 
Trends 2025:  A Transformed World, 
an unclassified assessment of long-term 
trends shaping the future geopolitical 
landscape.1  This study identified a 
number of emerging trends that will 
affect significantly the character and 
direction of the future security 
environment over the next 15 to 20 
years, including:   
 
• The current international system is 
being transformed into a global 
multipolar one where the gaps in 
national power between developed 
and developing countries will 
continue to narrow.   
 
• The relative power of non-state 
actors—businesses, tribes, religious 
organizations, and even criminal 
networks—will also increase. 
 
• The United States will remain the 
single most powerful country but 
will be less dominant in the future 
international system. 
 
• A shift in relative wealth and 
economic power roughly from West 
to East is underway, and the current 
economic crisis is accelerating a 
global economic rebalancing, 
creating considerable risk of 
instability for developing countries 
with large account deficits. 
 
 
                                                
1 The report is available at 
www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html.   
• Future global economic and 
population growth will put pressure 
on energy, food, and water resources.   
 
• Climate change is expected to 
exacerbate resource scarcities. 
 
• Asia, Africa, and Latin America will 
account for virtually all the 
population growth over the next 20 
years and states with significant 
youth-bulges, such as Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Yemen, will 
remain ripe for continued instability 
unless employment conditions in 
those states change dramatically. 
 
• Terrorism will likely continue, but its 
appeal could lessen if economic 
growth continues in the Middle East 
and youth unemployment is reduced.  
For those terrorists that remain 
active, the diffusion of technologies 
puts increasingly dangerous 
capabilities within reach. 
 
• Rapid changes in the Middle East, 
including nuclear proliferation and 
the spread of lethal capabilities, 
increase the potential for conflict.   
 
While the Global Trends report 
identifies these trends as relative 
certainties about the future, it also notes 
a number of key uncertainties that make 
it difficult to provide a single 
characterization of the future security 
environment.  The report concludes that 
a “rapidly changing international order 
at a time of growing geopolitical 
challenges increases the likelihood of 
discontinuities, shocks and surprises.  
No single outcome seems preordained.”   
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Two Critical Uncertainties about the 
Future   
Among the many uncertainties about the 
future, there are at least two that are 
critical to the character of the future 
global geopolitical environment about 
which we can now only speculate but 
which nonetheless will have a significant 
impact in the determination of the 
security challenges the United States 
will face in the future:  
 
• The future capacities of key states in 
international system, in terms of 
governance, political influence, 
wealth, and relative military power. 
 
• The future character of the 
international system and the 
relationships between major powers.   
 
The first uncertainty deals with the role 
of the nation-states in the future 
international system.  Specifically, will 
the leading nation-states have the 
capacity to manage the number of 
transnational challenges that are likely to 
emerge in the future or will a prolonged 
global economic downturn and an 
increasingly decentralized world erode 
their ability to cope with these 
challenges?  The second uncertainty 
questions the nature of the future 
international system itself.  Will, for 
example, the multiplicity of important 
actors add strength to the international 
system or will it fragment it, fostering 
competition and incapacitating 
international cooperation on key security 
challenges?   
 
These two uncertainties, depicted 
graphically on perpendicular axes, 
suggest a framework for conceptualizing 
alternative future security environments 
in 2025 and implications for US security 
interests (see figure on following page).  
In the upper right quadrant of our matrix, 
the Concert of Powers scenario 
postulates a multipolar security 
environment where the leading states 
cooperatively tackle transnational 
security challenges.  In the lower left 
quadrant, the Fragmented International 
System scenario describes an 
environment in which the diversity of 
key global actors leads to a disjointed, 
ineffectual approach to managing 
security challenges such as nuclear 
proliferation.   
 
In the lower right quadrant, the Rise of 
Non-state Networks describes an 
environment in which decreasing state 
capacity increases the difficulty for 
governments in managing issues such as 
resource scarcities, ethnic tensions, and 
income inequalities prompting nonstate 
networks to fill the vacuum.  Finally, the 
Return of Great Power Confrontation 
scenario postulates an environment in 
which emerging powers assert their 
growing political, economic, and 
military clout in a global competition for 
























• The Concert of Powers scenario describes a future where the growing number of powerful 
states strengthens the international community’s ability to deal with future security 
challenges, creating opportunities for the United States and its allies to forge new multilateral 
security partnerships. 
  
• The Fragmented International System scenario postulates a security environment in which 
the diffusion of global power makes it more difficult for the international community to 
achieve consensus on managing global security challenges such as nuclear proliferation, 
terrorism, and energy security.   
 
• The Rise of Non-state Networks scenario envisions a future in which the dispersion of power 
and authority away from nation-states gives rise to a myriad of security challenges involving 
sub-national and transnational entities.  
 
• In the Return of Great Power Confrontations scenario, the future security environment is 
defined by increasing competition between rising and status quo global powers for resources, 
markets, and influence.  
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Alternative Scenarios for the 
Future Security Environment  
 
The following scenarios describe 
alternative security narratives for world 
of 2025 depending upon which 
combination of trends identified in the 
Global Trends 2025 report come to 
dominate in the future international 
environment.  For each scenario the 
factors that would drive international 
developments towards that scenario are 
identified and the security challenges 
resulting from the scenario are 
discussed.   
 
• The following four scenarios are 
intended to illustrate—not to 
predict—how a range of security 
challenges might materialize in the 
future depending upon the interplay 
of emerging global trends.2 
 
Multilateral Security …  
In the Concert of Powers scenario, 
emerging and developed powers worked 
cooperatively in managing a variety of 
transnational security challenges.  This 
scenario postulates that the growing 
number of powerful states strengthens 
the international community’s ability to 
deal multilaterally with future security 
challenges.  In this scenario, the United 
States is one of a number important 
                                                
2 Many of the trends identified in Global Trends 
2025 report are present in each scenario but only 
in some scenarios do they result in significant 
security challenges.  Future demographic trends, 
indicating aging societies in many developed 
countries and significant youth populations in 
parts of the developing world, for example, are 
assumed in every scenario but are only assessed 
to create significant security challenges in 
scenarios where there are limited government 
capacities to address the societal needs and 
security issues resulting from these demographic 
changes.  
powers but its leadership remains critical 
in forging new multilateral security 
partnerships to tackle a variety of 
transnational security issues.  Such 
partnerships would likely not be formal 
strategic alliances but rather coalitions of 
key state powers agreeing to work 
cooperatively to address particular 
security issues such as peacekeeping, 
maritime security, and 
counterproliferation.  
 
• Current and recent examples of 
multilateral approaches to security 
challenges such as the Six-Party 
Talks, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, and the anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden 
become the models upon which 
future multinational security efforts 
are based in this scenario.   
 
Driving Trends.  The emergence of a 
multipolar world in which multilateral 
security cooperation becomes the norm 
would likely be preceded by the 
developments in the international system 
intended to successfully accommodate 
the strategic interests of rising global 
powers.  Multilateral institutions, such as 
the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund, in this scenario would 
adapt their structure and performance to 
accommodate the interests of emerging 
powers and the increasingly multipolar 
geopolitical environment.  Rising global 
powers, such as China, in turn would 
view their future economic well-being as 
tied to geopolitical stability incentivizing 
them to work cooperatively with the 
international community in addressing 
security challenges that could impact 
global economic growth.   
 
• This scenario assumes that potential 
sources of significant state 
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competition such as competition over 
access to energy resources are 
mitigated.  In this scenario, 
competition for energy resources 
ease as a result of new energy-
producing technologies, lower 
energy demand as a result of 
increased efficiencies, and the 
exploitation of newly discovered oil 
and gas fields that counterbalances 
the rising energy needs of rising 
powers such as China and India.   
 
• This scenario also postulates 
continued stability in key energy-
producing states, especially those in 
the Middle East.  A stable Middle 
East emerges in this scenario as a 
result of improving security 
conditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan; reduced levels of terrorism; 
international cooperation on 
containing nuclear weapons 
proliferation; and new educational, 
financial, and social policies that 
encourage higher levels of economic 
growth and employment in the 
region. 
 
• In this scenario Iran is dissuaded 
from pursuing destabilizing nuclear 
weapon capabilities by a 
combination of international 
diplomatic initiatives, technological 
impediments, an improved security 
environment, and the desire by 
Tehran to avoid political isolation 
and seek greater integration into the 
global economy.   
 
Key Security Issues.  US security 
challenges in this scenario are mainly 
defined by operations other than war 
and by the issues associated with 
changing foreign perceptions of the 
US role as a global security provider.  
The security environment of 2025 that 
emerges in this scenario is the most 
benign of the four presented in this paper 
in terms of direct threats to US and allied 
interests.  The accommodation of 
emerging powers into existing 
multilateral institutions and the 
incentives created for preserving global 
economic growth suggests the likelihood 
of significant interstate conflicts would 
remain low in this environment.  In 
addition, although terrorism would not 
completely disappear in this scenario, 
the threat it poses would be significantly 
diminished as a result of improved 
multilateral cooperation on counter-
terrorism activities and increased 
stability in the Middle East.  The 
growing divergence between rich and 
poor in this scenario does, however, 
create additional burdens for 
governments that could lead to societal 
disruptions and conflict if not managed 
effectively.  
 
• Global security challenges such as 
proliferation, terrorism, and energy 
security unite rather than divide the 
great powers in this scenario.   
 
• The primary requirement for 
employing US and allied military 
forces in this security environment 
would be in operations other than 
war, frequently as part of a 
multinational coalition.  
 
• This security environment would 
emphasize US and allied military 
capabilities for conducting 
humanitarian assistance, disaster 
relief, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations, non-
combatant evacuations, maritime 
security missions, counter-drug and 
counter-proliferation operations, and 
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security assistance, including 
training, to friendly foreign military 
forces.   
 
While traditional threats to US interests 
decrease in this scenario, the changes to 
the future geopolitical landscape that are 
postulated could have a profound impact 
on how the world perceives the future 
role of the US military and US security 
commitments.  As the international 
system adapts to accommodate rising 
powers there would likely be 
accompanying expectations by those 
powers for a greater role in addressing 
security interests within their own 
perceived spheres of influence.   
 
Or Competing Spheres of Influence?   
The Fragmented International System 
scenario postulates a security 
environment in which the diffusion of 
global power increases the difficulty for 
the international community in achieving 
consensus on how to manage global 
security challenges such as proliferation, 
terrorism, and energy security.  In 
addition, varied interests among the 
principal actors in a multipolar world 
increase competition and tensions as 
states seek to strengthen their own 
spheres of influence.  These dynamics 
result in a breakdown of the global order 
into regional and other blocs ushering in 
an era of slower economic growth and 
globalization and ineffectiveness in 
dealing with transnational security 
challenges.    
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario assumes 
that lagging economic growth and 
burden fatigue reduce the West’s 
capacity to manage wide-ranging global 
challenges while the quest for greater 
inclusiveness in existing international 
organizations increases the difficulty of 
achieving consensus on key security 
issues.  In this future, a prolonged global 
economic downturn leads to a loss of 
confidence in Western institutions 
resulting in rising powers exhibiting a 
higher degree of freedom in customizing 
their own policies.  This trend is 
reinforced by the inability of multilateral 
institutions to adapt sufficiently to 
accommodate the interests of emerging 
powers.  
 
• In this scenario, multinational 
forums, such as the G-20 process, 
unravel as their members become 
unwilling to make compromises that 
would allow consensus, resulting in a 
set back for multilateralism.   
 
• The challenges of aging societies in 
Western Europe and Japan drive 
budget allocations in those states in 
this scenario towards social and 
welfare programs and away from 
spending on defense and military 
operations, further eroding the 
West’s capacity to manage 
transnational security issues.   
 
• NATO faces increased challenges to 
its ability to mount sustained future 
security operations in this scenario 
resulting from financial and material 
burdens created by its long-term 
military commitment to Afghanistan 
and the demographic challenges and 
slow economic growth confronting 
many of its member countries.   
 
Competing security interests and lack of 
consensus on managing transnational 
security issues by the major state powers 
creates the conditions for further 
proliferation of nuclear and advanced 
conventional weapons capabilities in this 
scenario.  In addition, the challenges of 
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acquiring and maintaining modern 
conventional military capabilities in an 
era of limited economic resources causes 
some states to place increasing emphasis 
on nuclear weapons for deterring and 
responding to large-scale conventional 
military attacks.  
  
Key Security Issues.  Nuclear 
proliferation, shifting power dynamics, 
and potential for conflict in the Greater 
Middle East dominate US security 
interests in this scenario.  A breakdown 
of the international cooperation on 
proliferation that leads to a more 
proliferated world will likely have the 
greatest impact in the Middle East where 
Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon 
capability and the shift in the balance of 
power in the region raise the potential 
for conflict and further proliferation.  Of 
significant concern is that an Iranian 
nuclear weapon, or the perception by 
other countries that Iran has acquired a 
nuclear weapon capability, will 
embolden Iran and prompt a regional 
arms race or other military responses 
that destabilizes the region.   
 
Growing Irregular Warfare 
Challenges …   
The Rise of Non-state Networks 
scenario envisions a future security 
environment in which the dispersion of 
power and authority away from nation-
states gives rise to a myriad of security 
challenges involving sub-national and 
transnational entities.  The problem of 
coping with these “global troubles” 
including the spread of violent 
extremism, transnational terrorism and 
crime, food and water scarcities, failing 
states, and intrastate conflicts drives the 
future security agenda.   
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario 
postulates a prolonged global economic 
downturn and an increasingly 
decentralized world leading to the 
dispersion of power and authority away 
from nation-states and fostering the 
growth of sub-national and transnational 
entities.  While states generally seek to 
cooperate on security issues in this 
future they often lack the capacity alone 
to resolve persistent problems such as 
food and water scarcities, ethnic 
rivalries, poverty, and environmental 
degradation.  
 
• The United States continues to be 
called upon to be the primary 
provider of economic and security 
assistance to weakened governments 
in this environment because it is 
unclear if developing powers, such 
as China and India, are willing or 
able to take on this responsibility.   
 
Demographic trends indicate that 
significant portions of the populations in 
parts of Africa, the Middle East, and 
South and Southeast Asia will be less 
than 30 years old in 2025.3  These 
“youth bulges” combined with high 
unemployment, resource scarcities, and 
disruptive political successions increases 
the prospect for instability in this 
scenario.  The West Bank/Gaza, Iraq, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan will especially have large youth 
populations that in this scenario, where 
there is broad unemployment and 
insufficient government capacities, 
become ripe for fostering volatility and 
violence.  Nigeria, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and Ethiopia also experience 
rapid youth population growth and 
continuing civil conflict in this future.   
                                                
3 Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World; 
National Intelligence Council, November 2008. 




• A failure to achieve a two-state 
solution in this scenario places 
increasing domestic pressures on 
Israel as it tries to manage the 
security situation in the West Bank 
and Gaza where the combined 
population will grow to nearly six 
million, mostly youthful, people by 
2025.  In addition, Israeli Arabs, 
currently about a fifth of the 
population, will comprise nearly a 
quarter of Israel’s population by 
2025.4  
 
In this scenario, significant migration 
from rural to urban areas and from 
poorer to richer countries occurs and is 
fueled by a widening gap in economic 
and physical security in adjacent areas.  
By 2025, over half the world’s 
population lives in urban areas and 
another eight mega cities are created, 
most in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Muslims from Africa and the Middle 
East continue to migrate to Europe 
shifting the ethnic composition in many 
areas particularly around cities.  The 
lack of economic opportunities and 
difficulties in assimilating these 
immigrant communities in this future 
lead to increased tensions and episodes 
of violence reminiscent of the 2005 Paris 
suburban riots.  
 
• Migration and forced displacement 
are further prompted by significant 
climatic events, environmental 
degradation, and food and water 
scarcities as a result of changing 
climate conditions.   
 
The lack of capacity of many 
governments to manage sufficiently the 
                                                
4 Global Trends 2025:  A Transformed World; 
National Intelligence Council, November 2008. 
challenges in this scenario prompts the 
emergence of non-state networks to fill 
the vacuum.  Increasing 
interconnectedness, as a result of 
advancing communication and 
information technologies, enables 
individuals to coalesce around common 
causes across national boundaries.  In 
some situations these new networks act 
as forces for good by pressuring 
governments through non-violent means 
to address injustice, poverty, the impact 
of climate change and other social 
issues.  Other groups, however, use 
networks and global communications to 
proliferate radical ideologies, manipulate 
public opinion, recruit and train fighters 
for their cause, coordinate terrorist 
attacks, and organize criminal activities.   
 
• Turmoil and societal disruptions 
generated by resource scarcities, 
poor governance, ethnic and 
religious rivalries, and forced 
displacements of populations create 
conditions conducive to the spread of 
civil unrest, radicalism, terrorism, 
and insurgencies. 
 
• Diasporas, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), ethnic 
groups, religious organizations, and 
other non-state actors acquire 
significant power in this scenario and 
establish formal and informal 
relationships with states.  
 
• Transnational criminal networks 
grow in this scenario and expand 
their traditional involvement in 
narcotics trafficking to include 
managing global resources such as 
energy, minerals, and other strategic 
markets.    
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• Piracy continues to flourish along 
key maritime traffic routes adjacent 
to land areas lacking sufficient 
government and law enforcement 
capabilities such as in the Gulf of 
Aden.   
 
Key Security Issues:  The challenges 
posed by violent extremism, 
transnational terrorism and criminal 
networks, intrastate conflict, 
stabilization and reconstruction 
operations, failing states, and irregular 
forms of warfare dominate the US 
security agenda in this future.  This 
scenario suggests that many of the future 
security problems will emanate from 
parts of Africa, the Middle East, and 
South and Southeast Asia, and Central 
and South America and spread to other 
parts of the world via transnational 
networks.  The persistence and wide-
ranging character of these problems, 
however, threatens to create operational 
overload of military forces, especially 
US and allied ground forces that might 
be frequently called upon to respond to 
these security challenges, and 
engagement fatigue among the public of 
countries providing these forces.   
 
• This security environment 
emphasizes US and allied 
capabilities for conducting 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 
special operations, stability and 
reconstruction operations, urban 
conflict, critical infrastructure 
protection, and homeland security.   
 
Or High End Asymmetric Threats?   
In the Return of Great Power 
Confrontations scenario the future 
security environment is defined by 
increasing competition between rising 
and status quo global powers for 
resources, markets, and influence.  In 
some cases these competitions lead to 
interstate confrontations.  Although total 
war involving massed force-on-force 
military clashes among the great powers 
is still unlikely, conflicts involving 
limited military objectives and warfare 
through non-military means, such as 
information, economic and resource 
warfare, become more prevalent in this 
environment.   
 
Driving Trends.  This scenario 
postulates that future global economic 
growth leads to an unprecedented 
transfer of wealth and economic power 
roughly from West to East.  Existing 
international institutions, however, can 
not adapt successfully to the changing 
geopolitical landscape, leading to some 
countries to want to challenge the 
Western-led global order.   
 
• Emerging powers in this scenario 
increasingly lack confidence in 
global institutions such as the United 
Nations to resolve emerging security 
challenges and to protect their 
interests.  
 
• Lagging Western growth prompts 
protectionist measures against faster-
growing emerging powers leading to 
resentment and competition in the 
international system.   
 
Rising energy demands of growing 
populations and economies bring into 
question in this scenario the availability, 
reliability, and affordability of energy 
supplies.  Energy producers that scaled 
back investments in energy 
infrastructures during earlier economic 
downturns can no longer keep pace with 
rising demands as the global economy 
recovers.  Perceptions of energy scarcity 
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drive states to take actions to assure their 
future access to energy supplies.   
 
• Nationalist sentiments rise as states 
perceive themselves to be in an 
intense competition for influence, 
markets, and resources in this zero-
sum world. 
 
• New strategic relationships develop 
between energy deficient and energy 
rich states including increasing 
codependency of Russia and Europe 
over energy, Chinese efforts to 
strengthen political and security ties 
to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states, and growing Indian influence 
and involvement in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. 
 
• Middle East states, looking to 
diversify their security relationships 
and reduce their reliance on the 
United States, seek to increase their 
political and economic ties with 
Europe, China, Russia, and India 
leading to a strategic competition 
among several powers for influence 
and access to energy resources in the 
region. 
 
• China increases its political and 
security relations in this scenario 
with countries in the littoral areas 
adjacent to its key energy sea lines of 
communications, such as Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, to obtain 
their support for future Chinese 
naval operations in these areas. 
 
• Balance of power dynamics emerge 
in this future that resembles a 21st 
century replay of the years before 
1914 with major powers developing 
networks of friendly states through 
security arrangements, arms 
transfers, and economic relationships 
to secure their interests and constrain 
the actions of potential rivals.   
 
Evolving competitions for energy 
security are increasingly supported by 
military capabilities raising the potential 
for heightened tensions and even 
conflict.  In this scenario, for example, 
the leading powers use the benefits of 
their growing economies to engage in 
naval and military buildups and 
modernization efforts to protect critical 
economic assets and to secure access to 
energy resources prompting increased 
tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing.  
These buildups raise concerns about the 
future of maritime security in a zone 
extending from the Persian Gulf to East 
and Southeast Asia.   
 
• A naval arms race in Asia occurs in 
this scenario in response to China’s 
development of naval power 
projection, including the 
development of aircraft carriers and 
“anti-access” capabilities such as 
attack submarines and antiship 
ballistic missiles that become widely 
viewed as efforts by Beijing to 
extend its political influence in the 
region and to deter attempts to cut 
off China’s sea-borne energy 
supplies by threatening mutual 
disruption of sea trade as a 
consequence.  
 
• Different interpretations of maritime 
sovereignty and permissible activity 
by foreign vessels in Exclusive 
Economic Zones lead to future 
incidents at sea such as the March 
2009 incident between Chinese 
vessels and the USNS Impeccable in 
the South China Sea. 
 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 148
12 
 
• The Indian Ocean by 2025 becomes 
a common operating area for 
nuclear-armed submarines from 
several countries including India, 
China, and Pakistan that have only 
limited experience in conducting 
such patrols, increasing the risk of 
accidents or unintended incidents 
between and among naval powers in 
the region. 
 
• Mutual suspicions regarding the 
intentions behind naval build-ups by 
potential regional rivals and the 
establishment of maritime security 
alliances that exclude key players 
undermine efforts to achieve broad 
international cooperation on 
maritime security in this scenario.  
 
Key Security Issues.  The primary US 
security challenges in this scenario 
stem from foreign competition for 
strategic resources, markets and 
influence; military buildups and 
disputed assertions of sovereignty, and 
threats to access to the “global 
commons.”  Energy security is 
increasingly militarized in this scenario, 
and growing “resource nationalism” 
heightens interstate tensions and raises 
the potential for conflict over disputed 
energy resources.  To the extent that 
traditional security issues remain 
unresolved in this future, they now 
assume new political-security 
dimensions in the context of growing 
resource and military competitions 
among the major powers.   
 
Perceptions of energy scarcity might 
drive countries to take action to assure 
their future access to energy supplies. In 
the worst case, this could lead to 
interstate conflicts if government leaders 
deem assured access to energy resources 
to be essential to maintaining domestic 
stability and the survival of their regime.  
However, even actions short of war will 
have important geopolitical implications 
as states undertake strategies such as 
developing new alliances and building 
up naval capabilities to hedge against the 
possibility that existing energy supplies 
will not meet rising demands.  
 
• Advances in exploration and drilling 
technologies might create new 
opportunities to find and exploit 
previously unexplored ultra-deep oil 
fields.  Such fields, however, may be 
located in areas of contested 
ownership, such as Asia or the 
Arctic, creating the potential for 
conflict.   
 
• In May 2009, the Kremlin published 
a document regarding the national 
security of the Russian Federation 
until 2020.  It noted that the attention 
of international policy over the long 
term would be focused on sources of 
energy reserves and listed the Middle 
East, the shelf of the Barents Sea, 
other areas in the Arctic, the Caspian 
basin, and Central Asia as among 
those sources.  The document further 
stated that in the face of the 
competition for resources, the use of 
military force could not be 
excluded.5   
 
                                                
5 Strategy of National Security of the Russia 
Federation until 2020, http://www.scrf.gov.ru  
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